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This project derives a set of research expectations from the propaganda model, a
structural model of the corporate news media developed by Edward S. Herman and Noam
Chomsky. The model predicts that the news media will reflect elite views and priorities and
marginalize views outside the range of elite opinion. Consequently, it is expected that the media
will tend to support the elite’s preferred modes of exercising state power in international affairs.
This often entails demonizing official enemies of the United States in order to justify military
interventions while downplaying the crimes of the United States and its allies. To see how well
these expectations are borne out in recent times, I apply discourse and content analysis to a
sample of the New York Times’ coverage of Libya in the weeks preceding the 2011 NATO
intervention in Libya. Three research expectations are presented: Coverage will mirror the U.S.
government story line, conforming to the tenets of American exceptionalism; Muammar Gaddafi
will be demonized, the nature and extent of his crimes will be exaggerated; Gaddafi’s victims
will receive extensive, sympathetic coverage, while black Libyan victims of the anti-Gaddafi
opposition will be marginalized. The analysis of New York Times articles on Libya from
February 15 to March 19, 2011, shows that the research expectations are met, providing
empirical support for the propaganda model.
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Wenn getanzt wird will ich führen
auch wenn ihr euch alleine dreht
Lasst euch ein wenig kontrollieren
Ich zeige euch wie es richtig geht*
--Rammstein, “Amerika”

*

When there is dancing, I want to lead
Even if you are alone
Let yourselves be controlled a little
And I’ll show you how it really goes
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Many studies in the social sciences have documented news media subservience to the
elite classes in the United States. That is, it is very well established that the mainstream news
media often exhibit an elite bias, reflecting elite perspectives and priorities. This tendency has
been observed especially in the domain of foreign affairs and war reporting. For example, a very
large body of literature has demonstrated and criticized the American media’s subservience to
the George W. Bush’s Iraq war agenda, which was predicated on the lies that Iraq possessed
weapons of mass destruction and that Saddam Hussein had ties to al-Qaeda. In recent years, the
invasion of Iraq has been the stock-in-trade case of elite domination of the American news media
(see inter alia, Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston 2007; Boyd-Barrett 2004; Castells 2013;
DiMaggio 2009; Goss 2013; McChesney 2008.)
What has less often been the subject of inquiry, however, is elite bias in more recent
cases of American war-making. The case of Iraq was remarkable for the way in which the
American media establishment systematically failed to challenge the Bush administration’s case
for war, but it was by no means unusual. Just as remarkable, but less well known and less
frequently studied, is the case of Libya in 2011, when the Obama administration and NATO,
backed by certain Arab states, went to war against Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya. As much as
Bush’s case for the invasion of Iraq, this war was also predicated on a gross distortion of reality,
faithfully reproduced and disseminated by an obedient mass media (see especially, Forte 2012;
also Campbell 2013; Prashad 2012; and chapter 5 in the present work).
The purpose of this project is, in part, to explain why the media perform this way. I use
the case of Libya to “test” a political economy model of the mass media called the propaganda
2

model, developed by Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky. In brief, the model identifies five
characteristics of the corporate media—concentrated ownership and profit orientation; reliance
on advertising; dependence on official sources; flak (external pressure); and convergence in
dominant ideology—that cause the media to exhibit elite bias. The particular news outlet I
examine is the New York Times, held to be one of the world’s most exemplary newspapers. I
present a quantitative and qualitative analysis of its coverage of Libya between February 15 and
March 19, 2011, the dates marking the beginning of the popular uprising in Libya and the
beginning of the NATO intervention, respectively. The official research question, then, is as
follows: Does the New York Times coverage of the events precipitating the 2011 NATO
intervention in Libya support the predictions of the propaganda model? The general predictions
of the model are explained in chapter 2. Specific predictions regarding the Times’ coverage of
Libya are presented in chapter 3.
As a sociologist, this question is particularly interesting for a number of reasons. The
most obvious reason is that the media, and particularly the news, is one of the most important
institutions of socialization in modern societies. It is widely held to be one of the fundamental
components of free, democratic societies. If the media carry out a function that is contrary to
democratic principles and the operation of a free society, then this raises serious questions about
the fundamental nature of nominally democratic societies, about the prospects for the freedom of
expression, freedom of thought, freedom of the press, and so on. But the question is also of
interest because the social sciences have generally marginalized the propaganda model. If the
model is well-supported empirically, as I try to show in the literature review below, and as I try
to demonstrate with this study, then why is it marginalized? While this is not a question
addressed at length in this study, it may entail other challenging questions about the autonomy of
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academia vis-à-vis concentrated centers of power in the state and corporate sector, and the
influence these power centers exert on the intellectual classes of our society.
The purpose of this study, then, is to see how well the New York Times’ coverage of the
Libya conflict meets the expectations of the model. Empirical support for the model may serve to
elevate the salience of the model for sociologists interested in questions regarding the power of
the state and concentrated capital. The propaganda model may also be relevant to theoretical
discussions in sociology. Though Herman and Chomsky distanced themselves from such an
interpretation, the model comports with a materialist theory of ideology and social reproduction,
given that it relates the production of ideology in the media to the capitalist mode of production
and class interests associated with it. And insofar as the model may facilitate an understanding of
the social production of ideology, it may be of interest to sociologists of knowledge.
Finally, the historical case examined in this study—the buildup to the NATO intervention
in Libya—may be of value to lay readers and academics alike who are concerned about the role
of the United States in global affairs and may facilitate a deeper understanding of the nature of
American involvement in that conflict and in the world more generally.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON THE HERMAN-CHOMSKY PROPAGANDA MODEL
AND MAJOR COMPETING THEORIES
This project tests predictions about the corporate news media associated with Edward S.
Herman and Noam Chomsky’s propaganda model. In this section, I review the scholarly
literature on the model. I have also included a review of some major competing or alternative
models and theories of the news media. This latter part of the review is by no means exhaustive.
This is because spatial constraints require that due attention is given to the propaganda model
literature at the expense of a longer review of sociological theories of news. Therefore, I have
tried to select competing theories that are (a) most current, (b) developed by sociologists, and (c)
represent and build off the major theoretical contributions in this area of research. The chapter
will proceed as follows. I begin with a brief discussion of what Herman and Chomsky dubbed
the “standard view” of the news media, before turning to a review of competing theories, the first
of which advances the standard view. I then review a more plausible contribution before turning
to the literature about the propaganda model itself. The final section is a detailed exposition of
the propaganda model and a review of Herman and Chomsky’s major findings in Manufacturing
Consent.
The standard view about the news media is that privately owned (capitalist) news
corporations yield a market of news choices which express a wide range of ideas and
perspectives on the world. The public chooses from this market of news choices and thereby
determines which ideas and perspectives win out in the market of ideas, and which news
corporations succeed in the market of news commodities. State interference with this market
system is usually held to threaten the freedom of expression and objectivity that supposedly
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characterizes the commercial mass media, even if sometimes it is argued that state intervention
may be required to uphold freedom of speech (as in cases where the “right to respond” is
invoked). Because the news is objective and independent of political power, it serves a
democratic function by providing information about the political process to the general public,
who can then make informed decisions on the basis of this information. Variations of this view
are propagated in civics textbooks, by governments, apologists for media privatization, the
corporate media themselves, and the mainstream of scholarship. However, these conclusions are
not borne out by the evidence. A large body of critical scholarship (some of which is reviewed
below) refutes the idea that the news media are mostly independent of state and corporate
influence and refutes the idea that the public influences available news media content through the
market. This scholarship also renders untenable the claim that the mass media make available a
diverse range of public opinion. Thus, the standard view of the media is best thought of as an
ideology rather than a set of propositions that can be seriously entertained or supported with
evidence.
The scholarly literature shows that a number of variables associated with the capitalist
media system, such as concentrated ownership, reliance on government sources, and elite
ideologies, do influence the content of the news in a way that severely compromises the
independence and objectivity of the corporate media. In fact, most sources more or less agree
that the media tend to reflect elite perspectives and ideologies. Most media scholars also do not
doubt that this is due at least in part to the variables just mentioned. This is all true of mainstream
scholarship as well as critical scholarship usually associated with the left. Where these two broad
categories of research tend to disagree most is on the explanatory power or strength of these
variables relative to others. The mainstream of scholarship, associated with the standard view, is
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generally opposed to the idea that these and other variables impose structural constraints on the
output of the media, preferring instead explanations that emphasize the actions of individual
journalists, editors, and so on, and their professional commitments and intentions. This approach
is exemplified most recently in the work of Michael Schudson, a Columbia University professor
of journalism who specializes in the sociology of news.
News Media Theory
Michael Schudson’s Sociology of The News offers a sociological study of the institution
of journalism, which he defines as “information and commentary on contemporary affairs taken
to be publicly important” (Schudson 2011:7). Schudson does not offer any explicit theory or
model of journalism or the media, but he may be best classified as a proponent of the standard
view of the media, which maintains that the media present a range of perspectives that might be
found among the general public. His major positive claim about the media is that the news is
typically “(1) event-centered, action-centered, and person-centered; (2) negative; (3) detached;
(4) technical; (5) official” (Schudson 2011:41). Schudson dismisses the propaganda model and
theories that identify bias in the media, preferring instead the concept of news framing—
“principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what
exists, what happens, and what matters” (Schudson 2011:28). News framing is preferred to that
of news bias as an explanatory concept because it “diminishes the extent to which evidence of
selection can be automatically read as evidence of deceit, dissembling, or prejudice of individual
journalists,” and therefore “we accept the possibility that news might speak in more than one
voice” (Schudson 2011:30-01). Here, and elsewhere, Schudson focuses exclusively on the
intentions of individual journalists, creating a false dilemma in which it is apparently impossible
for bias to be systematic, rather than the intentional work of individual journalists or editors. The
7

possibility that actual “evidence of selection” and omission might indicate systematic bias,
notwithstanding the intentions of individuals, is not considered.
Focusing on individual journalists, Schudson maintains that they are “detached,” in that
“objectivity is [their] guiding principle, often religiously practiced” (Schudson 2011:43). Like
sports commentators, journalists focus on “technical” aspects of news events, relying primarily
on official, reliable sources (e.g., government officials) who can offer specialized technical
knowledge, though journalists are critical and distrustful of these sources at the same time. These
tendencies are the outcome of journalistic professionalism, which Schudson exalts throughout his
book. Indeed, the “genius” of American journalism is its symbiosis of professionalism and
commercialism (Schudson 2011:79). Professionalism in journalism became more firmly
entrenched after the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal, according to Schudson: these
events led to a “more critical and watchful press” (Schudson 2011:190), and a “skeptical, critical,
and aggressive accountability journalism” (Schudson 2011:227), as journalists came to be more
distrustful of deceitful politicians. Thus, journalists maintain an uneasy relationship with
politicians and other official sources on whom they depend for news; they cannot alienate their
sources with aggressive and critical reporting, but they must also remain “detached” and
somehow hold government officials accountable to the public, per their professional obligations.
So which tendency predominates? And which “little tacit theories” about the world
inform news content? Schudson’s presentation does not make this connection explicit, but an
answer to both questions is provided in the following statement: “In all political and economic
systems, news ‘coincides with’ and ‘reinforces’ the ‘definition of the political situation evolved
by the political elite.’ This basic generalization seems incontestable” (Schudson 2011:123). This
is a stark admission for Schudson, given his central claim that the news “speaks in more than one
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voice.” On another page, we learn more about the vocal range of the media: “the media give
voice to all major parties (if not small dissident groups) and provide the common informational
currency that alerts organized groups (if not unorganized and disaffected citizens) of political
decisions that will affect their interests” (my emphasis, Schudson 2011:200). How much of the
citizenry is “unorganized” and “disaffected” and what exactly these terms mean, are left
unspecified. But if it is reasonably assumed that this is any kind of a majority, then we can infer
from Schudson’s claims that the news “gives voice” mostly to the upper middle class and elite
sectors of society—at best.
In addition to reliance on official sources, Schudson recognizes two other major
institutional imperatives that shape the news: the need for profit, and pressure from advertisers.
As we will see, these variables are identified by Herman and Chomsky in their propaganda
model, though Schudson draws rather different conclusions about their function. Most news
production is subsidized by advertising revenues, Schudson correctly points out. This has a
disciplining effect on the media, which can be threatened by advertisers if they deem reporting as
offensive to their interests. But, according to Schudson, the beauty of the corporate system is that
in virtue of large capital accumulations, the major news organizations can shield themselves
from these threats, as they can afford to lose advertisers. To a limited extent, this may be true.
However, as Schudson also recognizes, corporate advertising is crucial to media survival insofar
as the media depend on selling audiences with buying power to advertisers. Thus, as a general
rule, large corporate advertisers will choose to sponsor the corporate media rather than working
class or radical publications. This tendency makes it extremely unlikely that capital
accumulation—and by extension, market competition—will entail a more critical news media
enterprise.
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Overall, then, Schudson’s sociology of the news is an ambivalent account of the social
construction of news. On one hand, he tries to sustain the standard view of the news as
independent and critical of the power centers of society, and the “voice” of diverse points of
view, while on the other he admits that the media marginalize dissent and reflect elite interests
and interpretations of the world. Furthermore, it is an old media myth that the Vietnam War and
Watergate led to a more defiant and independent media. Schudson points to reporting during the
later phase of the Vietnam War, Watergate, and the Iran-contra scandal as examples of an
adversarial press that challenges political authority. Yet, as Herman and Chomsky observe,
media commentary on these events all occurred within the bounds of elite consensus and
revealed, in their words, “exactly the opposite” of media independence and adversarial
journalism. As Herman and Chomsky show in Manufacturing Consent, the media did not turn
against the Vietnam War until a substantial portion of the business elite did, and well after the
United States had dramatically escalated the invasion, which the media faithfully supported
(Herman and Chomsky 2002:300-301). And while Watergate received much attention, a far
more significant government subversion program, COINTELPRO, which targeted the general
public, was revealed at approximately the same time, and received much less media attention
(Herman and Chomsky 2002:299-300). Then, whereas the Reagan administration’s
circumvention of congress during the Iran-contra affair was considered a scandal in the media,
the administration’s dismissal of the International Court of Justice ruling against the U.S. attack
against Nicaragua was not, nor was the administration’s support of the Contras prior to Irancontra revelations (Herman and Chomsky 2002:300). While I consider below what Schudson
offers as a response to Herman and Chomsky’s argument about these events, for now we will
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simply note that it is both indirect and based on a complete misunderstanding of their actual
claims regarding the media.
While Schudson’s reiteration of the myth of an adversarial press is no more persuasive
than it was three decades ago, he does admit that in the domain of foreign reporting “the press’s
objectivity weakens.” “Indeed,” Schudson concedes, “it weakened during the cold war in just the
direction Chomsky and Herman suggested—toward hypercritical reporting of communist
regimes and overly generous reporting of noncommunist authoritarian governments” (Schudson
2011:34). And, we might add, the statist and nationalist bias of the media’s foreign policy
reporting has continued unabated since the end of the Cold War, a fact that Schudson does not
explore, which is remarkable for a book written after the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. And, what
is more, elite bias has been identified in the domain of domestic news reporting as well (Herman
and Chomsky 2002:xli-xlvii). But even if the media failed to conform to the standard view only
with respect to foreign policy reporting, this reality alone seriously weakens Schudson’s central
claims in The Sociology of News, namely that the press are critical of power, and reflect a broad
range of public opinion.
Moving on to more critical scholarship, by far the most ambitious and comprehensive
sociological work on the media and communication politics is Manuel Castells’s Communication
Power. In this work, Castells attempts to show, among other things, where power lies in what he
calls the global network society (Castells 2013:42) and how this power is exercised. In the global
network society, according to Castells, “Power is primarily exercised by the construction of
meaning in the human mind through processes of communication enacted in global/local
multimedia networks of mass communication, including mass self-communication” (Castells
2013:417). Power, then, rests primarily in the networks of elites who control this communication
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system. Castells attempts to explain both how political messages are constructed by the media,
including the corporate news media, and how these messages are received by the public. For the
purposes of this review, however, I am only concerned with how well Castells does the former,
as this is the explanatory domain of the propaganda model. (That is, the propaganda model
makes only predictions about the content of the media, not how it is received by the public. See
the discussion below.)
Castells identifies several important mechanisms that shape the news, including agenda
setting, in which the media decide what topics are most important by covering them more
frequently; framing, in which events or issues are selectively covered so as to promote a certain
interpretation; indexing, in which the government is the most important source of information for
reporters and journalists; and the “cascading activation model” which describes a media
hierarchy in which the leading publications like The New York Times and The Wall Street
Journal are the agenda-setting news outlets, with the rest of the mass media tending to closely
adhere to their story lines and interpretive frameworks. As a consequence of these factors,
“Mainstream political elites wield the greatest control over news frames” (Castells 2013:163),
and the media frames will tend to conform to the spectrum of elite opinion. When political elites
are in agreement on a given matter, dissenting voices are barred from the media. These processes
led the mass media to faithfully disseminate the Bush II administration’s lies about Iraq in its
buildup to the 2003 invasion, with the consequence that a large majority of the U.S. population
believed the Bush administration propaganda.
The above-mentioned observations constitute the major strength of Castells’s sociology
of news production. But Castells also mentions at least three other important characteristics of
mass media companies: They are increasingly concentrated into fewer corporations (Castells
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2013:74); they are closely linked to the non-media corporate community through interlocking
directorates and outside investors (Castells 2013:93-94); and they try to maximize their
advertising revenue (Castells 2013:79). However, Castells never provides much in the way of
explanation of why these factors are politically significant, and the explanation he does provide
is quite limited. With respect to media concentration, Castells points out that corporate models of
news entail greater emphasis on popular entertainment at the expense of quality news coverage
and analysis—a fairly trivial observation. Concerning interlocking directorates, Castells says that
this “is not without consequence,” but never says what the consequences are. Then he claims that
the large financial institutions and venture capitalists on which the media depend “play no role in
the day-to-day operations of their media investments” (Castells 2013:94) though he does mention
in a footnote that “in 2007 Harbinger Capital Partners Funds and Firebrand private equity
partners used their leverage of 4.9% combined holding in the New York Times Company to
nominate four directors at the 2008 Annual Meeting” (Castells 2013:94). Again, the
consequences of such actions are not spelled out, and even though outside investors do not play a
direct role in the operations of media companies, they do exert pressure on the media by
threatening to sell off holdings and applying other disciplining measures. As for advertising,
Castells’s key observation is basically the trivial fact that the media depend on advertising
revenue (Castells 2013:95), again missing the more politically relevant point that advertisers can
also threaten the media by pulling advertising subsidies when they fail to tow the corporate or
government line.
By focusing on the Internet as the hoped-for palliative to the power the elite exercise
through their control of the media, Castells shifts attention away from a serious political
economy analysis of the media. As just demonstrated, the closer his analysis gets to identifying
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the profit orientation of the media as the mechanism driving media politics, the more superficial
it becomes. No one network, Castells argues, given their numerous interrelationships, can be
understood as being driven by a single “logic of value-making,” (e.g., the profit imperative) and
therefore, the question of classical political economy, “what is value?”, has no definite answer in
the network society (Castells 2013:28-9). But it is only by conflating exchange value, the actual
concern of classical political economy, with normative value, that Castells is able to make this
odd claim, as if the utility of political economy simply evaporated with the advance of electronic
communications (which, according to Castells, facilitated the rise of the global network society).
The military, state, and the media may have their own institutional priorities and operating
principles, as Castells suggests, but he does not explain why they all tend to converge around a
shared interest in preserving private property and promoting elite ideology. The starting point for
a political economy of the mass media is the observation that media companies are in fact profitseeking businesses, whatever their other “values”, and that this has definite consequences for
news production.
It is also curious that Castells does not mention Herman, Chomsky, or the propaganda
model in his book. Indeed, leading communications scholar, Robert McChesney, maintains that
Manufacturing Consent “remains the starting point for any serious inquiry into news media
performance” (McChesney 2008:287). Herman and Chomsky anticipate some of Castells’s
insights by about twenty years, and offer a simpler, more powerful explanatory model of news
production that is supported with more evidence. But, it should be noted, Castells, like Schudson,
conforms to a longstanding trend in mainstream academic literature of marginalizing Herman
and Chomsky’s work. The major theorists of the media Castells and Schudson cite—Entman,
Hallin, and Bennet, for instance—have all been critical, if not dismissive, of Herman and
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Chomsky’s work, and this in spite of the fact that their own research tends to support the
propaganda model (see Herring and Robinson [2003] for evidence and discussion of this trend).
The Propaganda Model and Its Critics
The propaganda model itself first appeared in Manufacturing Consent: The Political
Economy of the Mass Media, published in 1988. The book was based on some twenty years of
research and media criticism, some of which appeared in other books co-authored by Herman
and Chomsky, such as their two-volume Political Economy of Human Rights. While
Manufacturing Consent became an instant classic among left-leaning social activists and
dissidents, it received scarce attention from professional academics, and most of this attention
consisted of harsh reviews and casual dismissals. Few of these scholars seriously engaged with
the arguments and evidence Herman and Chomsky presented and many of them misinterpreted
their claims (Herman 2003; Pedro 2011a). This dominant trend in academia was not interrupted
until the early 2000’s, when a small group of sympathetic scholars began writing about the
propaganda model, holding conferences to discuss it, and carrying out research to verify its
empirical basis and test its claims. Most of these scholars are professors based in Europe.
Given the marginalization of the propaganda model in the mainstream academic
literature, it is worth considering in some detail the major criticisms that have been leveled
against it. If they are sound, then the propaganda model is probably not a useful framework for
explaining the performance of the news media. But if they are not, then perhaps the model is
worth considering for social scientists interested in understanding the media and power. Edward
S. Herman (2003) himself provided a useful taxonomy of criticism in which he responded to
these criticisms. They may be classified under the headings of (1) conspiracy theory, (2) failure
to consider the intentions of journalists, (3) failure to take account of media professionalism and
15

objectivity, and (4) the model is mechanical, deterministic, and ignores contestation of power by
journalists. I will also consider at length Schudson’s critique, as well as objections made with
regard to Herman and Chomsky’s methodology.
The claims that the model suggests a conspiracy are not supported by any evidence. Such
a claim was made by Robert Entman, among others, and has been refuted by both Herman and
Chomsky. Entman’s charge, in brief, was that Herman and Chomsky claimed the media
“consciously” design propaganda to serve state needs, a phrase they never used (Herman 2003).
Rather than a conspiracy, Herman says that “the media comprise numerous independent entities
that operate on the basis of common outlooks, incentives, and pressures from the market,
government, and internal organization forces” (Herman 2003). On the basis of these
observations, no conspiracy theory is required to explain elite bias in the corporate news media.
As for the failure to consider the intentions of journalists, Herman notes that he and Chomsky
did consult reporters, but generally “This line of criticism . . . is a diversionary ploy that
essentially denies the legitimacy of a quantitative (or scientific) analysis of media performance”
(Herman 2003). Reporters may or may not be aware of pressure to conform to official
propaganda lines, but this is a different question; the propaganda model is concerned with
institutional tendencies. A related critique, leveled by Daniel Hallin, that the propaganda model
fails to account for the values of impartiality and objectivity associated with professional
journalism, also does not pass muster. As Herman points out, professionalism in journalism arose
as a way for press owners to give their publications a seal of legitimacy in an era when they were
under increasing scrutiny for failing to represent the views of the general public (see also
McChesney 2008). Professionalism, Herman notes, “has also internalized some of the
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commercial values that media owners hold most dear, like relying on inexpensive official
sources as the credible news source” (Herman 2003).
The critique that the model is mechanical and deterministic and ignores the fact that
journalists and reporters do challenge elite frames has been made by Philip Schlesinger (1989),
James Curran, Peter Golding, Graham Murdock, John Eldridge, and Daniel Hallin, all leading
writers in the academic mainstream. Schlesinger’s review, Herman says, was the only one to
summarize the propaganda model and discuss Herman and Chomsky’s evidence. Schlesinger
criticized the model for not explaining the relative weights of each filter, and held that it was
deterministic. Herman’s response to the latter point is worth quoting at length:
Any model involves deterministic elements, so that this criticism is a straw person
unless the critics also show that the system is not logically consistent, operates on
false premises, or that the predictive power of the determining variables is poor.
The critics acknowledge that the case studies we present are powerful, but they
don’t show where the alleged determinism leads to error nor do they offer or point
to alternative models that would do a better job. (Herman 2003)
Elsewhere, Herman and Chomsky have pointed out that the weights of the filters can only be
determined on a case-by-case basis. Herman also notes that the propaganda model “deals with
extraordinarily complex sets of events, and only claims to offer a broad framework of analysis, a
first approximation, that requires modification depending on local and special factors, and that
may be entirely inapplicable in some cases” (Herman 2003). Finally, Herman and Chomsky do
not doubt that reporters and journalists may challenge government narratives; but, consistent
with an indexing hypothesis, they claim that this will tend to happen within the bounds of elite
consensus. They also make the point that media are not monolithic and the model is not all
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powerful. The implication is that the model describes strong tendencies and reporting may on
rare occasions challenge elite frames.
Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang, two sociologists specializing in media, added several
criticisms of Manufacturing Consent (Lang and Lang 2004a; 2004b). The Langs’ critique of
Herman and Chomsky’s case studies foundered on their lack of familiarity with the facts, as
Chomsky and Herman made apparent in their reply (Chomsky and Herman 2004) in the same
journal. For example, in criticizing Herman and Chomsky’s methodology, the Langs argued that
Central America was consistently underreported in the 1980’s, providing an alternative
explanation for the media’s more extensive coverage of the killing of Jerzy Popieluszko in
Poland than the killing of 100 religious people in Central American, including Oscar Romero.
But Herman and Chomsky point out that Central America was in fact extensively covered in the
1980’s, and generally El Salvador alone received as much coverage as Poland. Unfamiliarity
with—if not a selective reading of—Manufacturing Consent was also obvious in their critique of
Herman and Chomsky’s method of analyzing the media’s application of the term “genocide”.
The Langs claimed, falsely, that Herman and Chomsky only used quantitative measures of the
use of the term, whereas in fact, the latter also implemented qualitative analyses. Also of interest
was the claim that Herman and Chomsky provided no criteria for choosing case studies and that
they chose cases and data which demonstrated the political points they wanted to make (a point
which Herman and Chomsky also address in the concluding chapter of Manufacturing Consent).
Herman and Chomsky point out in their reply that the cases they chose were important in and of
themselves, receiving ample coverage in the news media (e.g., the Vietnam War, wars in Central
America, etc.), and filtered according to the predictions of the propaganda model. Furthermore,
they reply: “If our model works well in these cases, it has proved its value, whatever our process
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of selection” (Chomsky and Herman 2004:105). The number of cases Herman and Chomsky
have addressed is sufficient to demonstrate a significant tendency. (I address these
methodological concerns in more detail in chapter 4).
Finally, let us return to Schudson and his critique of Manufacturing Consent. As it is
more recent than those critiques addressed above, it is worth seeing if it offers any original
argument against the validity of the propaganda model. “Some scholars,” Schudson laments,
“persist in emphasizing the media’s uniformity, which derives from its role as a necessary
component of advancing the interests of corporate capitalism” (Schudson 2011:31). “To these
critics, every apparent sign of debate or controversy merely covers up a deeper uniformity of
views” (Schudson 2011:31). For Herman and Chomsky, he continues, “the New York Times is no
better than Pravda, the propagandist official newspaper of the Soviet Union. The state is
apparently little more than a front for the ruling class. This is a misleading and mischievous
stance” (Schudson 2011:31). The first reason offered for this characterization is that the New
York Times and Pravda comprised different institutional structures with different relationships to
the state, and that Times journalists “almost always embrace professional ethics” (Schudson
2011:32). Furthermore, media owners “rarely seek to use the news as a soapbox for their own
political views of whatever political orthodoxy they subscribe to,” (Schudson 2011:32) with the
exception of FOX, MSNBC, and so on. The other three reasons Herman and Chomsky are
“misleading and mischievous” are because there is, in fact, a “vital arena of legitimate
controversy in the United States” (Schudson 2011:32), as in Schudson’s example, between the
Republican and Democratic parties; because “there are multiple voices in the American news
media” (Schudson 2011:33), as demonstrated by numerous examples of media scandals such as
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the My Lai massacre, Iran-contra affair, and so on; and lastly, because the media must remain
credible with the general public, particularly “critical subgroups” in Washington, D.C.
Let us consider each sub-argument. First, Herman and Chomsky’s remarks about Pravda
and comparisons of the American media to it, suggest that the American media served similar
social functions to Pravda, and that the publications were probably both bound by similar kinds
of nationalist ideology and self-serving arguments. They would surely acknowledge that the
institutional structures were different, but maintain that the propaganda functions were
nevertheless similar. And as discussed above, the focus on individual journalists and
professionalism is irrelevant when the object of study is systematic bias. Furthermore, Herman
and Chomsky nowhere claim that owners use the media as their “soapbox”; again, they
document and try to explain institutional tendencies. Next, concerning the “vital arena of
legitimate controversy,” this claim is entirely consistent with that made by Herman and
Chomsky. They maintain that debate in the media will occur within the limits set by “legitimate
controversy” among elites; the media will represent the range of elite opinion, as Schudson
basically accedes in his book. Next, the argument regarding “multiple voices” is directed at a
straw person. Schudson’s overarching argument in this section of the book is that there are
“multiple voices” represented in the media, which offer differential criticisms of government
policy, rather than uniform support. But if the argument is contra Herman and Chomsky, it is
misdirected, because they do not disagree with this claim in the first place. And if media
commentary on the Vietnam War (including the My Lai massacre), Watergate, and the Irancontra affair do not support Herman and Chomsky’s claims on this score, why not? Schudson
does not say. Finally, it may be problematic for Schudson’s last argument that the media do not,
in fact, maintain credibility with the general public, with only 40 percent of Americans trusting
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the media in 2015 (Riffkin 2015). Moreover, the “critical subgroups” in Washington D.C. that
the media must be sensitive to, represent organized elite opinion, as Herman and Chomsky
discuss in Manufacturing Consent.
This overview exhausts the more serious criticisms of the propaganda model that I am
aware of. It is of some interest that most of the researchers who have criticized and dismissed the
utility of the model also have not actually disputed the operation of the filters or the quality of
the evidence offered by Herman and Chomsky. To quote Lang and Engel Lang (2004a), for
example, “few [communications and media scholars] would seriously dispute the existence of
such filters or Chomsky’s contention that they ‘narrow the range of news that passes through the
gates and even more sharply limit what can become “big news” subject to sustained news
campaigns’.” And as we have seen in the case of Schudson, mainstream scholarly criticism of
the propaganda model is based on misunderstandings, fallacious arguments, and an
unwillingness to engage with substantive claims and evidence. Moreover, as mentioned, much of
the critics’ own research augments the propaganda model. For these reasons, Herring and
Robinson (2003) conclude that the marginalization of Chomsky and Herman’s work in academia
is ideological, not scientific.
Supporting Literature on the Propaganda Model
This conclusion is in fact consistent with the “second order prediction” of the propaganda
model, that, to quote Chomsky, “If invalid, it may be dismissed; if valid it will be dismissed” by
mainstream intellectual culture. “The general prediction, at each level, is that what enters the
mainstream will support the needs of established power” (Chomsky quoted in Mullen 2010:677).
Andrew Mullen (2010) sought to test this claim, finding that “Since its publication in 1988 the
PM [propaganda model] has received very little attention within the field of media and
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communication studies, the wider social sciences or the media” (Mullen 2010:677). Surveying
articles in ten media and communications journals over the period of 1988 to 2007, he found that
only 2.6 percent of 3,053 articles on media theory and media practice addressed the propaganda
model. “This,” he adds, “is despite the fact that, certainly as far as the theoretical articles were
concerned, attention to the work of James Curren, Jürgen Habermas, Stuart Hall, Daniel Hallin,
etc. was standard” (Mullen 2010:679). Furthermore, Mullen documents that of 43 media and
communications text books published over the same period, 21 books (43.8 percent) did not
mention the propaganda model, 16 (33.3 percent) only included it in the bibliographies, and only
11 (22.9 percent) engaged with it substantively.
Andrew Mullen and Jeffery Klaehn were early leaders among the new generation of
scholars who began to study and utilize the propaganda model in the early 2000’s. Klaehn edited
a book containing a series of essays which discussed and implemented the propaganda model for
empirical studies (ed. Klaehn 2005) in addition to publishing other articles (Klaehn 2002a;
2002b; 2009), two coauthored with Mullen (Kleahn and Mullen 2010a; 2010b). Among these
articles and essays were some important and original research contributions. For example,
Klaehn analyzed the Canadian media’s coverage of the genocide in East Timor, where Canada
had economic and geopolitical interests, finding that the media minimized the genocide and
downplayed Canada’s role. Many of Klaehn’s other articles are exploratory in character and
contain similar content describing the model, discussing what has been said about it,
methodology, and suggestions for further research; they do not advance an understanding of the
model beyond what Herman and Chomsky have already written about it. Communications
professors Joan Pedro and Brian Michael Goss have more recently made important contributions,
both on the empirical foundations of the model’s filters, as well as original case studies
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demonstrating its continued relevance as an analytic tool. And though space does not permit a
complete review of this work, several other authors have also used the propaganda model as a
framework of analysis: Anderson and Kincaid (2013); Boyd-Barrett (2004); Dowler (2004);
Good (2008); and Dolan, Johnson, and Sonnett (2011).
Summarizing these contributions, Anderson and Kincaid (2013) applied the propaganda
model to samples of The Daily Show and The Colbert Report, finding that the content of these
satirical television programs usually reproduced hegemonic discourses, though also challenging
elite ideology in limited respects, mainly by alluding to the mainstream media’s propaganda
function. Boyd-Barrett’s 2004 article, discussed more below, showed how media coverage of the
second Gulf War comported with the predictions of the propaganda model. Dowler (2004) used
the propaganda model to analyze American and Canadian news coverage of crime, finding that
in both cases, the media reproduced traditional elite attitudes about crime and punishment by
marginalizing white collar crime and focusing on street crime. Good (2008) used the propaganda
model to analyze how international newspapers covered climate change, finding that they tended
to downplay the connection between climate change, extreme weather consequences, and the oil
industry. Dolan, Johnson, and Sonnett (2011) showed how racism operates in conjunction with
the class structure identified by the propaganda model, leading to television broadcast coverage
of Hurricane Katrina that marginalized the opinions of blacks and reflected white middle-class
perspectives, even though blacks figured prominently as subjects in reporting and had a large
presence in New Orleans after the hurricane.
Pedro’s 2011 two-part article, “The Propaganda Model in the Early 21st Century”
provides an authoritative literature review, an overview of the model with more contemporary
supporting evidence, a discussion of its applicability to countries other than the United States,
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validity in explaining news content on the Internet, and the plausibility of adding other filters to
the model. Goss’s 2013 Rebooting the Herman & Chomsky Propaganda Model in the TwentyFirst Century provides several original paired case studies which provide further empirical
support for the propaganda model, recent data supporting the existence of the model’s filters, and
a discussion of the role of the Internet. Goss has also written a separate article on the flak
machine, Accuracy in Media (Goss 2007). These works, along with the contributions of Klaehn,
Mullen and others, have demonstrated the continued relevance of the propaganda model in the
twenty-first century. In the remainder of this section I discuss important findings in the work of
Pedro and Goss.
Concerning the validity of the model in countries other than the United States, Pedro
notes that researchers have successfully tested the propaganda model in the U.K. (Robertson
2006), Canada (Klaehn 2005), Spain (Sierra and Vazquez 2006), and Australia (Baker 2007).
Pedro cites one interesting study which showed that the Scandinavian “public service model” of
the media, differentiated from market-driven models, yields a news media system that focuses
more attention on public and international affairs, and results in a more even distribution of
knowledge across the domestic population. On the international scope of the model, then, Pedro
concludes
that the filtration process also occurs in other countries with mostly
private/corporate media, although the filters may not be as fully developed as they
are in the United States, and the political, cultural, and ideological environment
may be somewhat more open (depending on the country). This confirms the
consistency of the PM [propaganda model], as it demonstrates that there is a
causal relationship between a weaker system of filters and a rather more open and
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varied spectrum of opinion. In the few countries (Scandinavian) where the
predominant model is a public service media system that is less exposed to market
forces, media content is aimed at fulfilling a more positive social role. All of this
suggests that the PM will be applicable to other advanced capitalist democracies,
given the similar institutional arrangements. (Pedro 2011b:1911)
Adding to this body of comparative research, and reinforcing Pedro’s conclusion, Goss
(2013) demonstrated that the London Guardian, which is partly subsidized by a trust, and
therefore less subject to the filtering mechanisms of the propaganda model, differed
quantitatively and qualitatively in its coverage of the 2011 London riots from the London Daily
Telegraph, which has a conventional corporate ownership structure. The Telegraph engaged in a
process of othering and demonizing the rioters, while the Guardian investigated the social,
political, and economic context of the riots, and offered more coverage than the Telegraph.
With regard to the Internet and whether or not the propaganda model can be used to
explain its content and operation, Pedro’s basic conclusion is that “the advent of the Internet has
done little to change the type of information presented by corporate mainstream media, [and] the
PM [propaganda model] continues to be perfectly valid for the description of online mainstream
news production” (Pedro 2011b:1912). And “while the Internet is used for the empowerment of
grassroots and protest movements, it is also increasingly being shaped and controlled by
corporations, and used by political parties, reactionary forces, and even criminal groups for
social control” (Pedro 2011b:1911). As one example of such state-corporate tampering, Pedro
mentions the important case of WikiLeaks, which has been subject to government attacks and
attempts by major corporations to stall its operations.
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Other relevant facts concerning news on the Internet are discussed by Goss (2013:537;167-194). In particular, he points out that the corporate news publications dominate Internet
news in terms of viewership, which vastly outstrips that of blogs. Citing Eli Noam’s work on
media concentration, Goss reports that “Seventeen of the 25 most visited online news sites are
organs of incumbent news firms. The four most visited sites (CNN, Yahoo!, MSNBS, AOL)
account for more than half of all news-seeking by online readers” (Goss 2013:56). Moreover, as
some successful blogs, such as Daily Kos, have come to resemble traditional news publications,
requiring dedicated staff and incurring greater expenses, they are likely to become more
constrained by the ownership and advertising filters of the traditional media. Furthermore,
according to Goss, the Internet creates an interesting paradox: Because Internet advertising
revenues are much lower than that of the print media, while Internet news viewership has
increased and print subscriptions have declined, the major publishers are increasing viewership,
but with less revenue. It turns out, then, that the Internet is actually reinforcing some of the
filtering mechanisms of the propaganda model.
As reviewed by Pedro (2011b), a number of writers have suggested modifications or
updates to the propaganda model in the form of additional filters. In this discussion, Pedro
includes criticisms of the model to the effect that Herman and Chomsky neglected important
factors that influence news production, such as the role of journalists and journalistic
professionalism. As I have already addressed these criticisms, I will simply note that Pedro
thinks these two factors should be thought of as “secondary filters” which operate under the
constraint of the five primary filters. A more constructive critique, formulated by Sparks (2007),
that the model does not account for the important role of the audience in shaping news content,
suggests that the role of the audience should be included as a “sub-filter,” according to Pedro.
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Because the news media is in the business of selling audiences to advertisers (Herman and
Chomsky 2002:16) the news must be presented in a way that is appealing to different audience
segments. This explains some of the substantive and ideological differences between partisan
media (FOX, MSNBC, etc.), mainstream liberal media, and the business press. “However,”
Pedro notes, “the overall effect of the filters is the imposition of restrictions on what can and
cannot be offered, regardless of what may interest the audience. While the elite are able to
influence the media, the audience doesn’t have the adequate or effective mechanisms to make
requests or demands. The audience generally chooses between the products that the media decide
to offer” (Pedro 2011b:1919). All corporate news media are subject to certain constraints, as
described by the propaganda model.
Pedro discusses two other possible extensions of the propaganda model. One is
technology, a sixth filter proposed by Vanderlinder (in Pedro 2011b). Pedro summarizes
Vanderlinder’s discussion of technology and media: “The technology of the medium imposes
various limitations and constraints on the production and dissemination of news, influences the
number of possible recipients, serves to create time-space reconfigurations, affects style, and
leaves its mark on the culture of journalistic practice” (Pedro 2011b:2010-11). Contrawise, Pedro
argues, in effect, that as technology is socially neutral, (i.e., a given technology can be utilized
for the benefit one or another social group, depending on which group controls it), what is more
important is whose interests are served by it. Technology, therefore, is best thought of as a
secondary filter. The last proposed extension of the model concerns the direct or purchased
influence of the elite. Boyd-Barrett (2004) has offered evidence of large scale CIA penetration of
the mainstream news media, in which the CIA bankrolled journalists. While it should be noted
that Boyd-Barrett’s article is an important contribution, Pedro points out that this element was in
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fact discussed under the heading of news sourcing in Manufacturing Consent, and is therefore
already encompassed by the model.
The Propaganda Model
We turn now to the propaganda model itself and what it is, as described by Herman and
Chomsky. I have also included discussion of more recent research findings that support Herman
and Chomsky’s original formulation.
The propaganda model is a structural model of the news media in capitalist political
economies. It describes the major forces that influence news production and explains how these
forces cause the news media to function as a propaganda distribution system for the elite classes
of society, biasing the news according to elite interests (Herman and Chomsky 2002:lix-lx). The
model also engenders a series of predictions about patterns that will emerge in news output
which exhibit this elite bias.
Two important key terms, propaganda and elite, merit some explanation. Here,
“propaganda” refers to news that is oriented primarily toward the social reproduction of the class
system and capitalist political economy (Pedro 2011a:1866). Keeping to Pedro’s definitions, by
“elite” we mean “members of the upper social classes, who enjoy a privileged status in power
relations. In particular, it refers to those who hold financial-economic power, political-state
power, and military power, although it is not limited exclusively to these three sectors” (Pedro
2011a:1865-1866). Thus, the propaganda model describes the structural factors that enable those
who own and control the news media to use it as a mechanism for social control, for the
reproduction and maintenance of a definite social and political order in which they have vested
interests. It is important to note, however, that the propaganda model makes no predictions or
claims about the actual success of the media in performing this function. The major claim is
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simply that this social control is in fact one of the major functional purposes of the news media,
whether or not it is effective.
Crude state intervention is not necessary for the media to carry out this function. Rather,
the model explains media subservience to state and corporate power largely as an outcome of the
corporate structure of media companies and their integration into the economy. Media owners
and shareholders preselect “right-thinking” people to fill management, editorial, reporter and
other positions which facilitates ideological uniformity throughout the institution and throughout
the industry (Herman and Chomsky 2002:lx). Herman and Chomsky maintain that “Censorship
is largely self-censorship, by reporters and commentators who adjust to the realities of source
and media organizational requirements, and by people at higher levels within media
organizations who are chosen to implement, and have usually internalized, the constraints
imposed by proprietary and other market and governmental centers of powers” (Herman and
Chomsky 2002:lx). However, certain powerful agents do exert more or less direct pressure on the
media to conform to elite preferences (Herman and Chomsky 2002:lx), as discussed below.
The propaganda model predicts that the corporate news will tend to reflect only the range
of elite opinion on the issues where elite interests are at stake (Herman 2003). Thus, coverage of
issues that fall outside the most salient concerns of elites, such as abortion rights, gun control, or
school prayer (Herman 2003), will express a range of opinions and views that may reflect more
closely those of the general public. Debate will also emerge in the corporate media on issues
over which there is disagreement among the elite themselves. But where there is a strong elite
consensus on a given topic, perspectives and opinions that fall outside of this consensus will tend
to be filtered out. Therefore, private property and the associated organizing principles of liberal
economics will not be questioned by the mass media. Or that the frequent U.S. military
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interventions are anything but well-intentioned or that they are simply wrong—as opposed to
merely strategically flawed, too costly, or mistaken—are positions that tend to go unexplored.
The original propaganda model, as formulated by Herman and Chomsky, is composed of
five “filters” through which news must pass before it can be “fit to print.” In more concrete
terms, these filters describe different structural constraints on the output of the media.
Subsequent writers have proposed additional filters to strengthen the model, but in accord with
Pedro’s assessment, these additional filters are best understood as being encompassed by the
original five. The model, therefore, remains adequate in its original formulation, with some slight
modifications that are necessary to reflect important historical developments. The filters are (1)
size, ownership, and profit orientation of the mass media, (2) advertising as the primary source of
revenue, (3) dependence on official sources, (4) flak, and (5) convergence in the dominant
ideology (Pedro 2011a:1888), (formerly, anti-communism).
Size, Ownership, and Profit Orientation of the Mass Media
The first filter is size, ownership, and profit orientation of the mass media (Herman and
Chomsky 2002:3). With major technological innovations in print production and the associated
rise in capital costs, by the end of the nineteenth century significant economic barriers had been
erected to entry into newspaper markets, which meant only the most wealthy entrepreneurs could
afford to participate (Herman and Chomsky 2002:3-4). This process eventually led to the decline
of the radical and working-class press as a ubiquitous news medium and ensured elite hegemony
over mass media with any substantial readership. Thus, in free market capitalist economies, the
most widely available news mediums are owned and controlled by people drawn from elite
social classes. In the propaganda model this is held to be an important structural feature of the
media that influences and shapes the content of the news.
30

As the mass media outlets themselves are corporate business enterprises, and increasingly
integrated into the stock market and dependent on outside investment, their owners and managers
must focus increasingly on the profitability of the firm. In conjunction with the size of the media
companies, this creates competitive pressure which has engendered buyouts and mergers of
major media firms, leading to increasingly concentrated ownership of the mass media. Herman
and Chomsky maintain that this concentration of media resources creates a tiered mass media,
with the largest and most prestigious firms setting the news agenda for smaller media companies,
which may lack foreign correspondents and have fewer reporters and staff. “It is this top tier,
along with the government and wire services, that defines the news agenda and supplies much of
the national and international news to the lower tiers of the media, and thus for the general
public” (Herman and Chomsky 2002:4-5). They also note that in 1988 the four major Western
wire services accounted for approximately 80% of the global international news. The American
wire services (AP, UPI) compete, and, dependent mostly on the American market for survival,
are subject to the same domestic pressure to reflect elite perspectives as the rest of the media.
In addition to stock market integration and pressure from investors to focus on the bottom
line, the large mass media corporations are tightly integrated into the greater corporate
community through their boards of directors and parent companies. Outside directors from other
corporations express their own interests through media directorships, as do board members and
the managers of parent companies. Thus, shared interests of the capitalist class as a whole
converge in the mass media through intercorporate links. The media also do business with and
depend on major financial institutions for capital investment. “These holdings, individually and
collectively, do not convey control, but these large investors can make themselves heard, and
their actions can affect the welfare of the companies and their managers. If the managers fail to
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pursue actions that favor shareholder returns, institutional investors will be inclined to sell the
stock (depressing its prices), or to listen sympathetically to outsiders contemplating takeovers”
(Herman and Chomsky 2002:11).
Ownership of the mass media by major non-media corporations, or conglomeration, is
another important structural feature of the mass media. It often puts media corporations in a
dubious relationship with controversial industries such as armaments, nuclear weapons
production, the food industry, the oil industry, and the real estate industry (Pedro 2011a:1877).
Pedro (2011a:1878) notes that increased conglomeration has also entailed greater financialization
of the mass media, in which the media have become more dependent on the financial sector and
responsive to its imperatives.
Finally, Herman and Chomsky point out that the mass media depend on the government
for licensing and “general policy support,” and maintain important ties to government officials
and politicians. Media outlets which fail to placate the government or are critical of government
policy orientation can be threatened. Outside directors often comprise former government
officials in a revolving door of regulators and media officials. Media companies also lobby on
behalf of their interests to congress. Outside of lobbying, policy support also includes subsidies
for nuclear and military production, as in the case of Westinghouse and GE, major media
conglomerates, in addition to dependence on and support for government policies that are
directed at penetrating markets overseas for both media and non-media products.
The first filter, then, describes how the position of the corporate media in an advanced
capitalist political economy subjects the mass media industry to market forces which limit
ownership to the very wealthy; reinforces a profit-maximizing corporate model; concentrates
ownership of the majority of media outlets into a handful of mega-corporations; links the mass
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media closely to the financial-corporate sector and the government and military; and through all
these factors, directs the social-political orientation and commitments of the mass media toward
elite priorities and away from popular concerns of the general public that are at odds with the
profit imperative and government policy.
Dependence on Advertising Revenue or the Advertising License to do Business
As corporate advertising subsidies became essential to lowering the price of a print copy,
newspapers that could not procure such advertising were automatically at a disadvantage in the
market. In addition to the increased capital costs associated with large-scale print operations, the
failure to obtain corporate advertising also contributed to the decline of the British working-class
press. Herman and Chomsky argue that “With advertising, the free market does not yield a
neutral system in which final buyer choice decides. The advertisers’ choices influence media
prosperity and survival” (Herman and Chomsky 2002:14). Advertisers’ choices, in turn, are
politically motivated. Corporations want to advertise their products to segments of the public
with purchasing power. Herman and Chomsky maintain that readers of radical and working-class
publications tend to be drawn from lower social strata, biasing the advertisers’ choices in favor
of the large corporate media and wealthy audiences. Moreover, corporations do not want to
advertise in publications or fund television programs that interfere with the “buying mood” by
exposing corporate ties to Third World dictators, for example, or state crimes. Thus corporate
advertisers tend to promote a conservative news agenda.
The fact that advertisers can and do pull funding for papers or television programs has a
disciplining effect on the media such that the influence of this filter occurs without any direct
pressure or threat from advertisers (see also Pedro 2011a:1881). But several examples of such
withdrawals of funding are worth mentioning. Herman and Chomsky relate the story of a public33

television station that lost its corporate funding from Gulf + Western after it aired a documentary
that was critical of the role of multinational corporations in the Third World, and an NBC
documentary on environmental problems that failed to air due to lack of sponsors. The
documentary assigned blame to corporations and so it did not fit the desired image of corporate
sponsors (Herman and Chomsky 2002:17). More recently, Pedro (2011a:1880-1881) recounts a
Spanish journalist’s story about an energy company that reneged on a sponsorship due to the
newspaper’s previous coverage of pollution that negatively affected the company. And Cromwell
and Edwards (2006) show how the dependence on advertising and other components of the
propaganda model have shaped the media’s coverage of climate change in a way that filters out
mention of scientific analyses that link climate change to the material accumulation processes
endemic to capitalism.
Dependence on Official Sources
Generally, production cost is proportional to production time, and news is no less subject
to this economic reality than any other commodity. For journalists and reporters, this means that
they must have readily available and reliable sources of news that require little fact checking or
background research to establish source credibility. The conventions of professional journalism
hold that the major centers of power—government and business—are prima facie credible, and
more or less objective, sources of information. Thus reliance on these sources helps cut
expenses, entailing a symbiotic relationship between the mass media and the powerful, elitedominated, sectors of society. The media rely on these sources for information, while
government and business, in turn, depend on the media as reliable conduits of their own
perspectives and interpretations of reality.
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Government agencies and business news-promoters facilitate corporate media access
through a number of means described by Herman and Chomsky: press conference rooms and
press conferences scheduled to meet news deadlines; advance copies of speeches and
forthcoming reports; and organized photo sessions (Herman and Chomsky 2002:22). These
powerful bureaucracies, the authors note, effectively subsidize the mass media with privileged
access, and function as gatekeepers. The media can be excluded from this privileged access if
they fail to disseminate the official line, or are otherwise adversarial to the fundamental interests
of the state or institution.
These powerful bureaucracies, and in particular, the federal government, inundate the
media with stories and information, which, according to Herman and Chomsky, “serve
sometimes to foist a particular line and frame on the media . . . and at other times to help chase
unwanted stories off the front page or out of the media altogether . . .” (Herman and Chomsky
2002:23). Because the government is a major source of news on national and international
affairs, the media are receptive to this constant stream of information, enabling the government
to set the news agenda and framework on important issues (Herman and Chomsky 2002:23).
Pedro (2011a) cites several studies which show that significant proportions (ranging from 17 to
60 percent depending on the medium and country) of media output are derived “wholly or
mostly” from elite public relations material. This research also shows that imperatives toward
increased production make journalists more dependent on these prepackaged news releases.
Another important consequence of the media’s dependence on official sources is that the
media rely overwhelmingly on current or former government officials and corporate-sponsored
“experts” who reinforce the official propaganda line. Dissenting intellectuals and activists tend to
be marginalized, though they are occasionally included on mainstream programming to present
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the appearance of a balanced presentation of ideas. But the majority of experts are preselected on
the basis pro-establishment ideology. Herman and Chomsky presented data on experts on
terrorism who appeared on the “McNeil-Lehrer News Hour,” finding that “a majority of the
participants (54 percent) were present or former government officials . . .” (Herman and
Chomsky 2002:24). The majority (76 percent) of expert sources on the network stations in the
early phase of the 2003 invasion of Iraq were also current or former government and military
officials (Whiten 2004). Many other experts are drawn from conservative think tanks which are
financed by corporations and provide a revolving door between the State Department and CIA to
nominally private and non-partisan organizations (Herman and Chomsky 2002:24).
Flak
“Flak” refers to criticism and harassment of the mass media for failing to follow a
particular agenda leveled by specialized organizations or individuals. Flak takes many forms,
such as “letters, telegrams, phone calls, petitions, lawsuits, speeches and bills before Congress,
and other modes of complaint, threat, and punitive actions” (Herman and Chomsky 2002:26).
“Flak machines” are connected to and supported materially and ideologically by the major
centers of power, receiving large streams of funding from the corporate sector, and receiving
regular attention from conservative politicians and media pundits. Flak conditions the media to
avoid taking certain positions or presenting inconvenient facts that might elicit flak, and, as a
result, incur expenses.
Flak-producing organizations are numerous and influential in the media industry. Some
of these organizations are the Media Research Center (see Goss 2013), the Commonwealth
Foundation, the Center for Media and Public Affairs, and Accuracy in Media (AIM). Like other
right-wing think tanks, their names and stated objectives sometimes disingenuously suggest a
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non-partisan, objective position with respect to the media or political culture. AIM, for example,
presents itself as “a non-profit, grassroots citizens watchdog of the news media that critiques
botched and bungled news stories and sets the record straight on important issues that have
received slanted coverage” (cited in Goss 2009:458). In reality, AIM is lavishly funded by the
corporate sector, and specializes in portraying the mass media as having a strong “liberal” (i.e.,
progressive) bias, usually making its case on the basis of false and manifestly absurd claims (see
Goss 2009). Herman and Chomsky write that AIM’s function “is to harass the media and put
pressure on them to follow the corporate agenda and a hard-line, right-wing foreign policy”
(Herman and Chomsky 2002:27).
Goss (2013:142) makes an important distinction between flak organizations and
progressive activist organizations such as Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) or Media
Lens, which employ similar tactics in their attempt to influence the mass media. First, the rightwing flak machines are connected to and supported financially by major centers of power,
receiving streams of funding from the corporate sector, and receiving attention from conservative
politicians and media pundits. This is not true of progressive activist organizations, which rely
largely on public contributions, and are often dismissed in the mainstream media as partisan or
otherwise illegitimate. Representing dissenting view points, they are marginalized. Secondly, as
Goss puts it, “activism may be defined as actions performed in good faith toward pro-social
ends, typically in confrontation with authority. Flak, by contrast, trades on bad faith, is malicious
as needed, and is often utilized to thwart pro-social change in favor of the status quo or for
reactionary purposes” (Goss 2013:142-3). Thus, activist organizations are differentiated from
flak machines on the basis of structural features and orientations toward existing power
structures.
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Dominant Ideology
This filter originally concerned anticommunism, but with the demise of the Soviet Union
and the virtual disappearance of Communism, it has been necessary to modify it. Different
modifications have been proposed by different writers. Herman and Chomsky have proposed
including free-market ideology in addition to anticommunism, noting that “Adding it to the
residual power of anticommunism in a world in which the global power of market institutions
makes nonmarket options seem utopian gives us an ideological package of immense strength”
(Herman and Chomsky 2002:xvii-xvii). Pedro’s reassessment seems more on point, however: “In
general, atemporal terms, the ideological slant that this filter identifies refers to the discrediting
of opposing voices and the dismissal of anything that might lead to democratic social change, or
that simply diverges from the elite view, either internationally or domestically” (2011a:1888). He
goes on to note that after the fall of the Berlin Wall, in foreign policy discourse the official
enemy of monolithic communism was replaced by a host of enemies from the Third World:
Milosevic, the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, Saddam Hussein, Hamas, Gaddafi, and so on. This seems
more in accord with the functional role attributed to anticommunism in Manufacturing Consent.
According to Herman and Chomsky’s original formulation, anticommunism served a
double policy function in Western political discourse. On one hand, it was utilized to mobilize
domestic support for intervention in Europe and the Third World. Western leaders emphasized
the violence and abuses associated with certain Communist states, on this basis “elevating
opposition to communism to a first principle of Western ideology and politics” (Herman and
Chomsky 2002:29). States that were associated with communism, governments that extended
civil liberties to communists, or even mildly social democratic governments that could be
colored as communist, could then be legitimized as targets of Western aggression and
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subversion. The role anticommunism played in various U.S. interventions in the Third World is
well known. On the other hand, in domestic politics, anticommunism was used to keep the
popular social leanings of liberals in check, while politicians had to present themselves as
sufficiently tough on communism at home and abroad. Underlying this anticommunism was the
threat communism posed to the domestic class structure (Herman and Chomsky 2002:29) and the
system of economic and military domination capitalism engendered abroad.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, American policy planners turned their attention to
alleged threats to Western interests posed by developments in the Third World (Chomsky 1991;
Huntington 1993). Dangerous actors in the Third World replaced the global communist
conspiracy as the new enemies. This shift was reflected in mainstream political discourse, and fit
the old Cold War pattern of good vs. evil, us vs. them, or friends vs. enemies, that was functional
for maintaining the capitalist order. This pattern emerges in contemporary elite ideology in
different ways. For example, in the discourse of “humanitarian intervention” and its relative, “the
Responsibility to Protect,” or “the war on terrorism,” “the war on drugs,” “the clash of
civilizations,” “American exceptionalism,” and so on. These concepts all consist of a strategy of
othering, in which we are supposed to feel morally superior to whomever the evil enemy
happens to be, and therefore justified in inflicting on them whatever kind of punishment the
national leadership decides is appropriate (Pedro 2011a:1890).
These ideological frameworks serve to mystify the real interests and motives of the
controlling elite, which dominate policy formation and mainstream discourse on policy through
the mass media and other channels of elite opinion such as public education. This is apparent in
the mass media’s dichotomous treatment of actors in international affairs. As Herman and
Chomsky have documented so thoroughly in their classic works, in the Cold War era, the crimes
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of Communist states were harshly condemned and closely investigated by the media, while the
crimes of U.S. client states and the United States itself were either ignored entirely or justified as
necessary, if sometimes regrettable, in the fight against Communism and the defense of the “free
world.” This dichotomous treatment continues in the post-Cold War period, where U.S. clients
such as Israel or Saudi Arabia escape serious scrutiny and condemnation for their crimes, while
official enemies such as Iran or Gaddafi are the focus of sustained propaganda campaigns replete
with lies, fabrications, and suppressed evidence.
Herman and Chomsky write: “It should be noted that when anti-Communist fervor is
aroused, the demand for serious evidence in support of claims of “communist” abuses is
suspended, and charlatans can thrive as evidential sources. Defectors, informers, and assorted
other opportunists move to center stage as ‘experts,’ even after exposure as highly unreliable, if
not downright liars” (Herman and Chomsky 2002:30). As I show in chapter 5, this principle is
still operative in mass media coverage of international affairs, of course making the requisite
substitution of communists with the evil others. I also show that while the communist threat may
have subsided, it is still private property and global hegemony that are at stake.
The Predictions of the Propaganda Model and Manufacturing Consent
The structural constraints operating on the mass media, as described by the five filters of
the propaganda model, suggest that the news media will be a reliable channel of elite
perspectives and ideology. Or, what amounts to the same thing, the centers of concentrated
power in the society exert a strong influence on the news agenda and framework of analysis that
is available to the public. The government and corporate sector have a major influence on what
events are covered and how, what information is allowed to be reported, and who will be
supported and who will be vilified in coverage of foreign and international affairs. Given that
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Herman and Chomsky specialize in international affairs and U.S. foreign policy analysis, this last
determination took on particular salience in the set of predictions and related concepts they
derived from the propaganda model and their prior research on which it was based.
Key here are their terms, worthy and unworthy victims. These refer to the victims of
enemy states, and victims of client states or the U.S. government, respectively. The terms are
meant to be partly ironic, and derive their meaning from the differential treatment these victims
receive in the mass media. Worthy victims will receive extensive coverage and the media will
carry out a thorough investigation of their victimization with a search for responsibility in the
leadership of the criminal state or organization, expressing much moral indignation at their
crimes. Unworthy victims, by contrast, will receive a different treatment. They will receive
limited coverage and the media will balk at assigning blame to state leadership. Here, rather than
the expression of indignation and horror, the media will serve up apologetic explanations for
criminal acts or explanations that otherwise remove or obscure criminal agency. This
dichotomous treatment results from the different utilities these victims have for directing public
outrage at official enemies and away from the U.S. government and its allies.
Thus, media coverage of worthy and unworthy victims, of official enemies and allies or
the home country, will differ in terms of total coverage time and space and in terms of quality of
evaluation and analysis. The differential treatment is also manifest in the fact that, according to
Herman and Chomsky, “Reports of the abuses of worthy victims not only pass through the
filters; they may also become the basis of sustained propaganda campaigns” (Herman and
Chomsky 2002:32). “Conversely, propaganda campaigns will not be mobilized where
victimization, even though massive, sustained, and dramatic, fails to meet the test of utility to
elite interests” (Herman and Chomsky 2002:33). One of the most remarkable exhibitions of this
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tendency is seen in the U.S. media’s coverage of Khmer Rouge atrocities from 1975 to 1979,
which formed the basis of a sustained propaganda campaign (see Herman and Chomsky
2002:260-295), compared to its coverage of the U.S.-backed Indonesian massacres in East Timor
from 1975 onward, which were suppressed. In the first volume of Political Economy of Human
Rights, Chomsky and Herman showed that once it began, U.S. media coverage of this latter
massacre fell to almost zero (Chomsky and Herman 1979:129-204).
Some of the other major findings presented in Manufacturing Consent were that, as
mentioned previously, the media dedicated far more attention to the 1984 murder of Jersey
Popieluszko, a Polish priest and resistance leader, than to the murder of one hundred religious
martyrs in Latin America, including Oscar Romero. The authors argued that Popieluszko’s
murder was instrumental for Western anticommunist propaganda, whereas the religious victims
were not, victimized as they were by U.S. clients. As another part of their investigation of media
coverage of Latin America, marshaling the partly ironic concepts of legitimizing and
meaningless elections, Herman and Chomsky also showed that elections in Nicaragua were
evaluated by the media according to different standards than those applied in coverage of
elections in El Salvador and Guatemala. The latter countries were U.S.-backed terror states in
which elections were held under conditions of extreme terror intended to quell popular
resistance. Elections in Nicaragua, by contrast, were held under far more free and democratic
conditions, in which the popular Sandinista government was not systematically murdering its
population. In spite of these and other differences, the American media assailed the elections in
Nicaragua, while legitimizing the elections in El Salvador and Guatemala. Herman and Chomsky
attribute this difference to the fact that the Reagan administration was trying to legitimate its
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attempt to overthrow the Sandinista government, while concealing the nature of the terror states
it was supporting.
In their discussion of the Vietnam War, Herman and Chomsky pointed out that the media
conformed closely to official government perspectives. For example, the views of the anti-war
movement were marginalized and the “righteousness of the cause and nobility of intent”
(Herman and Chomsky 2002:172) of the U.S. war effort were rarely questioned. The
perspectives of the victims of the American onslaught were rarely sought out as sources: “Only
very rarely did U.S. reporters make any effort to see the war from the point of view of ‘the
enemy’—the peasants of South Vietnam, Laos, or later Cambodia—or to accompany the military
forces of ‘the enemy’ resisting the U.S. assault” (Herman and Chomsky 2002:177). The
dominant frame in media coverage of the war was that the U.S. was defending South Vietnam
against the “internal aggression” of the NLF, while ignoring the fact that the U.S.-backed
government in Saigon was not democratically elected and was not popular among South
Vietnamese, who largely supported the NLF. And that the U.S. carried out aggression in South
Vietnam was virtually never entertained as a possibility in the media, even though, as Herman
and Chomsky illustrate in detail, “The United States attacked South Vietnam, arguably by 1962
and unquestionably by 1965, expanding its aggression to all of Indochina with lethal and longterm effects” (Herman and Chomsky 2002:184). Herman and Chomsky also documented how
the media were complicit in making the large-scale U.S. bombings of Laos and Cambodia
“secret bombings” by failing to cover them.
Conclusions
This literature review has demonstrated several things. First, the propaganda model is and
remains a powerful explanatory framework for social scientists interested in the performance and
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function of the news media. Although it has been marginalized in the mainstream of
scholarship—as it predicts—media researchers have not shown that the premises underlying the
model are inconsistent or that it is not empirically supported as claimed. If anything, they have
shown just the opposite. Not only is the model extremely well supported—both in terms of
claims about the structure of the media, and in terms of its predictions about media
performance—but it is also a relatively simple model that still encompasses the theoretical
contributions of more recent and sometimes more complicated theoretical frameworks. It is also
more plausible than the standard view of the news media.
Even though a significant body of research supports the propaganda model, its relative
obscurity, and the social and political significance of its central claims, indicate a troubling
lacuna in the existing literature. Insofar as sociologists have not shied away from politically
sensitive and challenging domains of inquiry, Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model
deserves a place in the sociological cannon alongside such influential contributions as Mills’
analysis of the power elite, Foucault’s meditations on the capillary nature of power, and other
staples of social theory.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND RESEARCH EXPECTATIONS
The major research question my thesis will answer may be stated as follows: Does the
New York Times’ coverage of the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya comport with the
predictions associated with Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky’s propaganda model? The
choice of this question is justified on several grounds, which I outline below, followed by an
outline of research expectations.
There are two classes of research questions associated with the propaganda model: Those
regarding its empirical foundations, and those regarding the performance of the model and its
ability to explain observed phenomena. Or, as Pedro says, “Submitting a model to empirical
examination is an important step toward validating it; however, it is also necessary to analyze the
relevance, consistency, and exhaustiveness of its operating principles or categories (for the PM
[propaganda model], the filters), and their capacity for application to a wide range of general
contexts” (Pedro 2011a:1870). Therefore, the question addressed in this work belongs to the
latter class of research questions; that is, those regarding the performance of the model. Much
recent research has been dedicated to investigating the empirical foundations of the model,
whether the model remains relevant in the twenty-first century, how well it predicts media
performance in countries not the United States, and so on. In light of this research, it seems
reasonable to take for granted here that the model remains relevant in spite of the emergence of
the Internet, remains consistent with the facts about the structural aspects of the media, and
applies well to the media in many capitalist democracies. What remains then is to satisfy our
curiosity not that the model is valid, but how exactly it is operating in specific cases, and what
this tells us about our society, historical circumstances, and so on.
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Moreover, the propaganda model has never been used as a tool for analyzing the case I
have chosen. This case is also of special interest for the model, apart from practical concern, in
that it is suitable to test the model’s predictions regarding worthy and unworthy victims, the two
terms given by Herman and Chomsky to the victims of U.S. enemies and friends, respectively.
The model predicts that victims of official U.S. enemies will be given extensive, sympathetic
treatment by the mass media, whereas victims of U.S. clients and allies will be largely ignored
and justifications will be adduced for their victimization (see the discussion in chapter 2, p. 41).
This aspect of the propaganda model has been given little attention in empirical studies utilizing
it. The case selected for this study allows comparison of the Times’ treatment of an official
enemy—the Muammar Gaddafi regime—to that of U.S. allies—the anti-Gaddafi opposition, and
their respective victims during a civil war. We would expect the victims of Gaddafi’s repression
to be considered worthy victims, and the victims of the anti-Gaddafi insurgency unworthy
victims, thus demonstrating dichotomous treatment in one case study.
The choice of the New York Times is justified on the grounds that it is one of the major
papers “of record” in the United States. This has significant consequences for not only the way
readers think about the world in the present, but also how history is subsequently written and
understood in mainstream scholarship. And while the study is limited to the Times, as a major
publication it offers some insight into general news reporting in the United States, due to the
“cascading” effect of news production, in which the major publications serve as the agendasetting media (Castells 2013:164). Furthermore, it is well known that distortion and extreme
ideological bias are standard for the right-wing media, particularly FOX News, Breitbart, and so
on. However, what is probably less well understood, at least in the popular imagination, is that
the liberal news outlets are no less subject to elite structural bias, as Herman and Chomsky and
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many other observers have demonstrated. As Goss puts it, the Times enjoys a “lofty reputation”
and “suffers no lack of modesty.”
The newspaper self-regards as “the world’s greatest news-gathering organization
(…) a colossus astride the globe”; “To work at our newspaper is to experience
awe,” boasts one editor . . . [media scholar, James] Curran posits the Times as best
exemplifying “why the American model of responsible media capitalism has
admirers around the world.” (Goss 2013:95)
“As the Times often showcases the pinnacle of US news tendencies, its discourses furnish a
stringent test in evaluating the nation’s news performance on an immensely important topic”
(Goss 2013:95). Goss was referring to the coverage of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, but his point is
relevant for other topics as well. Furthermore, insofar as the Times represents the outer limits of
mainstream progressive opinion, a focus on the liberal media provides insight as to the “bounds
of the expressible,” to paraphrase Noam Chomsky.
In accordance with the predictions of the propaganda model, then, the research
expectations of this study are as follows. (1) The New York Times’ coverage of the 2011 NATO
intervention in Libya will reflect the range of elite opinion in the United States, as evidenced by
the Times’ close adherence to official government analyses of events. Commentary and reporting
will downplay or ignore facts and topics that are inconsistent with official narratives, and will
generally fail to provide historical context that challenges the assumptions underlying official
narratives and U.S. government pronouncements to do good, to uphold human rights, democratic
values, and so on. Coverage will thereby support the policy needs of the state. (2) Specifically,
the Times will emphasize the crimes of the Gaddafi regime with extensive coverage in which
Gaddafi will be portrayed negatively as a dictator, villain, war criminal, and so on. There will be
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little or no sympathetic coverage of Gaddafi and his crimes will be exaggerated. (3) Gaddafi’s
victims—the anti-Gaddafi rebels—will be portrayed as innocents, peaceful protestors, and
democratic reformers, and their plight at the hands of the Gaddafi regime will be given much
sympathetic attention. They will be treated as worthy victims and their crimes downplayed or
ignored. Conversely, the victims of the anti-Gaddafi rebels—black Libyans and African migrant
workers—will be either ignored or portrayed as pro-Gaddafi mercenaries.
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CHAPTER 4
METHOD AND RESEARCH DESIGN
In order to demonstrate and measure the hypothesized tendencies outlined in the
preceding chapter, both qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection and analysis were
employed. Specifically, critical discourse analysis and content analysis were used, as these are
the methods that were utilized by Herman and Chomsky in their original studies (Klaehn 2009;
Mullen 2009), and are often employed in similar media studies. I begin this chapter with brief
explanations of what is meant by “critical discourse analysis” and “content analysis” in the
context of this study. Then I outline the specific research design applied in this study and explain
how these methods work with it. Variables and concepts are then defined and operationalized.
And questions regarding reliability and validity are addressed in the final section.
Critical Discourse Analysis and Content Analysis
Critical discourse analysis is a research method which attempts to identify how social
relationships shape discourse, and how, conversely, discourse shapes social relationships. Thus,
it is assumed that discourse is a social activity that cannot be considered separately from a given
social and historical context. Therefore, this is an appropriate method to use for analyzing text
when the expectation is that historical social conditions—such as those identified by the
propaganda model—are expected to influence the text in ways that are likely reproduce these
social conditions.
According to Fairclough and Wodak, as discourse is socially constitutive, “it gives rise to
important issues of power.” They elaborate further that
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Discursive practices may have major ideological effects: that is, they can help
produce and reproduce unequal power relations between (for instance) social
classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the
ways in which they represent things and position people. So discourse may, for
example, be racist, or sexist, and try to pass off assumptions (often falsifying
ones) about any aspect of social life as mere common sense. Both the ideological
loading of particular ways of using language and the relations of power which
underlie them are often unclear to people.
Therefore, critical discourse analysis “aims to make more visible these opaque aspects of
discourse” (Fairclough and Wodak 1997:357). That is, it tries to show how certain discursive
practices embody assumptions about the social world that arise from and reinforce power
relations. It can do this by elucidating double standards and unstated assumptions, criticizing
problematic interpretations, narratives, and descriptions, refuting fallacious arguments,
presenting conflicting evidence, and so on. These are the methods I used to criticize the New
York Times in chapter 5. And analogous to Foucault’s method, as outlined by Hall (1997),
critical discourse analysis can also identify the rules that “govern the way that a given topic can
be meaningfully talked about and reasoned about” (Hall 1997:346). The concepts offered by
Herman and Chomsky—for example, worthy and unworthy victims—engender rules that govern
discourse in the mainstream media.
Another important characteristic of critical discourse analysis is that it is “engaged and
committed” to intervening in social life “on the side of dominated and oppressed groups and
against dominating groups, and that it openly declares the emancipatory interests that motivate
it” (Fairclough and Wodak 1997:358). This follows from a fundamental principle of critical
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social science that total objectivity and political neutrality vis-à-vis the social totality is
impossible. (See, for example, Abromeit 2011:141-84, 227-245, passim., for an exposition of
how this philosophical stance was developed by Max Horkheimer.) But, as Fairclough and
Wodak also note, this “does not imply that CDA [critical discourse analysis] is less scholarly
than other research” (Fairclough and Wodak 1997:358), as it remains a rigorous, systematic form
of analysis, subject to many of the same rules of traditional empirical science, such as
reproducibility, generalizability, and grounding in empirical observation.
While critical discourse analysis provides the qualitative design aspect to this study, it is
also buttressed with the more quantitative approach of content analysis. Holsti defines content
analysis broadly as “any technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively
identifying specified characteristics of messages” (Holsti 1968:601). In traditional content
analysis, rules are specified for identifying and coding certain features of texts, such as particular
words or phrases, themes, text length, number of paragraphs, sentences, or words, so that
systematic, objective comparisons between or within texts can be made. Thus, content analysis is
useful, Holsti states, “whenever the problem requires precise and replicable methods for
analyzing those aspects of symbolic behavior which may escape casual scrutiny” (Holsti
1968:602). And content analysis may be used to “test hypotheses and make inferences about (1)
characteristics of the text, (2) causes or antecedents of the message, or (3) effects of the
communication” (Holsti 1968:604). In this study, I am concerned with the first and second
objectives: Identifying characteristics of texts and linking them to a causal explanation.
Holsti identifies several ways in which content analysis may be incorporated into a
research design. These suggestions, it may also be noted, apply equally well to critical discourse
analysis. According to Holsti, comparisons can be made between documents derived from a
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single source or from two or more sources (Holsti 1968:605). When comparing messages from a
single source, the comparisons can be made over time in order to demonstrate changes that occur
in the source. Additionally or alternatively, comparisons can be made between documents from a
single source in different situations. This can be useful for demonstrating how different historical
contexts influence the message or how different subjects are presented. According to Holsti,
“Hypotheses may be tested by comparing the messages of two or more difference sources.
Usually the purpose is to relate theoretically significant attributes of communication sources to
differences in the messages they produce” (emphasis in original, Holsti 1968:605). We may add
that hypotheses can be tested, and theoretically significant attributes of communication sources
can be related to content, using only a single source, which is the approach taken in this study.
Another possibility for content analysis designs (which, again, applies to critical
discourse analysis as well) is the comparison of content data “to some standard of adequacy or
performance” (Holsti 1968:605) For example, “Many studies have employed a priori standards
defined, often implicitly, by the investigator’s preferences” (Holsti 1968:605). However, Holsti
cautions against this approach, and outlines other ways of deriving standards of adequacy. His
remarks on these matters are important in the context of this study, especially as they pertain to
the problem of operationalizing bias:
Even when a priori standards are made explicit, the problems of defining
operationally such deviations as “bias” have rarely been dealt with in a
satisfactory manner. An alternative to the deductive approach is to derive
standards inductively from content data. A representative sample of messages
produced by a class of communicators may provide norms against which the
products of any single communicator may be compared. This technique has often
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been used in mass media research: the content of a given newspaper, magazine, or
network is compared to the performance of the medium as a whole. A third type
of standard against which content data may be compared is one defined by
noncontent indices, such as aggregate data or expert opinion. (Holsti 1968:605)
The problem identified here by Holsti will be addressed in the sections below. For now, it is
simply noted that both a priori standards and noncontent indices providing standards of
comparison will be developed and implemented in the application of content analysis and critical
discourse analysis in this study.
Overview of the Research Design
The propaganda model predicts that the news media will tend to function as a propaganda
system for societal elites insofar as the range of opinion expressed in the media will tend to
reflect only the range of elite opinion, with dissent and criticism that falls outside of this range
marginalized. An obvious way to demonstrate this tendency is through a careful analysis of
media output covering a given topic to see how closely it conforms to or challenges elite
perspectives. Therefore, the research design necessitates comparisons among at least two classes
of data: that contained in the sample of media output, and that which provides some standard of
performance to which the sample can be compared.
The empirical data that was collected and analyzed in this study was drawn from articles
published by the New York Times; specifically, articles on the 2011 conflict in Libya. The
articles were obtained through the LexisNexis Academic database, using the search term
“Gaddafi” for the period February 15, 2011 through March 19, 2011. These specific dates were
selected because they correspond to the beginning of a series of protests in Benghazi which
precipitated the civil war, to the beginning of the NATO bombing. Events that took place during
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this time period provided the Obama administration and leadership in France and Great Britain
with the pretexts for military intervention. Therefore, an understanding of the events that took
place during this time is essential for understanding the propaganda that facilitated Western
military involvement.
As events unfold, a narrative emerges from reporting and opinion pieces that contains
both objective elements (“hard reporting”) such as historical facts presented in chronological
order, and subjective elements (“soft reporting”), such as interpretations given to the facts,
circumstantial inferences, calls for particular kinds of responses, and so on. This narrative must
then be compared to alternative sources of information and frameworks of analysis.
This alternative framework constitutes the “standard of performance” conceptualized by
Holsti. In this study, I relied on the expert analyses provided by dissident scholars, as well as
reports from human rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International, and documents from intergovernmental organizations such as the African Union
and the United Nations. I also relied on news reports, including those appearing in the Times
itself. This is a legitimate practice inasmuch as key facts do pass through the filters described by
the propaganda model, though often placed near the end of an article, mentioned only once in
passing, or presented in isolation from other facts which may give it meaning (Herman and
Chomsky 2002:lxii-lxiii). It should also be noted that the decision to rely on critical, dissenting
experts is justified insofar as these authors are leading writers in their fields, regardless of their
social and political commitments. In the final analysis, we are concerned with arguments and
their premises, evidence, and facts—not persons.
Following these prescriptions, I constructed a historical narrative on the history of United
States-Libya relations and the civil war in Libya. The narrative contains two parts: one providing
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a general background to the conflict, demonstrating U.S. special interests in weakening or
deposing the Gaddafi regime, and one that overviews in detail the weeks preceding the NATO
intervention. This overview includes important facts and topics that were likely to be left of out
of coverage because they conflicted with the official story. Thus, the narrative presented at the
beginning of the chapter provides a standard to which the discourse produced by the Times can
be compared. If a body of facts can be presented that contradicts official sources, and if it is
subsequently found in an analysis of the Times samples that these facts tend to be marginalized
or excluded, then it may be concluded that the Times conforms to elite interpretations of events.
If, however, these facts do receive coverage proportional to those facts which support elite
interpretations, then we would draw the opposite conclusion. This is a quantitative approach
appropriate for content analysis.
There are two important points to be made regarding this methodological approach. The
first is that it is not simply that “evidence of selection” is “automatically read as evidence of
deceit” or bias, as Schudson (2013:30-31) maintains in his critique of news media bias as an
unserviceable concept. Rather, it is that a series of facts entirely or largely absent from reporting
can be presented which all belong to a particular class of facts, namely, facts which are
incompatible with official propaganda lines and official government policy. This is a
methodologically sound way of operationalizing the concept of elite bias. The second point is
that the historical account I present in this work and compare to the Times sample is based on
information that was publicly available at the time the events reported on were occurring
(Chomsky and Herman 2004:105). This obviates the possibility of creating a narrative in which
information that was unavailable to reporters is used to demonstrate the systematic omission of
this very information, which would obviously prove nothing and be absurd. But the fact that
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publicly available information of a certain kind tends to be omitted from media coverage may
provide evidence of bias, though other factors must be considered, such as the source of the
information and how widely distributed it was by the source.
In addition to quantitative analysis of reporting, it is important to show qualitatively how
a given topic is treated in the news media. Some topics and facts are inconvenient for those in
power and require careful treatment so that they can be made to fit in plausibly with official story
lines. Here the concepts of worthy and unworthy victims are especially useful for the analysis. If
in the Times sample the victims of the anti-Gaddafi opposition tend to be dehumanized, their
suffering is ignored or somehow defended, and little or no outrage is expressed at their plight, it
may be concluded that the Times conforms to elite perspectives. And, in conjunction with this
tendency, if the Gaddafi regime’s victims tend to be given sympathetic treatment, their suffering
is clearly linked to its actions, and outrage is expressed at their plight, it may be concluded that
the Times exhibits an elite bias. This would also support the related victimization expectation of
the propaganda model. If, on the other hand, such a dichotomous treatment cannot be
demonstrated, if victims of friends and official enemies tend to be given similar treatment, then
the opposite conclusions are warranted and the victimization expectation would not be
supported. Demonstrating these tendencies requires the application of critical discourse analysis,
involving as it does a comparison of how oppressed social actors are positioned in the discourse
and analysis of how well the discourse supports the predictions of the victimization expectation.
The expected dichotomous treatment of victims was also assessed using content analysis, in
which total amounts of coverage given to the two classes of victims was compared.
Critical discourse analysis was also used to evaluate the nature of policy criticism in
Times reporting and commentary. It was expected that, in conformity with elite frames, criticism
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of foreign policy in the press would be limited to strategic concerns and pragmatic calculations
of costs and benefits—political or economic—to the United States. That is, criticism would
never rise to the level of moral condemnation in which the alleged good intentions of U.S.
leadership and foreign policy are put into question (per research expectation number 1. See p.
47). Policy may be mistaken or too costly, but never simply wrong, and never for geostrategic
purposes. If this tendency is observed, it may be concluded that the Times conforms to an elite
framework of analysis, which traditionally engenders some form of American exceptionalism,
the belief that the United States is a unique moral force in the world, motivated solely by abstract
principles of democracy, liberty, freedom, justice, and so on, and rarely self-interest or material
gain. If criticism moves beyond this framework and extends into the realm of social criticism in
which this framework is called into question, the expectation would not be supported.
To summarize, then, the research design involves the analysis of data derived from a
sample of New York Times publications on the conflict in Libya. This civil war in Libya was
chosen on the basis of features—diplomatic relationship to the U.S. of parties to the conflicts,
and so forth—that enable testing of the expectations derived from the propaganda model, a form
of theoretical sampling. The unit of analysis is the newspaper article. The independent variables
are described by the five filters of the propaganda model. The three main dependent variables are
(1) treatment of politically salient facts, (2) treatment of victims, and (3) scope of foreign policy
criticism in the Times. The first variable will be measured by comparing the Times to a historical
account derived from authoritative sources on the topics. The second variable will be measured
by comparing the treatment of the two classes of victims. And the third variable will be
measured by comparing the Times to the theoretically established constraints of elite opinion and
again to the historical accounts provided by the author. The measurement of each variable
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requires qualitative discourse analysis as well as quantitative analysis in which objective
measures will be obtained using statistics derived from a content analysis.
The three variables described in this section may, in turn, be taken as a kind of index of
the central construct at stake in this study: elite bias in the New York Times. Figure 1.1 (page 59)
shows the relationship between the components of the propaganda model, the dependent variable
and its separate components, the research expectations, the operational definitions provided
below, and the indicators of the dependent variables.
Conceptualization, Operationalization, and Coding
Though much has already been said regarding major concepts featured in this study and
how they are operationalized, this section provides an outline of central concepts and operational
procedures that link them to empirical measures. Coding procedures are presented in appendix B.
Beginning with the central concept of “elite bias,” we note that the Webster’s dictionary
defines “bias” as “An inclination or preference, esp. [especially] one that interferes with
impartial judgment.” Working from this definition, in the context of news media analysis, we can
then define elite class bias provisionally as an inclination or preference for those facts and
perspectives which corroborate elite views. Also following from the dictionary definition, this
preference would interfere with an impartial judgment, namely, one which included the facts and
perspectives considered important by non-elite classes and group formations. Ipso facto, this
could only be achieved through a failure to adequately consider non-elite perspectives.
Therefore, we need not be concerned that the definition implies that the preference does in fact
interfere with impartial judgment. And keeping to the definition provided earlier, “elite class”
refers to those members of the upper social classes who wield the most economic, political, and
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Figure 1: Schematic Diagram of the Research Design
Note: This figure shows the relationship between the propaganda model and the various components of the research
design. While I have used the language of positivistic science in the headings of the figure, it should be noted that I
have not treated “elite bias” strictly as a quantifiable, continuous variable in this study, and hence, I have not carried
out “hypothesis testing” in the strict sense.
The figure should be understood as demonstrating that the propaganda model predicts elite bias, which in turn is
understood in terms of three other variables: Treatment of topics, treatment of victims, and the limits of debate.
Treatment of topics is indicated by compatible topics, incompatible topics, and the framework of analysis; treatment
of victims is indicated by treatment of anti-Gaddafi protestors, rebels, and black Africans and Libyans; limits of
debate are indicated by the presence or absence of political economy analyses and American exceptionalism. The
indicators, in turn, are defined operationally in terms of the quantitative and qualitative dimensions described above.

military power. Combining the two definitions, then, we arrive at the following expanded
conceptual definition of “elite class bias”: a preference for those facts and interpretive
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frameworks which corroborate the views of the social classes wielding the most economic,
political, and military power, and a tendency to ignore those facts and interpretive frameworks
considered important by non-elite social classes and group formations.
This definition of bias is basically consistent with that found in the social science
literature. Buss and Hofstetter defined media bias as “selectivity . . . which may or may not lead
to unbalanced, inequitable or unfair treatment of individuals or issues” (Buss and Hofstetter
1978:518). (Note the connection to the research expectations regarding worthy and unworthy
victims and the demonization of Gaddafi.) One study (Fitzgerald, Campbell, Sivak 2001), which
utilized content analysis to measure bias, operationalized bias in press articles as a failure to give
approximately equal coverage to both pro and con sides of a prominent political debate, though
the authors did not provide an explicit conceptual definition. Leading communications scholar,
Robert Entman, notes that bias is a “curiously undertheorized staple of public discourse about the
media” (Entman 2007:163) and has sought to provide a definition informed by framing theory.
Framing, as defined by Entman, is “the process of culling a few elements of perceived reality and
assembling a narrative that highlights connections among them to promote a particular
interpretation” (Entman 2007:164). Working from a commonly held view of bias as content
bias—the preference for one side over another in news coverage—Entman defines content bias
as “consistent patterns in the framing of mediated communication that promote the influence of
one side in conflicts over the use of government power” (emphasis in original, Entman 2007:
166). Like the conceptual definition of elite bias employed in this study, Entman’s definition of
bias emphasizes politically relevant patterns or tendencies.
The news media topics chosen for this study necessitate that elite bias is operationalized
in a way that makes it relatable to the particular subject matter engendered by these topics.
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Different topics would require different operational definitions. In this study, three dependent
variables were derived from subject matter to provide measures of elite class bias relevant to the
domain of foreign affairs reporting: treatment of facts and topics, treatment of victims, and the
nature of foreign policy criticism. Definitions or descriptions of these variables beyond what has
already been provided would be superfluous, but more precise operational definitions
(measurement procedures) can now be provided.
Treatment of Politically Salient Topics
The topics and historical facts incorporated into the narrative comprising the standard of
comparison are events and facts that figure prominently in the scholarly literature, regarded by
experts as politically salient. Some of these topics were then recorded onto a frequency table
with three columns: one containing a brief description of the topics themselves, and two
containing spaces to record the number of articles in which they are mentioned in the New York
Times sample. The table was also divided into two parts: one containing topics that are
compatible with the official government agenda in Libya, and one containing topics that are
incompatible with the official agenda. Thus, raw measures of the frequency of occurrence in the
samples could be recorded and clearly displayed, enabling a comparison of the two classes of
topics. (The table used during data collection is the one shown in appendix C.) Additionally, a
summary of the Times narrative is presented and compared to the baseline narrative. This
summary highlights the facts and events that were salient in the paper’s coverage and establishes
the general framework of analysis that guided reporting and commentary.
Because it is important to show how topics that are inconvenient for official propaganda
lines are treated when they aren’t simply ignored, the summary of the Times narrative was
accompanied by a discussion of how such topics were dealt with. When such topics did appear in
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the samples, the following five questions were addressed with respect to each one: (1) How
many times is the topic mentioned in the entire sample? (2) How is the topic or fact presented in
relation to other key facts? (3) Where is the topic or fact positioned in the article(s) and paper(s)?
(4) How much attention is given to it in the article(s) (e.g., total number of lines)? (5) What is the
framework of analysis in which it is presented (Herman and Chomsky 2002:lxiii)?
Worthy and Unworthy Victims
With respect to the victims in each conflict, the following questions were asked about
them: (1) Is outrage and indignation expressed at their plight? (2) Does their victimization lead to
a search for responsibility at the top? (3) Does their victimization lead to a call for state military
intervention? (4) How often are they or their representatives consulted as sources? (5) How much
coverage do they receive (i.e., total number of articles) (cf. Herman and Chomsky 2002:34-35)?
The first three questions require qualitative descriptions while the other questions entail
quantitative measurements.
The quantitative analysis described here is different from that employed by Herman and
Chomsky in that they measured coverage of individual victims. This analysis employed here
measured coverage of classes of victims. It does not appear that there are difficulties associated
with this procedural difference, as long as coding instructions specify when the classes of victims
are being mentioned or described as such, rather than being mentioned simpliciter. This approach
also enables the researcher to demonstrate how the victims of enemies and clients are employed
differently for different propaganda purposes.
Limits of Foreign Policy Criticism
To discern the ideological limits of foreign policy criticism in the Times samples, the
following questions were asked about U.S. and ally foreign policy and exercises of state power:
62

(1) Does policy analysis include political-economic explanations of foreign policy (Herman and
Chomsky 2002:lx)? (2) Are the stated intentions of state and military leadership ever critically
scrutinized (Herman and Chomsky 2002:lx)? (3) Is foreign policy ever characterized as morally
unacceptable? (4) What is the general character of foreign policy debate in the samples? The first
three questions measure simple dichotomous variables that can be answered positively or
negatively, while the fourth question requires a detailed summary description.
The coding process used coding sheets for each article and two kinds of recording sheets.
(For examples of each, see appendix C.) A coding sheet was filled out for each article. It
contained spaces to fill in the following information: date; title; total number of lines; section
(page number); type (article, op-ed, etc.). Then, depending on whether the article discussed
victims, the following: class or name of victim; whether outrage or indignation is expressed or
philosophical generalizations about violence and conflict are made instead; whether there is a
search for responsibility; whether the victims figure as sources; and total lines dedicated to
victims. The coding sheet also contained a notes section for illustrative examples of how victims
were described, interesting quotes, and comments regarding data recorded on the recording
sheets.
The first recording sheet was described above. The second recording sheet for recording
data about policy analysis featured a simple table. This table contained rows for placing article
dates and titles, and three columns for recording if and when three possible kinds of discourse
appeared in articles published on those dates. Heading the three columns of the table, the three
kinds of discourse were listed as: Political economy analysis of state power and policy;
intentions of state leaders are questioned; policy is characterized as immoral. The data recorded
here only pertained to U.S. policies and actions.
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Validity, Reliability, and Generalizability
The major construct examined in this study is that of elite bias in news coverage. In this
study it is composed of three main variables, which were linked to empirical phenomena (New
York Times article content) through 14 indicators. Since these indicators are measured using both
quantitative and qualitative methods, it is not possible to carry out statistical tests of construct
validity. However, unless otherwise demonstrated, the 14 indicators selected provide an
exhaustive operational definition of the construct of elite bias in the context of reporting in which
they are applied, demonstrating content validity. As can be seen by comparing the questions
formulated above to the citations provided along with them, this operational definition is in fact
consistent with that used by Herman and Chomsky in their original study, indicating criterion
validity. Furthermore, the predictive validity associated with this construct has been
demonstrated by Herman and Chomsky (2002).
Issues pertaining to the internal validity of Herman and Chomsky’s original research
design have already been addressed, but may be revisited here in the context of this study. In
general, proposed alternative explanations of the phenomena predicted by the propaganda
model—namely, generally lower coverage of a geographical region as accounting for lower
coverage of a given conflict, and researcher bias—have been ruled out (see the discussion of the
Lang and Engel Lang critique in chapter 2, p. 18). In this study, overall coverage of Middle East
affairs is sufficient enough to rule out the possibility that certain matters pertaining to conflicts in
this region are less likely to be covered. Such an explanation is plainly implausible with respect
to reporting on the Middle East in the American press. And as to whether or not the case has
been selected for this study because it supports the desired conclusions of the author, the
response is that the true reason for selecting the case of Libya is derived in part from the
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theoretical requirements of the model and in part from the author’s own interests. With respect to
the former, the model requires examples in which news coverage is about reporting of our own
military adventures or those of a client, and one is about those of an official enemy. Or, the
sample involves a case in which these two classes of actor are both present. This criterion is met.
The selection of this particular case was also motivated by the author’s interest in Middle East
politics and history. My own familiarity with these events and how they appeared to be covered
in mainstream news outlets suggested that they demonstrated the predictions of the propaganda
model. However, demonstrating whether or not they really do requires systematic scientific
analysis. Of course, many other cases could have been selected, and the spatial constraints of a
Master’s thesis required that I choose only one. But it is not apparent that any of this biases the
sampling method.
Researcher bias or influence should also be minimized in this study by using the provided
historical background as a standard of comparison, focusing the data analysis on the 14 questions
that constitute the operational definition, and following the coding procedures for the content
analysis. All of this makes possible some degree of reproducibility and a check on the reliability
of the methods employed.
Finally, regarding generalizability, this study tests the ability of an existing model to
explain, or predict patterns in, a new set of data. In the terms of qualitative methodology, this is
referred to as an “illustrative method,” in which a model is confirmed or rejected depending on
whether or not it is able to explain new data (Nueman 2003:451-52). Thus, the results of this
study will be “generalizable” to the extent that they add to an already existing stock of case
studies which support the propaganda model. In a sense more specific to quantitative
methodology, generalizability may be taken to mean inferences from the data analyzed in this
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study to some larger population of cases. Here, that could mean, for instance, a generalization
about how all American news outlets or articles covered the case focused on in this study. But
without carrying out the time consuming work of making specific empirical observations using
the appropriate methods, making such an inference is practically impossible, though this study
could form the basis of further research. Because inferential statistical analysis is simply not
possible given the nature of the object of study, generalizability must be addressed in terms of an
illustrative method.
Strengths, Weaknesses, and Limitations of the Design
The major strength of this research design is that it establishes a sound framework for
analyzing the performance of one of the leading news outlets in United States, indeed in the
world. It offers a serious challenge to the premises of conventional thinking about this particular
outlet, and the liberal media in general. It searches for a less apparent, more scientific assessment
of the New York Times that moves beyond surface appearances and ideology, as good sociology
often does.
Of course, strengths are often also weaknesses. The time and space limitations of a
Master’s thesis, and the nature of the methodology required for this study, limited the analysis to
one news outlet and one case study. As mentioned above, this may not tell us very much about
how the news media in general covered Libya during this time, though it does provide some
grounds for speculation and further hypothesis formation, given what is known about the tiered
structure of the news industry. Preferably, the study would also include a case which seems
likely to reject the hypotheses of the propaganda model, as Herman and Chomsky sought to do in
Manufacturing Consent by examining claims made regarding the media and Vietnam, Irancontra, and so on, discussed earlier.
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The delimitations of the study should also be made clear. As mentioned in previous
chapters, this study is concerned with the discursive output of the media as a propaganda system,
not with the effects this system may have had on readers and whether or not this propaganda is or
was effective in mobilizing public opinion in favor of elite priorities. These are different
questions. While some survey data will be provided to at least cast some light on this interesting
question, the actual aim of this study should be kept in mind throughout. The study is also only
concerned with discursive content, the written words and specific narratives produced by the
New York Times. It is not overly concerned with the nature of the medium, either as a newspaper,
or as an online news source, nor is it concerned with visual content such as photographs. This
focus on textual content may also constitute a weakness of the study, insofar as different
mediums may have different effects on discourse and propaganda techniques. However, it is
ultimately arguments, discourses, and frameworks of analysis which influence the total
“discursive formation,” to use Foucault’s term.
To repeat an earlier point, the study is mostly concerned with how the model operates in
specific cases, and empirical evidence that demonstrates this, rather than with the structural
features of the media described by the model, and the empirical evidence that illustrates these
structural features. The latter has been the domain of many other studies, but I have chosen as the
goal of this project a careful analysis of media output to test the expectations of the propaganda
model. This focus, in my opinion, constitutes an important strength of this study. For, as
mentioned before, critical discourse analysis, and the tradition of critical sociology in general,
openly and unapologetically sides with oppressed and socially downtrodden peoples. A careful
investigation of a leading newspaper in the United States that may have facilitated major crimes
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against humanity, ethnic cleansing, war, and so on, is an important piece of political activism for
those who wish to understand and put an end to such heinous crimes.
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CHAPTER 5
THE NEW YORK TIMES’ COVERAGE OF THE 2011 NATO INTERVENTION IN LIBYA
Introduction
In this chapter, I present an analysis of the New York Times’ coverage of the civil war in
Libya during the period of February 15, 2011, through March 19, 2011. The analysis uses as a
basis of comparison a historical narrative constructed from both primary sources and existing
literature on that conflict. This literature, which includes Prashad’s Arab Spring, Libyan Winter,
Forte’s Slouching Towards Sirte, and Campbell’s Global NATO, is all based on publicly
available information about which any Times writer reporting on Libya would have known. To
contextualize the 2011 conflict, I also provide an account of Libya-United States relations from
1969 onward. This historical context establishes that the United States had special geostrategic
interests in removing Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi from power, explaining his demonization as an
official enemy and U.S. support for the anti-Gaddafi insurgency. Thus, the 2011 civil war
provides the historical circumstances required for testing the worthy victims hypothesis of the
propaganda model: victims of official enemies will be worthy of support, our outrage and
indignation. This case study also stands on its own as a comparison of worthy and unworthy
victims given that the U.S.-backed side of the civil war—like Gaddafi—also carried out
atrocities.
The chapter proceeds as follows. I begin with the broader historical background from
Libya’s 1969 revolution through 2011. I then present a detailed account of the events from
February 15 to March 19, 2011, the period which is the focus of this study. Then I analyze the
Times’ coverage of Libya during this same period. This section is divided into four parts: a
general discussion of topics included and excluded in the Times; a look at worthy and unworthy
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victims in the conflict (especially Arab Libyans v. black Africans); the range of debate on policy
options for the United States; and letters to the editors, op-eds, and editorials. The focus on this
33-day period is important because February 15 may serve as the beginning of the 2011 civil
war, and March 19 marks the beginning of the NATO military intervention. Therefore, events
that occurred during this time provided the casus belli for the West. Carefully considering what
actually happened and what was known (and not known) at the time enables one to see very
clearly how the Obama administration and the media made a dubious case for humanitarian
intervention in Libya.
Historical Background: Libya-U.S. Relations, 1969-2011
Tensions between the West and Libya emerged after the 1969 revolution led by
Muammar Gaddafi. The revolutionary government sought to remove Libya from the reach of
Western political-economic domination and Gaddafi quickly closed the U.S. and British military
air bases inside Libya.
The revolution was a popular one, and later, one of the major initiatives of the new
government was to use Libya’s oil wealth to raise the standard of living for the general
population. Gaddafi nationalized oil companies, redistributed land and property more equitably,
expanded welfare programs, and encouraged worker control of several firms (Prashad 2012:1067). However, the Libyan Jamahiriya—approximately, the Libyan “state of the masses”—was
always undemocratic from the standpoint of the Western liberal tradition. Moreover, the new
social programs disproportionately benefited the Western part of Libya relative to the East. This
was due to tribal rivalries in which the Sa’adi tribes in the East—those who dominated under the
former regime of King Idris—were marginalized by Gaddafi and his tribe, the Gadhadhfa
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(Prashad 2012:112-113). According to Prashad, this “meant that the Eastern part of Libya
became a hive of conspiracy against the regime” (Prashad 2012:113).
Yet, the social programs were effective. In 2010, Libya scored very high on social
indicators, placing 55th out of 170 countries on the United Nations Human Development Index;
first among African countries, and fourth among all Arab countries (Prashad 2012:105). The
literacy rate was 90 percent. The programs were expensive, however, and in the 1980’s Libya’s
ongoing war with Chad began to exert additional pressure on the Libyan economy. Under these
conditions political tensions within Libya heightened. In addition to tribal rivalries, the new
middle class that formed as a consequence of the social programs began demanding more
political power (Prashad 2012: 111). A crucial split within the regime also emerged between
those known as the “reformers” and the conservative “hard-liners”. Both groups were led by
Gaddafi’s own sons, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi (the reformers) and Mutassim Gaddafi (the hardliners). The difference between these two factions turned largely on matters of economic policy,
with the reformers favoring opening Libya to greater Western economic penetration, and the
hard-liners, who were skeptical of such moves, fearful that opening Libya to greater Western
investment was an invitation to neocolonialism. To the hard-liners, such moves would be
contrary to the principles of the Jamahiriya.
In the 1980’s and 90’s Libya was also subjected to routine subversion and aggression by
the United States and Europe. In addition to the Reagan administration’s plot to assassinate
Gaddafi, this included military provocations intended to create pretexts for bombing, as in 1981,
when the United States shot down two Libyan fighter jets in the Gulf of Sirte (Forte 2012:70),
and in March 1986, when massive military mobilizations in the Gulf of Sirte did provoke a
Libyan response, which was then used as a pretext to bomb a missile defense system in Sirte
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(Forte 2012:71). The CIA also implemented various strategies to destabilize the Gaddafi regime,
and attempts were made to convince Egypt and Sudan to invade Libya. The Gaddafi regime
orchestrated the bombing of a nightclub in Berlin, most likely as a response to the March 1986
military exercises in the Gulf of Sirte. In turn, the United States used this as a pretext to bomb
Tripoli and Benghazi in April, killing 60 to 100 civilians (Chomsky 1986/2002:87-94). This is
the context in which the Gaddafi regime undertook bombings of international airliners, Pan Am
Flight 103 and UTA Flight 772, leading to U.N. sanctions against Libya in 1992. Western
subversion continued into the 1990’s, when in 1996, Great Britain’s M16 attempted to
assassinate Gaddafi with the help of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), an al-Qaeda cell
based in eastern Libya (Forte 2012:79-80).
In an attempt to resolve the many problems afflicting Libya, Gaddafi eventually
attempted to find a middle ground between the reformers and hard-liners in the regime. He did
this by making several concessions to the West, including cooperating in the Lockerbie
proceedings, and later, providing support for the United States in the so-called War on Terror,
halting Libya’s weapons of mass destruction programs, and in 2008, agreeing to pay $1.5 billion
in compensation for the various bombings. All of this cooled relations with the West. The U.N.
sanctions were suspended in 1999, and fully lifted in 2003. In 2006, Libya was removed from the
U.S. State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism, and in 2008, all outstanding claims
against Libya were dropped through Executive Order 13477, signed by George W. Bush
(Prashad 2012:125-126). By straightening out relations with the West, Gaddafi appeased the
reformers, but remained loyal to Libyan nationalism and autonomy. And by cooperating with the
United States in the War on Terror, Gaddafi also hoped to squash Islamic extremism inside
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Libya, particularly in the east, where it had taken root after various Libyan jihadists had returned
from the 1980’s war in Afghanistan and the civil war in Algeria.
While Gaddafi was seen as an ally in the War on Terror, and had improved relations with
the United States and Europe, he continued to be a problem for imperial planners in Washington.
In the early 1990’s, Gaddafi had turned away from the Arab League countries toward Africa. In
the spirit of the influential Pan-Africanist, Kwame Nkrumah, he began to pursue a vigorous PanAfrican policy in which Libya would make massive investments in development and aid projects
across several African states (on these projects, see Forte 2012:156-167). Gaddafi led in the
formation of what became the African Union, founded in 1999 in Sirte, Libya. He played a
leading role in the African Union, and Libya, along with Algeria, Egypt, and South Africa,
provided around 75 percent of the its budget (Campbell 2013:134). And in 2009 Gaddafi was
elected its chair.
The African Union was problematic for Western leaders principally for two reasons: It
sought to create a common African military defense system, in addition to a commercial trade
zone with financial institutions that could have freed Africa from economic subordination to, and
dependence on, the West. Indeed, the African Union had ambitions to create a whole body of
parallel institutions to Western-led investment banks, international criminal tribunals, and
military defense alliances, which were seen by many African leaders as instruments of
neocolonialism. Gaddafi was a vocal supporter of creating these parallel institutions as a way to
achieve African sovereignty, and he gained support for them through the African Union. At the
2009 A.U. Summit in Libya, member states agreed to Gaddafi’s plan to create an African
Defense Council under a new supranational African Authority, which would replace the A.U.
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Commission, the executive branch of the African Union (Forte 2012:169). At the summit,
according to Forte,
Gaddafi maintained that, “from a legal standpoint, international bodies and thirdparty states had no right to interfere in the internal problems of another state.” The
role of the AU should instead be “to mediate between opposing factions in an
effort to bring peace.” However, if internal conflict were to be intensified by
exogenous forces (he provided the example of oil-thirsty foreign governments in
Sudan), then the AU had a duty to intervene in a protective capacity. (Forte
2012:168)
The implication of this stance was clear: Western military intervention in African affairs was not
welcome, and the African Union could become a bulwark against it.
Such developments as the formation of an African Authority troubled U.S. diplomats and
the Obama administration, as revealed in the diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks in 2010,
and analyzed by Maximillian Forte in his authoritative work on NATO’s military intervention.
Such a military defense system was a direct challenge to the presence and purpose of the U.S.
Africa Command (AFRICOM) on the continent, which Gaddafi had always opposed, believing
that it infringed on African sovereignty and was likely to increase terrorism. In addition to the
Organization for African Unity, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) was one of
the intergovernmental organizations that provided the foundation for the creation of the African
Union. CEN-SAD, comprised of 23 African states, was founded in Libya in 1998, and its
purpose was to foster economic development and security for member states. It was opposed to
foreign military intervention in Africa, and in 2007, issued a statement rejecting the presence of
AFRICOM in any CEN-SAD state. This troubled U.S. diplomats, who dismissed CEN-SAD as a
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“Libyan organization.” Such a characterization was plainly untenable, however, given Gaddafi’s
popularity among CEN-SAD states, whose ministers unanimously supported his chairmanship of
the African Union in 2009 (Forte 2012:171-172). AFRICOM remained a major point of
disagreement between the Libyan government and a U.S. general who visited Libya twice in
2009 and attempted to shift Libyan opinion on AFRICOM (Forte 2012:200-202).
As an idea, AFRICOM itself was the creation of the oil industry, backed by a select
group of Congress members and military officers. In 2002, they issued a white paper, titled,
“African Oil: A Priority for U.S. National Security and African Development” (Forte 2012:190).
In the paper, Africa was identified as a major source of natural resources, especially oil and
strategic minerals, and as such, it would be “projected onto center stage in global affairs” (in
Forte 2012:191). Its authors argued that a “sub-unified command structure” in Africa was
desirable to secure “U.S. investments” and prevent “U.S. rivals such as China, adversaries such
as Libya, and terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda” from securing “political, diplomatic, and
economic presence in parts of Africa.” This would send “a powerful signal of long-term U.S.
commitment to regional stability and development” (in Forte 2012:192). The paper, Forte notes,
“was submitted to Congress on May 23, 2003 . . . Virtually all of their recommendations were
followed, in many cases in the same form and even with the same language” (Forte 2012:190). In
addition to the aspirations of U.S. oil firms, the paper reflected increasing concerns in
Washington over Chinese investment in Africa and continued difficulties negotiating with
Gaddafi in Libya, difficulties that would not lessen as time went on. The Gaddafi regime would
deny lucrative U.S. investment opportunities in Libya (e.g., Bechtel in 2008), and in 2006, the
expansion of the U.S. embassy (Forte 2012:58;78-79).
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Therefore, it is clear that the African Union, and especially Libya, were major obstacles
to Western, and especially U.S., geostrategic and economic interests. This was true in spite of the
fact that Gaddafi had made major diplomatic concessions to the Western powers.
United States diplomats were keen on the fact that Gaddafi’s Pan-African policies were
resented by many Libyans, who saw Libyan wealth being spent to uplift the rest of Africa while
conditions deteriorated inside Libya, especially after the global recession began in 2007 (Forte
2012:169-170). Development inside Libya was slowed down, too, by neoliberal economic
reforms approved by Gaddafi. These reforms were in effect by 2007, and included relaxing
restrictions on the import of consumer goods, privatization of banks, and easing currency
regulations (Prashad 2012:142). Then, in the third quarter of 2008, there was severe inflation,
especially in food prices, leading to social unrest (Prashad 2012:143). Economic pressure on the
Libyan economy in conjunction with Gaddafi’s Pan-Africanism has also been linked to the
fomentation of anti-black racism inside Libya (Forte 2012:177). Gaddafi had implemented an
open-door policy towards African migrants, and black African migrant workers made up large
proportions of the agriculture and construction labor forces. They filled menial work positions
that many Libyans did not want, but became objects of scorn for disaffected and unemployed
Libyans. In 2000, during which time Libya endured an economic crisis, there was a series of
anti-black pogroms across Libya that included lynchings and butcheries in which perhaps
hundreds of black Libyans and African migrants were murdered (Forte 2012:172-174). Firmly
entrenched in Libyan society, anti-black racism endured through 2011, and the 2011 war would
see ethnic cleansing of blacks from entire towns carried out by the U.S.-backed rebels.
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The Events Precipitating the 2011 NATO Intervention
On February 15, 2011, the arrests of human rights lawyer Fathi Terbil Salwa and novelist
Idris al-Mesmari sparked mass demonstrations in Benghazi. They, along with lawyer Salwa alDighaili were leaders of the February 17 Movement, “formed to commemorate the date of the
2006 police firing in Benghazi at a demonstration which killed ten, and to build the movement
for civil liberties that grew out of it” (Prashad 2012:94). The arrests were part of an attempt by
the Libyan government to preemptively suppress protests scheduled to take place on the 17th. But
these actions only aggravated protestors. In Benghazi, they clashed with police, who attempted to
quell the demonstrations. The news spread to other towns, sparking more protests, and in alBayda and Az Zintan, the protesters became violent, burning down a police headquarters and
police station.
By February 18, Gaddafi’s security forces had killed fifty-five people in Benghazi, along
with others in al-Bayda (23 killed), Ajdabiya (3 killed), and Derna (3 killed) (Human Rights
Watch 2011b). As early as the 17th, rumors began to appear on Twitter of black African
mercenaries flown into Libya by the government to repress and kill the protestors, though these
messages were from unreliable sources outside of Libya and the claims were not corroborated by
independent observers (see Forte 2012:210-215). The authors of these Twitter messages claimed
that black African mercenaries, hired by Gaddafi, were “killing everybody” and raping women in
their homes in Benghazi. In spite of a lack of independent confirmation, the black African
mercenary Twitter stories were quickly picked up and uncritically disseminated by the Western
media, as discussed more below. Accused of being Gaddafi loyalists or mercenaries, black
Libyans and black African migrant workers became targets of the protestors, in what had quickly
transformed from a mass protest into a violent rebellion in only a few days. (For details on the
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few early reports of attacks on African migrant workers, see Forte 2012:224-225.) According to
an anti-Gaddafi “activist,” on February 18, the rebels captured a military base in al-Bayda,
executing 50 black “mercenaries” and two Gaddafi loyalists. And in Derna, it was claimed that
“a number of conspirators were executed. They were locked up in the holding cells of a police
station because they resisted, and some died burning inside the building” (Black and Bowcott
2011).
On February 20, Human Rights Watch reported at least 233 deaths across five Libyan
cities, though it did not specify who the victims were or their loyalties (though the article did
mention one protestor who was killed) (Human Rights Watch 2011a). By February 21, Benghazi
was firmly under the control of the rebels, and remaining Gaddafi loyalists were “butchered by
angry mobs” (Prashad 2012:96). On the 21st it was also reported that Gaddafi had deployed the
air force against civilian protestors in Benghazi. A similar claim regarding aerial attacks on
civilians was made by Ali Abd al-Aziz al-Isawi, the defected Libyan Ambassador to India
(Prashad 2012:148). However, there was little evidence to substantiate these claims. Indeed, on
March 1, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, when asked at a press conference about
reports of air attacks on Benghazi, replied: “We’ve seen the press reports, but we have no
confirmation of that,” a statement backed up by his colleague, Admiral Mike Mullen (in Forte
2012:242; U.S. Department of Defense 2011). The next day, Radio Netherlands Worldwide
(Radio Netherlands Worldwide 2011) reported that Peter Bouckeart of Human Rights Watch
found no evidence of black African mercenaries in eastern Libya where they were allegedly
captured by the rebels. They were in fact Libyan soldiers of African descent. Moreover, Human
Rights Watch had not yet been able to confirm that there were mercenaries in the west or central
regions.
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Even though the rebels had taken over military bases, police stations, and committed acts
of violence constituting war crimes and possibly crimes against humanity, the Western media,
human rights agencies, the United Nations, and defecting Libyan diplomats focused almost
exclusively on Gaddafi’s repression of what were still being described as “peaceful protestors.”
On February 21, a Libyan mission to the United Nations denounced Gaddafi in New York.
There, Libyan Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ibrahim Dabbashi,
claimed: “The regime of Qaddafi has already started genocide against the Libyan people”
(Moynihan 2011). He reiterated the African mercenary story, calling for the implementation of a
no-fly zone to prevent Gaddafi from flying in more of the alleged mercenaries. The U.N.
Security Council released a press statement the next day, emphasizing government attacks on
“peaceful demonstrators,” and Libya’s need to “meet its responsibility to protect its population”
(United Nations 2011). It said nothing about how the peaceful demonstrators were targeting
black Libyans and African nationals, which unlike Dabbashi’s claim, was realistic and confirmed
by independent observers.
Dabbashi was among the first of many high level defectors who would claim genocide
was occurring in Libya. The cry of “genocide,” along with the African mercenary myth, was
intended to provoke Western military intervention and would become a key propaganda line to
justify waging war to publics in the United States and the rest of the NATO countries. Indeed, on
February 23, Obama announced that his administration was mulling over actions to take against
Gaddafi. And on the 25th, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated via Twitter
that “I have called for an emergency meeting in the North Atlantic Council today to discuss
Libya.” NATO, he said, would be “prepared for any eventuality” (in Forte 2012:240). On
February 26, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1970, which again emphasized Libyan
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state repression of “peaceful” protestors, calling for a halt to violence, free travel for foreign
nationals fleeing violence, an arms embargo, and asset freezes for certain Libyan government
officials. It also referred the Gaddafi regime to the International Criminal Court. President
Obama told German Chancellor Angela Merkel that Gaddafi had “lost legitimacy” and must
“leave now,” with similar declarations coming from secretary of state, Hillary Clinton. The
predominant narrative in Western discourse at this time, then, was that it was peaceful protestors
defending themselves against the violent repression of the Gaddafi regime, rather than a civil war
between a violent, and increasingly armed rebellion and the Libyan government. It was the
narrative of the rebel leadership and Western heads of state.
Meanwhile, inside Libya, there were more defections from the government and the
rebellion was swelling its membership and weapons stockpiles. On February 27, the National
Transition Council (NTC), the new self-appointed transition government of Libya, was formed
by Gaddafi’s former Justice Minister, Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, and ex-Interior Minister ‘Abd alFattah Younis, who would become the military leader of the rebels. Not coincidentally, the NTC
was made up of the reformers from the Gaddafi regime. There were mass defections in the army,
with ten thousand troops joining the rebellion in the east, now fully under control of the
opposition. On March 1, several high-level military leaders also defected to the rebellion. At this
point in the conflict, then, the rebels commanded their own army. They shot down three Libyan
Air Force jets (Prashad 2012:153) and by mid-March had secured several towns, including
Misrata, where upon defeating Gaddafi’s forces on the 13th, they took command of as many as
one hundred tanks (Prashad 2012:154). From February 21 on, several fighter jets defected,
supplying the rebellion with its own air force, and on March 13, Libyan Air Force Colonel Ali
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Atiyya defected. Two days later, the rebels used their air power to destroy three government
warships off the coasts of Ajdabiya and Benghazi.
While the rebels had made significant gains in only a matter of weeks, ousting Gaddafi’s
forces from several towns and major cities in the East and West, Gaddafi still had support from
the populations in the central towns where his forces were able to expel the rebels. Importantly,
Gaddafi had major support in his home town of Sirte, which resisted the rebel insurgency and
supported Gaddafi until his assassination there in October, 2011, and which would become the
site of major war crimes committed by the insurgents and NATO. Still with a significant base of
support in the country then, Gaddafi proceeded to attack the rebels, advancing towards Benghazi
on March 14, where his forces were held off at Ajdabiya (Prashad 2012:160), a strategically
important city 100 miles south of Benghazi. “It is at this point,” Prashad notes, “that the calls
began to intensify for either a ‘no-fly’ zone or some kind of intervention to prevent a massacre”
(Prashad 2012:155). Of decisive importance, on the 13th, the Arab League made a request to the
U.N. Security Council for a no-fly zone. On March 17, reiterating earlier announcements,
Gaddafi announced on state television that an assault on Benghazi was imminent, but that
amnesty would be offered to those who surrendered, and an escape route would be opened to the
east to avoid a protracted battle, an important point lost on the Western media, which preferred
the image of Gaddafi the mass murderer (Kuperman 2011; Landler and Bilefsky 2011). Yet, the
claim made by the NTC and Western leaders was that a massacre, if not “genocide”, would be
carried out by Gaddafi’s forces in Benghazi. Gaddafi’s forces mobilized outside of Ajdabiya,
still held by the rebels on the 17th.
Before turning to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973, which established a no-fly
zone and provided the legal cover for overt Western military intervention (the CIA and M16
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were already inside Libya assisting the rebels in mid-February and early March, respectively
[Mazzetti and Schmitt 2011]), it is important to consider the A.U. peace process that was already
under way, and almost entirely ignored by the Western media and heads of state, as discussed
below. After an initial meeting on Libya on February 23, on March 10, in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, the A.U. Peace and Security Council set up the High Level Ad Hoc Committee on
Libya, which drafted a “roadmap” for a diplomatic solution to the conflict (Dewall 2012;
Prashad 2012:188-189). Paragraph 7 of the Council’s communiqué contained the core of the
A.U. peace proposal:
. . . the current situation in Libya calls for an urgent African action for: (i) the
immediate cessation of all hostilities, (ii) the cooperation of the competent Libyan
authorities to facilitate the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance to the needy
populations, (iii) the protection of foreign nationals, including the African
migrants living in Libya, and (iv) the adoption and implementation of the political
reforms necessary for the elimination of the causes of the current crisis. (African
Union 2011)
The communiqué also noted that Gaddafi had committed to “embark on a path to reforms.”
Prashad notes that “Gaddafi respected the African Union. . . . If anyone could influence Gaddafi,
it was the African Union. By all indications, Gaddafi did not want to become an utter pariah, at
least not in the eyes of those whom he sought out as his peers (the African leadership). That was
the only possible lever” (Prashad 2012:189).
The Council established the African Union Panel on Libya, comprised of five heads of
African states and a team of African foreign ministers. The Panel included Mali’s Amadou
Toumani Touré, Uganda’s Oryem Okello, and South Africa’s Jacob Zuma, all widely respected
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figures in African politics (Prashad 2012:189). The A.U. plan was to fly the Panel to Libya on
March 20 and engage in dialogue with all parties to the conflict, as stipulated in the roadmap.
However, the peace panel was blocked by the no-fly zone imposed by UNSCR1973, which went
into effect on March 20. According to Prashad, there were “assurances from both Tripoli and
Benghazi that they would entertain the mediation” (Prashad 2012:190). Thus, while the A.U.
proposal was not without problems (see Dewall 2012), and would not have guaranteed an end to
the conflict, the U.N. Security Council, and in particular the United States, France, Great Britain,
and Lebanon, undermined the most likely route to a peaceful resolution to the civil war in Libya
at this early stage. This was in fact the view of African leaders involved in the A.U. plan. And as
we shall see, mention of this stage of the A.U. peace effort was virtually nonexistent in New York
Times reporting.
The Obama administration was initially reluctant to support a no-fly zone over Libya, in
part because of the likely political consequences of military involvement in another Muslim
country. But the Arab League request to the U.N. Security Council provided a seal of approval
for Western intervention. After much debate, on March 17, the Security Council passed
Resolution 1973, with five countries abstaining: Brazil, China, Germany, India, and Russia.
Pressure from Washington on Zuma—a phone call from Obama—was necessary to get the
crucial vote from South Africa to pass the resolution. While Resolution 1973 noted the efforts of
the A.U. High Level Committee to Libya, it gave priority to the League of Arab States “in
matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security in the region” (United
Nations Security Council 2011). It established the no-fly zone, and, crucially, gave member
states authorization “to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution
1970 (2011) to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under the threat of attack . . .
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including Benghazi” (United Nations Security Council 2011). The key clause, “notwithstanding
paragraph 9 of resolution 1970,” which referred to an arms embargo, contradicted paragraph 13
of 1973, which called for an arms embargo—based on paragraphs 9 and 10 of Resolution 1970!
This gave Washington the “flexibility” to arm the rebellion if they decided to, as White House
spokesperson Jay Carney put it (Prashad 2012:223). Resolution 1973 also condemned “the
continuing flows of mercenaries,” calling on the Libyan government “to prevent the provision of
armed mercenary personnel to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya” (United Nations Security Council
2011), even though the veracity of the mercenary claim was still an open question. The March 10
A.U. Peace and Security Council communiqué cited above took a much more reserved approach
to the mercenary allegations, calling for further investigations. And even though its major
ostensive purpose was the protection of civilians, Resolution 1973 made no explicit reference to
the crimes perpetrated against black Libyans and African nationals by the rebels, and
condemnation came down exclusively on the side of the government.
The Human Rights Watch reports cited above were among the few credible reports
available on the number casualties inside Libya during the period of February 15 to March 19.
Based on these reports and others from Western news agencies, some of which are cited above,
one can only piece together a very rough approximation of what actually happened inside Libya
during this time and the scale of the violence. Yet, the narrative that does emerge is quite
different from the one perpetuated by the elite Libyan defectors, anonymous Twitter accounts,
human rights organizations, the United Nations, and Western governments. The dominant
narrative was that of peaceful protestors resisting a violent dictator, rather than a civil war
between a deadly, armed rebellion and a longstanding regime, however detestable, threatened
and attempting to hold on to power. The “peaceful protestor” story was credible through
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February 17 at the latest. But by February 18, the claim that the uprising was uniformly
“peaceful” was no longer plausible. And arguably, by February 22, with mass defections from
the Libyan military, including some high-level figures, a full-scale civil war had erupted. Also
implausible was the claim that Gaddafi was carrying out anything approximating a “genocide” or
mass killing of civilians, or that such an atrocity was impending in Benghazi. For this there
simply was no evidence beyond the outlandish claims of Libyan dissidents and selective
interpretations of Gaddafi’s belligerent pronouncements on Libyan state television. Finally, there
was very thin evidence that Gaddafi had imported mercenaries from other African states. Yet,
this was unanimously treated as fact by those in the elite power bloc mobilizing against Gaddafi.
According to the propaganda model, then, we would expect the New York Times to
emphasize and exaggerate Gaddafi’s crimes and focus extensively on his regime’s victims while
downplaying the context of the civil war. We would expect it to conceal or minimize the crimes
of the anti-Gaddafi opposition and downplay anti-black racism and the killing of blacks. We
would also expect blacks to be conflated with mercenaries. Bouckaert’s report that there was no
evidence of foreign mercenaries in eastern Libya will be downplayed or ignored, as will the A.U.
peace effort. There will be extensive coverage of government aerial attacks, but little to no
coverage of rebel air attacks. All of this will be in accord with the opposition’s perspective on the
conflict, which will be the dominant perspective; there will be many interviews with antiGaddafi Libyans, but few if any interviews or quotes of pro-government Libyans. There will be
few or no interviews with black Africans or Libyans, and the perspectives of the Gaddafi regime
itself will be dismissed. And finally, we would expect the range of debate to be limited to an
American exceptionalism framework in which the United States’ official pretext of protecting
civilians is not questioned.
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The New York Times’ Coverage of Libya: February 15 through March 19, 2011
Summary of the Coverage: Topics Included and Excluded
The New York Times began covering the protests in Libya on February 16 (February 17
in print), noting the unrest in the context of the Arab Spring. This very early coverage balanced
the violence of the regime with that of the protesters, who in Benghazi, it was pointed out, were
armed with gasoline bombs and rocks, and had set fire to a police station and security
headquarters in Az Zintan, as noted above. Gaddafi was described as “erratic and quixotic,” and
it was noted that he traveled with female bodyguards and lived in a tent (Cowell 2011a).
Gaddafi’s person was a central theme in the Times coverage, where he was invariably treated
with contempt, described as “erratic,” “megalomaniacal,” “evil,” “clownish,” “incoherent,” “a
Stalin who aspired to become a Marx,” and so on. This theme appeared in at least 19 articles (see
table 1.1 on page 87).
The relative balance that characterized the first day of coverage gave way to a sustained
propaganda campaign by no later than February 23, when Libya figured prominently in the
Times until the bombing began on the 19th. Protestor violence largely dropped out of reporting
after the 17th. The focus shifted to Gaddafi’s “violent crackdown” on protestors and civilians, a
leading theme which appeared in 33 articles. Protestor violence was only featured in 6 articles,
often described as occurring within the context of “battle” or self-defense. The February 18 rebel
killings of “mercenaries” and “conspirators” was mentioned in one February 24 article (Fahim
2011b) that appeared on page A-10, and which characterized the victims as mercenaries, as if
this was a simple matter of fact. The mercenary story was another leading theme in the Times
sample, appearing in 35 articles—more than any other theme in my analysis. The initial source
on the mercenaries, it appears from Times reporting, was anti-Gaddafi Libyans, who were
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Table 1.1. Topics Covered by the New York Times on Libya Between February 15 and March 19,
2011
Topics compatible
government agenda

with

No. articles dealing with topic

Percentage of articles dealing with
topic

Gov. crackdown on protestors,
civilians

34

17%

Gaddafi’s personality

20

10%

Foreign mercenaries

36

18%

Gaddafi’s February 21 air attacks
on Tripoli

5

2%

Interviews or quotes
Gaddafi Libyans

29

14%

Gaddafi air strikes after March 5

14

7%

Topics incompatible with U.S.
government agenda

No. articles dealing with topic

Percentage of articles dealing with
topic

Protestor violence

6

3%

Rebel killings of “mercenaries”,
“conspirators”

1

>1%

Defense Secretary Gates and
Admiral
Mullen
on
“no
confirmation” of gov. airstrikes

--

0%

Anti-black racism/violence against
blacks

5

2%

Interviews or quotes
Gaddafi civilians

pro-

3

1%

Interviews or quotes of black
Africans

5

2%

March A.U. peace effort

1

>1%

--

0%

1

>1%

of

of

Bouckaert’s report finding
mercenaries in eastern Libya
Rebel air strikes

U.S.

anti-

no

Note: This table presents a list of topics that are compatible with the U.S. government agenda in Libya and a list of
topics that are incompatible with it. The table shows that the compatible topics tended to receive more coverage than
the incompatible topics. The third column shows the percentage of articles of the sample which contained this topic,
based on a sample of 203 articles (see appendix D).
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frequently interviewed and quoted (29 articles), and Western officials like John Kerry who
presented no independent evidence of mercenary deployment by Gaddafi. Peter Bouckaert’s
finding that there were no mercenaries in the eastern Libyan prisons he visited was not
mentioned, though the Times did make note of his reporting from eastern Libya when he made
this observation.
Though one could read about the U.N. Security Council’s condemnation of the use of
force against “peaceful demonstrators” and find other generalizations about “peaceful
protestors,” the Times did not usually emphasize that the protestors were peaceful. However, its
reporters often blurred the distinction between armed rebels and civilian protestors, and they did
so too frequently for this to be written off as occasional sloppy reporting. On February 19, for
example, Anthony Shadid wrote that “protestors had wrested control of several towns, including
Bayda and Darnah . . .” (Shadid 2011a). And on February 21, when Benghazi fell to the rebels,
David Kirkpatrick and Mona El-Naggar reported that “protestors” fought government security
forces for control of Benghazi (Kirkpatrick and El-Naggar 2011a). Very typical for the Times,
Marlise Simons referred to “widespread condemnation of the bloody crackdown in Libya against
antigovernment protestors” (Simons 2011), as if the “crackdown” was directed solely at
protestors. The frequent conflation of armed rebels with protestors helped sustain the preferred
image of besieged civilians resisting Gaddafi’s “bloody crackdown on protests,” rather than give
the impression that there was a civil war, which could have legitimized Gaddafi’s later, though
not initial (i.e., on February 15), use of force, which at that time was directed at protestors. This
distorted image was also promoted in Dabbashi’s announcement in New York that Gaddafi was
“killing the Libyan people” (Protess 2011), which became a favorite refrain in the Times and
Western commentary more generally. Gaddafi was routinely described by Times writers, heads
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of state, diplomats, and others, as “killing,” “slaughtering,” “butchering,” or having “declared
war on” “his own people.” While the Gaddafi regime surely fired on, and killed, many civilians,
the locution “killing his own people” implied that Gaddafi’s actions were principally against a
civilian population rather than armed insurgents. And never were the rebels described as at war
with or killing their own people, which they, like the regime, certainly were, given that they too
were belligerents in a civil war.
Only by February 25 did the Times begin regularly describing the anti-government
fighters as “rebels,” a “well-armed revolutionary movement” (Fahim and Kirkpatrick 2011c),
properly differentiating them from civilian protestors. And only by early March did the Times
begin to concede that Libya was “sliding into civil war” (Fahim and Kirkpatrick 2011b), even
though it had been at civil war arguably since the 22nd, when eastern Libya had fallen to the
rebels. As the Times moved towards a civil war framework, the “bloody crackdown on
protestors” story line was superseded by somewhat more realistic reporting that focused on rebel
and government clashes as the two factions fought for control of various cities and towns. This
occurred around the time when the regime began its offensive to take back eastern Libya and
Zawiyah and the existence of a civil war could no longer be denied.
On February 28, a U.S. diplomat was quoted in the Times as saying that the no-fly zone
hoped for by the rebels would be considered only if there was a significant increase in “statesponsored violence.” In the Times, when the rebels advanced on Tripoli and Sirte, this was not
considered an important uptick in violence, and these events were hardly noticed. But as Gaddafi
began the offensive to take back the east, the Times and the rebels got their wish, and on the front
page of the next day’s March 1 edition, one could read about Gaddafi’s “escalation of
hostilities,” replete with alleged aerial attacks, moving Libya “a step closer” to civil war. Only in
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the 12th paragraph was it noted that the alleged airstrikes could not be independently confirmed
(Fahim and Kirkpatrick 2011d). The source of information on Gaddafi’s “escalation” was, of
course, the rebel leadership, who were undoubtedly following very closely the Western media,
and had read that more serious consideration of a no-fly zone in the Security Council would
require an escalation of violence. Along with the mercenaries, Gaddafi’s alleged air attacks was a
key propaganda motif in the Times reporting, as the stated purpose of a no-fly zone went from
preventing Gaddafi from importing mercenaries to preventing air attacks on civilians (Bumiller
2011), even though there was no reliable evidence that there were such air attacks (or
mercenaries). In a March 2 web article from the Times, Steven Erlanger quoted Shashank Joshi,
Associate Fellow at London’s Royal United Services Institute: “There have been no large
massacres, air power is being used in a calculated way and he [Gaddafi] is launching probing
attacks” (Erlanger 2011). This contrarian analysis did not make it to the print edition the next
day. Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Admiral Michael Mullen’s March 1 statement that
airstrikes on civilians could not be confirmed was not reported.
Even as it could no longer be ignored that a bona fide civil war was being fought,
emphasis was typically on Gaddafi’s military actions and alleged brutality toward civilians. As
the regime advanced into the east—countering the rebel effort to overtake Sirte—and
counterattacking in Zawiyah and Tripoli, David Kirkpatrick reported on the front page of the
March 5 edition that Gaddafi “counterattacked with brutal force,” using “military power against
his own citizens” (Kirkpatrick 2011b). With only 3 out of 40 paragraphs dedicated to the fighting
in the east, he focused mostly on the repression of civilian protestors in and near Tripoli, as told
from the perspective of anti-Gaddafi Libyans. In line with Kirkpatrick’s slanted analysis,
throughout the edition there were numerous references to Gaddafi’s use of violence against
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civilians and unarmed protestors. Rachel Donadio’s lead paragraph in a March 5 web article
began, “In response to the murderous tactics of Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi’s militias against
unarmed protestors . . .” (Donadio 2011), and J. David Goodman opened a web article
highlighting Gaddafi’s “harsh crackdown on demonstrators” (Goodman 2011), mentioning
nothing about armed rebels or a civil war. Mark Landler’s front page article on the 6th quoted
former State Department director of policy planning, Anne-Marie Slaughter: “The international
community cannot stand by and watch the massacre of Libyan protestors. In Rwanda we
watched. In Kosovo we acted” (Landler 2011a). Poor and tawdry comparisons to historic
conflicts in Rwanda, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Iraq were frequently invoked to justify Western
military intervention, an interesting propaganda maneuver I deconstruct below. For now, we note
that the emphasis on real or alleged violence against protestors and the relative downplaying of
the civil war context in which this occurred assisted Western decision-makers in making their
case for military intervention, which was predicated on protecting civilians from a massacre.
After Gaddafi’s renewed offensive, coverage emphasized the asymmetry of forces in the
conflict. In a front page article, Anthony Shadid (2011b) reported that, after the government
assault on Ras Lanuf, “The momentum shifted decisively,” illustrating “the asymmetry of the
conflict.” And the attack on Ras Lanuf by the government constituted a “vicious counterattack
against its own people.” Shadid warned that limited Western actions short of military
intervention seem “unlikely to be able to reverse the momentum.” He cited a rebel fighter who
lamented the superior organization and training of the government forces. “There was a growing
sense among the opposition,” Shadid continued, “echoed by leaders in opposition-held Benghazi
and rebels on the front, that they could not single-handedly defeat Colonel Qaddafi’s forces.”
Yet, towards the end of the article, opposition spokesperson Essam Gheriani is quoted as saying
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of Ras Lanuf that “It’s not a permanent setback,” and spokesperson Abdul Hafiz Ghoga claimed
that the rumors of its fall were not accurate. Overall, however, the article gave the impression of
rebels in retreat, panicked, and disorderly. Shadid might as well have written that the rebels were
in dire need of benevolent U.S. military leadership and assistance. This was indeed the
conclusion towards which U.S. political leadership was moving, and the Times was apparently
eager to assist them in arriving at that conclusion.
The Times’ focus on rebels in retreat and “leaderless” (Bronner and Sanger 2011)
disarray continued for the next several days. They were also characterized during this time as
virtually begging for a Western-imposed no-flight zone, now supported by the Arab League.
With few exceptions, a no-flight zone was the only solution that the Times would entertain for
the conflict in Libya. The A.U. peace plan was mentioned only once in the sample, several days
after it was released, and in passing:
While the Arab League was quick to suspend Libya last month and has even
asked the United Nations Security Council to impose a no-flight zone to stop
Colonel Qaddafi’s attacks on his own people, the African Union has taken a more
cautious stance, deciding only on Friday [sic] to send negotiators who will meet
with both sides. (Gettleman 2011)
In spite of his reported willingness to engage the opposition through the A.U. framework, the
Times characterized Gaddafi as adamantly against negotiation and dialogue with the opposition,
quoting an interview from the Italian newspaper Il Giornale: “Dialogue with whom? The people
are on my side” (Shadid 2011c), and emphasizing his will to “fight to the last man” (Kirkpatrick
2011c). And while it was reported that Gaddafi offered amnesty to the rebels if they surrendered,
this article was placed on page A-4 of the March 15 issue. (Ghoga and Younis’s more optimistic
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picture of the rebel predicament was also noted in this article. They touted their “sizable fighting
force” and fleet of one hundred tanks, facts relegated to the thirteenth paragraph [Shadid and
Fahim 2011]). The obvious implication is that if Gaddafi will not negotiate, what other solution
can there be to stop the massacre of civilians?
As the Security Council debated the substance of what would become Resolution 1973,
the Times summoned the expert authority of Human Rights Watch’s Tom Malinowski, who was
quoted as saying that Gaddafi will “stage a bloodbath” in Benghazi if not stopped. In the same
article, Ibrahim Dabbashi appeared again, this time warning that there could be a “genocide” if
the West did not intervene within the “next 10 hours” (Landler and Bilefsky 2011). These are
incredible claims, as discussed above, that served no other purpose but to mobilize support for
military intervention. They were not treated with any caution by Landler and Bilefsky. (Gaddafi
had not carried out large-scale massacres in the cities and towns he recaptured, and exactly
which ethnic group would be the target of “genocide” was unclear.)
The contradictions of the Western move towards military intervention emerged clearly
and fully in the front page article of the March 18 issue (March 17 online), the day before the
intervention began, and the day after Resolution 1973 passed. It pointed out that Gaddafi offered
amnesty to those who would surrender and noted that the regime was willing to enter a ceasefire.
But if both or even one of these claims was true, why was military intervention still necessary?
Bilefsky and Landler wrote that diplomats spoke of a “moral imperative” to protect civilians, and
“the political imperative of [the] United States not watching from the sidelines while a notorious
dictator violently crushed a democratic rebellion.” Bilefsky and Landler elaborated: “The vote
was also a seminal moment for the 192-member United Nations and was being watched closely
as a critical test of its ability to take collective action to prevent atrocities against civilians.
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Diplomats said the specter of former conflicts in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Darfur, when a divided
and sluggish Security Council was seen to have cost lives, had given a sense of moral urgency to
Thursday’s debate” (Bilefsky and Landler 2011). But, again, what evidence was there that
civilians were threatened to the extent they were in Bosnia, Rwanda, or Darfur? Or Cambodia
under the Khmer Rouge, or in Iraq under Saddam? Beyond unsupported, and occasionally
ludicrous claims from the likes of Malinowski, Dabbashi, and various Western political elites,
there simply was none. One couldn’t find it in the Times, nor any human rights report, but it did
not stop the Times from faithfully and uncritically disseminating these claims on a daily basis.
The Times did occasionally claim that there were civilian massacres during the March
government counterattack, in Zawiyah for instance (Fahim and Kirkpatrick 2011a), but its
correspondents never produced evidence of anything approximating systematic mass murder.
We can recall Herman and Chomsky’s quip that when official enemies are vilified, the
demand for serious evidence in support of claims of their abuses is suspended, “and charlatans
can thrive as evidential sources. Defectors, informers, and assorted other opportunists move to
the center stage as ‘experts’.”
Worthy and Unworthy Victims in Libya
A quantitative analysis of the Times sample reveals quite substantial differences in the
number of references to the three categories of victim in the Libyan civil war. As victims, antiGaddafi protestors and civilians received the greatest number of references, having been
mentioned in 42 articles or other items (lists, quotes, The Lede blog, etc. Hereafter I will also
refer to these items as articles). They were mentioned as victims in 17 front-page articles and 6
editorials. Anti-Gaddafi rebels were mentioned as victims in 5 articles, and 2 front-page articles.
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By contrast, blacks were mentioned as victims in only 5 articles total, 1 front-page article, and 0
editorials.
Table 1.2. Worthy and Unworthy Victims in the New York Times’ Coverage of Libya, February
15 through March 19, 2011
Victims/Parties to Articles
Conflict
No. % of row 1

Front-page
articles*

1. Anti-Gaddafi
Protestors/
Civilians

43

100%

17

100%

6

100%

2. Anti-Gaddafi
Insurgents

5

12%

2

12%

--

0%

3. Black
Africans/
Black Libyans

5

12%

1

6%

--

0%

Editorials

No. % of row 1

No. % of row 1

*These articles are also included in the overall count of articles in the “Articles” column.
Note: This table shows three classes of victims in the Libyan civil war and the respective volume of coverage they
received in terms of number of articles in which they were mentioned when the subject was their victimization.
Anti-Gaddafi protestors/civilians are the reference group because they received the most coverage; percent coverage
of the anti-Gaddafi insurgents and black Africans/black Libyans is given as a percentage of the total number of
articles on anti-Gaddafi protestors/civilians (e.g., 5/43 = 11.6%).

In general, references to anti-Gaddafi Libyans as victims were numerous and prominent
in reporting. A casual reader would have been very likely to read about Gaddafi’s “violent
crackdown on protestors” or the “slaughter of his own people”, or find dramatic quotes from
anti-government Libyans. Far less likely, however, would it have been for a reader to ever
encounter an article mentioning anti-black racism in eastern Libya, or the killing of blacks there
(see also table 1.1 above). When black victims were mentioned, they were either called
mercenaries (Fahim 2011), mentioned towards the end of the article (Cowell 2011b), or their
victimization was effectively blamed indirectly on Gaddafi by attributing it to Arab Libyans’ fear
of mercenaries (Fahim 2011; Cowell 2011b; Otterman 2011; Kirkpatrick and Sayare, 2011).
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Fahim’s Feburary 27 article also claimed that “Libya has become a dangerous place to be a black
man, after Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi used African mercenaries to kill opponents of his
government” (my emphasis, Fahim 2011a), as if anti-black racism did not exist in Libya prior to
the supposed arrival of Gaddafi’s mercenaries. And while black African migrant workers were
occasionally interviewed—they occasionally provided lurid details to Times correspondents
about the consequences of being black in eastern Libya—the Times provided only one quote
from a black African that expressed outrage and indignation at being harassed, attacked, and
killed by Arab Libyans (Kirkpatrick and Sayare 2011). (This is all the more remarkable given
that one third of the Libyan population was black.) Quite the opposite was true regarding the
anti-Gaddafi protestors and rebels; dramatic quotes expressing outrage at government violence
and crimes saturated Times reporting on Libya.
The killing of Arab civilians in Libya merited the outrage and indignation of Western
political leadership and the Times editors—for example, when on February 22, “witnesses” and
“residents” in Tripoli claimed that mercenaries were strafing crowds with machine gun fire and
government planes were bombing protestors (Kirkpatrick and El-Naggar 2011b). As the country
was at this time blocked to foreign reporters, these claims could not be independently verified.
Such reports were enough, however, to earn the righteous condemnation of Western officials like
Hillary Clinton, who blamed the regime for the bloodshed, “which she called ‘completely
unacceptable’,” as reported by Landler on the following day (February 23) (Landler 2011b).
Obama would chime in, too: “The suffering and bloodshed is outrageous, and it is unacceptable.”
“These actions violate international norms and every standard of common decency. This
violence must stop” (Cooper and Landler 2011). To this, Clinton added that the administration
“will look at all possible options to put an end to the violence, to try to influence the

96

government” (Cooper and Landler 2011). Again, on February 27, the Times reported that Obama
condemned the use of “mass violence against his own people” (Wyatt 2011). And so on. Similar
responses to the violence perpetrated against black Libyans by the “peaceful protestors” could
not be found in the Times from the editors or state officials.
While it is undoubtedly true that the regime was killing civilians (and insurgents),
meriting outrage and condemnation, the claims featured in the Times regarding this killing were
frequently outlandish, and occasionally absurd. We have already seen that Dabbashi was an
important source on the conflict in Libya, claiming “genocide” was occurring or would occur.
On February 24, Italy’s foreign minister, Franco Frattini, was cited as claiming that 1,000
“civilians” were killed in “clashes,” only citing “credible sources,” which were not identified.
Frattini argued that “nothing can justify the violent killing of hundreds of innocent civilians”
(Donadio 2011b). Of course, Frattini could not have known whether the hundreds of casualties
were “innocent” civilians or otherwise. On February 26, Libya’s ambassador to the United
Nations, Abdurrahman Shalgham, defected, and compared Gaddafi to Pol Pot and Hitler, as
reported on the front page. In the other front-page article on the 26th, Cooper and Landler wrote
that Gaddafi was “killing more of his people every day in a desperate bid to remain in power”
(Cooper and Landler 2011), as if rebels could still be described as “his people”. The active voice
implied that the killing was systematic, or at least deliberately intended to exterminate the
opposition. France’s Sarkosy went as far as to claim that the killing was systematic, as reported
in the same edition: “The systematic violence against the Libyan people is unacceptable and will
be the subject of investigations and sanctions” (Arsu and Erlanger 2011). To add to the eerie
picture of systematic extermination, the Times occasionally reported on the regime’s alleged
removal of bodies from the streets in an effort to cover up its crimes. Of course, the possibility
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was never considered that the soldiers were removing their own dead from the streets, as antigovernment Libyans were the only authorities on this matter.
With respect to Herman and Chomsky’s worthy and unworthy victims hypothesis, then,
we can conclude that it is well-supported by this sample. The Times made Gaddafi’s attacks on
civilians a central theme in its reporting in the first month leading up to the intervention, while
downplaying or not reporting at all the crimes of the anti-government opposition, namely the
killing of black Africans and Gaddafi loyalists. It is likely that the disparity in the extent of
coverage reflects a real disparity in the scale of killing on both sides, but the qualitative analysis
reveals that the differential treatment of blacks and Arab Libyans was not only in terms of
volume. Furthermore, a reader could always be sure that the killing of civilians was attributable
to Gaddafi. But the killing of blacks was often contextualized as in response to the alleged
mercenaries and sometimes glossed over without a search for responsibility or entirely without
comment (see, for example, Fahim [2011b]). And the victimization of blacks was never
identified as a problem to be addressed with any kind of state intervention or intergovernmental
action, unlike Gaddafi’s killing of civilians or his advance on Benghazi. Nor did the
victimization of blacks cast any doubt on the credibility of the democratic aspirations of the
Libyan opposition in Benghazi where these crimes were reportedly occurring. Black Africans did
appear as sources, but far less frequently than Arab Libyans, and their moral indignation was
infrequently expressed (once).
The Range of Debate
As noted above, and indicated in table 1.1, the reporting of events was told almost
exclusively from the perspective of the anti-Gaddafi resistance. Protestors and the NTC
leadership were the primary authorities on the course of events transpiring inside Libya.
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Interviews with pro-Gaddafi civilians were featured in only 3 articles, where they were dismissed
as part of Gaddafi’s “personality cult” (Kirkpatrick 2011a), bought by the government, or as out
of touch with reality. By contrast, there were 29 articles with interviews or quotes from antiGaddafi Libyans. In the Times, Gaddafi was never portrayed as having real civilian support; progovernment protests could only be contrived by the regime (Kirkpatrick 2011c). The Gaddafi
regime’s perspective on the conflict was also dismissed, usually without any argument. For
example, Gaddafi’s claim that Western intervention was motivated by oil interests was with few
exceptions an untenable proposition in the Times, as was his claim that the rebels were
influenced or otherwise infiltrated by al-Qaeda, which was certainly plausible in eastern Libya
with the al-Qaeda-linked LIFG. The range of debate on “What Should Be Done About Libya?”
generally conformed to these constraints on analysis.
There were two extreme opposite positions in the debate presented in the Times. One was
represented by Michael Ratner of the President Center for Constitutional rights, whose letter to
the editors (New York Times 2011c) slipped through the propaganda model filters. He pointed
out that there is no “widely recognized legal exception for so-called humanitarian intervention,
and for good reason. Often such claims are a fig leaf for intervention in countries that are of
strategic importance for oil or other reasons.” He went on to compare Libya to the situation in
the Ivory Coast, which did not merit Western intervention, as did another letter writer. And, in a
different issue, another letter contributor pointed out that “our reaction . . . to any atrocity is
always mediated by self-interest. Morality is, first and foremost, a utilitarian concept. If we learn
that lesson maybe we will finally stop proselytizing about freedom and democracy” (New York
Times 2011g). However, this letter appeared on March 17 (March 16, online), when
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deliberations for intervention were already well under way. Furthermore, these three letters were
very unusual aberrations in the Times—three critical drops in a sea of propaganda.
On the other side was the extreme hawk position, held by Anne-Marie Slaughter, John
Kerry, and others: “The international community cannot stand by and watch the massacre of
Libyan protestors. In Rwanda we watched. In Kosovo we acted.” This was the most common
position featured in the Times. Added to Slaughter’s choice examples were other historical
comparisons. For example, the no-flight zone over Iraq was frequently invoked, its alleged
purpose to protect Kurds from Saddam Hussein. Let us quote one of Lander’s articles:
[A]rguments that limited airstrikes can’t work were belied in Kosovo, where 78
days of NATO strikes in 1999 stopped Serbia’s leader, Slobodan Milosevic, from
persecuting the ethnic Albanian population. Proponents of a no-flight zone also
say that in the decade after the 1991 Persian Gulf War, America and its allies used
the tactic effectively to shield northern Iraq’s Kurds and, in the south, Shiites
whose unaided 1991 revolt had failed. (Landler 2011a)
All of these comparisons are inappropriate for two reasons. First, there was no reason to
believe the scale of the killing was anywhere close to Serbia, Iraq, or Rwanda. The second
reason is that these comparisons are all based on myths. Recent scholarship suggests that the
United States had special interests in Paul Kagame’s rise to power in Rwanda in 1994. And it
shows that Kagame and the RPF were principally responsible for initiating the genocide and
responsible for most of the killing. That the United States simply let a genocide happen there is
implausible (Herman and Peterson 2011; Herman and Peterson 2014; Philpot 2013). The
comparison to Iraq is predicated on the idea that, historically, the American elite actually cares
about Kurds. In Manufacturing Consent, Herman and Chomsky showed that the mass media’s
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treatment of Iraq’s Kurds under Saddam was very different from its treatment of Kurds in
Turkey, where their repression and killing was similar to that in Iraq. In short, Iraq’s Kurds were
worthy victims, Turkey’s were not. And Chomsky argues that “Uncontroversially, the bombing
[of Kosovo] preceded the ethnic cleansing and atrocities, which were, in fact, its anticipated
consequence” (my emphasis, Chomsky 2003). Thus, the Times was building war propaganda on
war propaganda.
A popular argument against intervention was represented by an op-ed by Maureen Dowd
(Dowd 2011). She invoked U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan and the consequences of
these invasions as an argument against intervening in Libya. She was critical of Bush-era
neoconservative, Paul Wolfowitz, who had criticized Obama’s Libya approach as too soft. She
mentions his “guilt over how the Bush I administration coldly deserted the Shiites and Kurds
who were urged to rise up against Saddam at the end of the 1991 gulf war.” The lesson, contra
Wolfowitz, is that the eventual NATO-imposed no-fly zone did not stop Saddam from using
helicopters to slaughter Kurds. She doesn’t draw the more relevant conclusion that saving Kurds
wasn’t a real concern of the Bush I administration in the first place. (As vice president under
Reagan, Bush I helped Saddam in gassing Kurds in the 1988 Halabja massacre.) Dowd went on
to cite “reformed interventionist” David Rieff, who argued that “Gaddafi is a terrible man,” but
“committing the United States to endless wars of altruism” is “folly”. None of this rises above
ideology. The underlying assumption, almost never questioned in the Times, is that the United
States does wage altruistic wars. Thus, the hypothesis regarding American exceptionalism was
borne out quite well in the sample.
A similar argument against intervention was sometimes advanced that the United States
did not have a “plan B” if the no-flight zone failed to overthrow Gaddafi (Douthat 2011). Oddly
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enough, this argument appeared in an op-ed entitled “Iraq Then, Libya Now.” It was ironic given
that it implicitly called for the overthrow of a government (which is illegal under the U.N.
Charter), and also strange, given that the establishment was claiming its aim was the protection
of Libyan civilians—not overthrowing Gaddafi. The legality of overthrowing Gaddafi was
almost never questioned or even featured as a topic of discussion in the Times. Thus—with the
rare exceptions of the three short letters cited above—even when the Times presented a position
opposing intervention in Libya, it still conformed to elite ideological constraints and did not
oppose war on moral or legal grounds, again in accord with the predictions of the propaganda
model.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ argument that a no-fly zone risked mission creep was
another position in the debate that received regular attention. Sometimes it was argued that an
intervention could cause America’s good intentions to appear suspect and create “anti-American
sentiment.” Another version of the argument was that our efforts would appear to be a grab for
oil, which would damage our reputation (Kristof 2011). But that the intervention really was
about oil was almost never entertained. That it was a humanitarian intervention at all is cast
further into the realm of implausibility when one considers past U.S. interventions in Iraq or U.S.
support for Israel’s aggression in Gaza. For an imperial power cannot legitimately claim
humanitarian concerns one day, while aiding and abetting mass murder on another.
With the exception of three short letters to the editors, then, the range of debate available
in the Times’ in the run-up to the intervention conforms remarkably well to the expectations of
the propaganda model. The paper regularly featured interviews with the anti-Gaddafi opposition,
and almost never with pro-Gaddafi Libyans; and when it did feature perspectives of pro-Gaddafi
Libyans, they were casually dismissed. A political economy analysis linking Western military
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involvement in Libya to oil interests was not seriously entertained. And the good intentions of
Western leadership—that is, the nominal war aim of protecting civilians—were almost never
questioned.
Letters to the Editors, Opinion-Editorials, and Editorials
One might expect that a newspaper’s letters to the editor and op-ed sections would
provide an opening for a greater range of opinion and debate. To an extent, as I have already
shown, this was true in the sample analyzed here. However, it must be remembered that the
letters to the editors and op-ed contributions are selected by the editors themselves. Thus, the
propaganda model filters can be expected to be operative in the case of letters to editors and opeds, in addition to editorials and regular articles.
In the sample of Times content analyzed in this chapter, some letters to the editors that
defied the expectations of the propaganda model did slip through, as already discussed. But as
also pointed out, these were very unusual aberrations. It would be redundant to review at length
all the letters, since most of them reproduced the propaganda lines already reviewed. There was
much to be read about “the killing by the Libyan leader of his own people,” “the wholesale
slaughter of civilians,” a “crisis that is reminiscent of Rwanda, Cambodia and countless other
cases of butchery” (New York Times 2011b). One could come across calls for the West to
intervene with economic sanctions and militarily if necessary to remove Gaddafi, the leader of a
“cruel and dictatorial regime” (New York Times 2011e). Writers condemned Western “handwringing,” trumpeting our responsibility to protect “those who value freedom and democracy as
we do” (New York Times 2011g), and so on.
Op-eds were scarcely better. The op-ed contributors all presented pro-intervention
perspectives or noninterventionist positions that still conformed to the predominant narrative and
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attendant assumptions, as in the contributions of Maureen Dowd and Ross Douthat, reviewed
above. As expected of a propaganda model, the experts selected to contribute op-eds were all
pro-establishment figures, including a former government official (Anne-Marie Slaughter). Not
one op-ed contributor presented a radical critique of military intervention, like that of Vijay
Prashad for example. Some contributors were bitterly anti-Gaddafi, including the Libya scholar
Dirk Vandewalle, who condemned Gaddafi and the mythical mercenaries for the killing of
“hundreds of civilians.” Hisham Matar was another anti-Gaddafi op-ed contributor. He praised
the civility of the rebels in Benghazi who tried captured “mercenaries” in courts (Matar 2011).
This would have required some explanation had Peter Bouckeart’s inconvenient finding been
reported. One wonders if Matar read about the civility of the Benghazi mobs who chased down
blacks with machetes.
I conclude this discussion with a note about the editorial staff’s own contributions. The
editors were adamantly pro-war, even before the Obama administration took a definite prointervention stance. In an early editorial entitled “Libya’s Butcher,” they called for Gaddafi to be
“condemned and punished by the international community” for killing “220 protestors” (New
York Times 2011a). (Recall that the loyalties of the victims reported by Human Rights Watch
were not known, or at least not specified in their publicly available report.) The editors utilized
all the propaganda tools available in the Libya kit. They claimed that Gaddafi “will slaughter
hundreds or even thousands of his own people” if the United States doesn’t stop him, invoking
Bosnia, Kosovo, and Rwanda. Readers were told that the Obama Administration needs to “find
ways to stop the killing,” what they referred to as “mass atrocities,” implying systematic mass
extermination (New York Times 2011d). Later, they were critical of Obama for not taking
action, calling for a no-fly zone, recalling Bush I’s noble effort to protect Kurds by way of
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comparison (New York Times 2011f). In sum, the Times editorial board faithfully served the
propaganda needs of the Obama administration and the power bloc that was determined to
overthrow Gaddafi.
Conclusion
Gaddafi claimed that the West’s intervention was motivated by an interest in Libya’s oil
supplies—the largest in Africa. He also predicted that a military intervention would destabilize
Libya and lead to tribal anarchy. Even though these claims could not be seriously entertained by
knowledgeable intellectuals like those who write for the New York Times, the first was entirely
plausible, even likely, and the second came true. In fact, the NATO intervention destabilized a
large portion of Northern Africa, leading to a coup in Mali, creating a massive flood of refugees
into neighboring countries, and created fertile ground for ISIS to take root inside Libya. The
world would be horrified when ISIS released a video of a mass execution of 21 Coptic Christians
on a Mediterranean beach in Libya. And Libyan tribes and militias are still at war at the time of
writing.
That the intervention was not genuinely motivated by the desire to protect civilians was
further evidenced by NATO’s actions once the intervention began. Sirte, where civilians were
not threatened, was bombed as early as March 27, almost routinely until Gaddafi’s assassination
on October 20. It was the most heavily bombed part of the country. Overall, NATO launched
9,600 airstrike missions, targeting Sirte, Bani Walid, and other towns where civilians were not
threatened by Gaddafi. One bombing on September 15 killed 47 civilians in Sirte. On September
25, NATO bombed an apartment in Sirte, killing 7 civilians. In Majer, on August 8, NATO also
struck a farming compound from the air, methodically killing several civilians, including those
who came to pick up the dead. This is only a sample of NATO atrocities (see Forte 2012:90-
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109). It should also be noted that NATO let scores of civilians perish in the Mediterranean as
they attempted to flee the war. The U.S.-backed rebels also carried out (real) mass atrocities and
ethnic cleansing. After Gaddafi’s brutal assassination (assisted by U.S. intelligence and air
power), some 500 bodies, civilian and fighter, were discovered in Sirte. CBS reported that 300
bodies were discovered in a mass grave. They were apparently executed with their hands behind
their back and most of them were black (in Forte 2012:112-113). Sixty-five bodies were also
discovered in Mahari, which served as a base for opposition fighters in Sirte. The town of
Tawergha, inhabited mostly by black Libyans, was ethnically cleansed by Misrata insurgents
(Forte 2012:115). And so on. As Horace Campbell argued, if the goal of the NATO mission was
to protect civilians, it failed miserably.
The analysis presented in this chapter shows that the New York Times failed to challenge
the official interpretation of events inside Libya prior to the NATO intervention and failed to
challenge an administration that was making a phony case for war. As predicted, Gaddafi’s
crimes received ample attention and his victims were given extensive, sympathetic coverage that
elicited much outrage, condemnation, and calls for the power of the full range of Western
intergovernmental institutions to be brought against Gaddafi. Gaddafi and his regime were
branded as evil others and their claims were not given serious consideration. Neither were proGaddafi Libyans. The anti-Gaddafi rebels were often portrayed as peaceful protestors and
democratic reformers and their crimes were virtually invisible. They, along with other antiGaddafi Libyans, were treated as worthy victims. Black Africans, by contrast, were unworthy
victims, ignored or portrayed as mercenaries. Thus, the research expectations regarding Libya
presented earlier, and the hypotheses of the propaganda model itself, are well-supported by the
sample of New York Times articles reviewed here.
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Moreover, a case can be made that the New York Times facilitated one of the most
significant war crimes of the 21st century, insofar as the U.N. Responsibility to Protect doctrine
was illegitimately applied, Resolution 1973 did not authorize regime change, and NATO and its
allies deliberately targeted civilians and/or carried out ethnic cleansing. According to the 2012
Chicago Council Survey on American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, only 19 percent of
Americans completely opposed the intervention (Chicago Council on Global Affairs 2012). How
many more would have opposed it had the Times and the rest of the Western media provided
more critical and honest coverage?
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
In this concluding chapter, I will assess how well the data presented in the previous
chapter fit the expectations of the propaganda model and make a determination as to whether or
not they support the research expectations presented at the outset. I will then provide an
affirmative or negative answer the research question. I also comment on how well the data fits
the standard view of the media and Castells’s theory. Finally, I will make some suggestions as to
further research questions inspired by this project.
The Case of Libya and the Propaganda Model: Discussion
The research question guiding this project is as follows: Does the New York Times’
coverage of Libya in the weeks preceding the 2011 NATO intervention comport with the
predictions associated with the propaganda model?
The propaganda model hypothesizes that the news will reflect elite perspectives and
priorities. In other words, it will tend to exhibit an elite bias. Elite bias, it will be recalled, was
defined as “a preference for those facts and interpretive frameworks which corroborate the views
of the social classes wielding the most economic, political, and military power, and a tendency to
ignore those facts and interpretive frameworks considered important by non-elite social classes
and group formations.” The research expectations regarding the news coverage analyzed in this
study, then, are as follows:
(1) The New York Times’ coverage of events precipitating the intervention will reflect the range
of elite opinion in the United States, as evidenced by the Times’ close adherence to official
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government analyses of events. Analysis and debate will occur within an American
exceptionalism framework.
(2) Thus, the Times’ will emphasize Gaddafi’s crimes with extensive coverage in which Gaddafi
will be portrayed negatively, his crimes exaggerated. There will be little or no sympathetic
coverage of Gaddafi.
(3) Gaddafi’s victims—the anti-Gaddafi rebels and protestors—will therefore receive extensive
sympathetic coverage, in which they will be portrayed as innocents, peaceful protestors, and
democratic reformers. Conversely, the victims of the anti-Gaddafi rebels—black Libyans and
African migrant workers—will be either ignored or portrayed as pro-Gaddafi mercenaries.
The data I have presented on the Times sample provide variable support for these
hypotheses that is difficult to quantify. The quantitative data provided in tables 1.1 and 1.2
provides purely quantitative measures of elite bias. The data presented in table 1.1 supported the
research expectations, indicating that topics that were compatible with the U.S. government
agenda tended to receive much more coverage than those topics that were incompatible with it.
With respect to research expectation 2, table 1.1 shows that Gaddafi’s “crackdown” was a
leading topic. This is an indication of the extensive coverage accorded to Gaddafi’s repression of
protestors and rebels. Some topics that did not corroborate the U.S. government narrative were
entirely absent from the sample. Table 1.2 shows that Gaddafi’s victims (anti-Gaddafi protestors
and insurgents) received extensive coverage, while the victims of the anti-Gaddafi faction
(blacks) received very little coverage, providing support for research expectation 3. However,
this quantitative data does not tell us much about the framework of analysis followed by the
Times, how key facts were presented in relation to other facts, how key facts and topics were
positioned in the articles and papers in which they appeared, whether victimization invoked
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indignation, and so on. That is, it doesn’t tell us about important qualitative dimensions of
coverage.
The qualitative analysis of the coverage in the previous chapter does provide evidence
that the Times generally conformed to the U.S. government framework of analysis. The Obama
administration sided with the Libyan anti-Gaddafi opposition, and it was this opposition whose
narrative provided the framework of analysis for the Times regarding events in Libya. No proGaddafi perspectives were treated as tenable. The general framework imagined Gaddafi carrying
out systematic mass murder on a scale reminiscent of Rwanda, Kosovo, or Cambodia, against
civilian protestors who opposed him. It included the mythical story of the mercenaries, which
served a triple propaganda function. First, the mercenaries supplied the early pretext for a noflight zone. Second, the mercenaries could be used to show, falsely, that Gaddafi had very little
domestic support. And third, the mercenaries could be used to obscure the nature of anti-black
racism and violence carried out by the anti-Gaddafi opposition; the blacks killed were
mercenaries or they were killed because the opposition thought they were mercenaries. All of
these findings support research expectation 1. Coverage was saturated with dramatic quotes from
anti-Gaddafi Libyans, but featured only one quote from a black African condemning the
treatment of blacks. About Gaddafi’s crimes, much outrage was expressed by the Times editors
and through quotes from various government officials—though mostly Europeans, Americans,
and Libyans—but not other Africans. These findings support research expectation 3.
If not entirely excluded, facts and topics that could have cast doubt on this framework of
analysis were downplayed. Because the image of systematic killing was preferable to a civil war
framework of analysis, early coverage of the conflict conflated rebels with protestors. A civil war
framework would have diverted attention away from civilians and unarmed protestors to the
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armed rebellion, in which case it would have been harder to justify a “humanitarian
intervention”. Thus, the Times focused on Gaddafi’s clashes with civilians rather than on fighting
with rebels once the government began its counterattack on cities and towns taken over by the
rebels. These tendencies provide support for research expectation 1 and 2. And given Gaddafi’s
close relationship with the African Union, and the possibility that it could have brokered a peace
between the government and the rebels, it was not convenient for the Times to attend to this
topic; the topic’s one appearance was in the middle of an article, mentioned in passing. This
supports research expectation 1. And in spite of Gaddafi’s willingness to negotiate with the
rebels under the A.U. framework, he was portrayed as against negotiations, bent on mass murder.
And this in spite of an offer of amnesty to rebels in Benghazi, only mentioned in passing in the
Times. This supports research expectation 2. In other cases, too, inconvenient facts which
qualified the official story line were kept out of lead paragraphs and placed deep in the article,
tendencies that support research expectation 1.
The adherence to the official government line was also evidenced by the general
conformity to an American exceptionalism framework. Only one item in the sample—Michael
Ratner’s letter to the editors—offered a political economy analysis of the impending
intervention. Another letter pointed out the Obama administration’s hypocritical concern for
conflicts in some countries but not others, and one presented a moral argument. These letters to
the editors notwithstanding, all other contributions to the debate in the pages of the Times
conformed to elite ideology. Even when editorial writers made anti-war arguments, these were
still made within the confines of elite ideology. Anti-war and pro-war editorials alike were
premised on war propaganda from previous conflicts; that is, myths about America’s benevolent
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role in world affairs. The editors were adamantly pro-war, and opinion-editorial contributors
were all pro-establishment figures.
Therefore, I conclude that the research expectations received overwhelming support from
the data in the sample of articles I analyzed and that an affirmative answer can be given to the
research question. There is almost zero evidence that can be interpreted as contrary to the
research expectations. As we would expect of a propaganda model, the New York Times
conformed to the Obama administration framework of analysis; Gaddafi, an official enemy of the
United States, was thoroughly demonized and his crimes were exaggerated; and Gaddafi’s
victims were treated as worthy victims, while the anti-Gaddafi opposition’s victims were treated
as unworthy. All of this served the interests of the U.S. government, oil industry, weapons
industry, and military, and the powerful elite who dominate these institutions.
The Five Filters
With respect to the operation of the propaganda model filters, Edward S. Herman (1998)
has described the structure of the New York Times in a way that is consistent with the propaganda
model. Regarding the size and ownership filter, the Times is owned by a publicly traded
company—The New York Times Company—with billions of dollars of annual revenue; it
depends on the banking industry for lines of credit, assistance underwriting its bonds and notes,
and buying and selling properties; and it maintains ties with the larger corporate community
through its board of directors. In 2011, it had ties to Chevron and the telecommunications
industry through directors Robert Denham and Doreen Tobin, respectively.
Herman also notes that managerial changes in the late 1970’s led the paper to greater
dependence on corporate advertising—the second filter—which entailed a shift to the right for
the paper. Herman observes that
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the paper was reoriented toward softer and more advertiser friendly news, and the
common "policy" root of news, editorials, and book reviews became more
conspicuous. Rosenthal [the newly installed executive editor] established a
Product Committee, and openly emulated Clay Felker's New York magazine's
pioneering of a news product featuring gossip on the shows, restaurants, discos,
attire, decor, and other cultural habits of the upwardly mobile, attractive to
fashion trade and other advertisers. (Herman 1998)
These structural features of the Times have not changed and they are important predictors of the
Times’s policy orientation.
My analysis has also shown that the Times depended overwhelmingly on government
officials and establishment experts as sources (and a fortiori, anti-Gaddafi Libyan dissidents),
and so reporting did not conflict with the government agenda on Libya. Barack Obama, Hillary
Clinton, John Kerry, and Robert Gates were frequently quoted and their perspective shaped
reporting and commentary. As noted, op-ed contributors were all pro-establishment figures or
former government officials. Former State Department director of policy planning Anne-Marie
Slaughter provided her seal of approval for “humanitarian intervention”, and Libya scholar Dirk
Vandewalle of Dartmouth provided an anti-Gaddafi contribution. Thus, the third filter—
dependence on official sources—did entail news coverage that mirrored the perspective of these
official and expert sources. The perspective was reflected in the story line and in the ideological
framework that informed reporting and commentary. It would appear that the dependence on
official sources was one of the most powerful filters in this sample of Times reporting.
The influence of flak on reporting was not apparent from the analysis of the coverage
alone. Determining an empirical relationship between flak and news content is difficult when the
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influence of flak may be present without direct applications of it by flak-producing agents.
Ethnographic research may therefore be necessary to establish its effectiveness in particular
cases such as the one analyzed in this study. This could include, for example, interviews with
those Times correspondents who reported on Libya and are cited in this work regarding their own
views on what was happening in Libya and how they reported on it. However, it is not in doubt
that flak has had a strong influence on the paper in the past. Boyd-Barrett (2004) shows that
Times journalists feared being labeled “anti-American” and threats to their careers that could
result from challenging the Bush administration during the build-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
Similar fears prevented journalists from reporting critically on Reagan-Bush anticommunist
policies in Central America in the 1980’s.
While the cases discussed by Boyd-Barrett are about the media’s relationship to
conservative Republican administrations, if is generally true that high-level reporters mostly fear
the government and lower level reporters fear retaliation from within their own media
institutions (Boyd-Barrett:441), then it is plausible that the same kinds of pressures on journalists
influenced Times reporting during the Libyan civil war. As I have demonstrated, the editorial
board was as pro-war, if not more so, than the Obama administration. For this reason, pressure
on low-level reporters to conform to the pro-war line was likely very great. As in the case of the
buildup to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, high-level journalists would not have wanted to alienate
their sources inside the Obama administration.
Finally, the influence of the fifth filter—dominant ideology—was clearly on display, as
already discussed at length. This filter was as equally as influential on coverage as the reliance
on government officials and establishment experts. Indeed, these two filters are closely related,
as it would not be possible for the media to rely on government sources if the media were critical
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of elite ideology to begin with. High-level journalists would not be granted privileged access,
and so on.
The Standard Model of the Media and the Communication Theory of Power: Alternative
Explanations?
If anything approximating a pluralist model of the news media held explanatory power,
the New York Times would have covered the events precipitating the NATO intervention quite
differently. The pluralist or “standard model” maintains that the news carries out a democratic
function by challenging government officials and criticizing their policies so that the public can
be informed as to whether or not certain policies are in their interest. If the media actually
performed this way, then the Times would not have exhibited the tendencies described above.
For example, it would have properly characterized the rebel takeover of several Libyan towns
and cities and the fighting between the rebels and the government as indications of a civil war,
not overwhelmingly as repression of “protestors”. It would have criticized Ibrahim Dabbashi for
claiming a “genocide” was underway in Libya, and criticized Anne-Marie Slaughter and John
Kerry for comparing the conflict to Rwanda and Kosovo. It would have criticized the antiGaddafi opposition for attacking and killing blacks. These killings would have led the Times to
question the alleged democratic aspirations of the government opposition and the morality of
providing support for them. It might have cautioned readers against supporting an aerial
bombardment of Libya and given more warnings about the dangers of mission creep, perhaps
drawing parallels to the recent U.S. experience in Iraq. And so on.
Manuel Castells’s communication theory of power would seem to make similar
predictions regarding the performance of the news media as the propaganda model, incorporating
as it does the indexing hypothesis, framing theory, the cascading activation model, and so on.
Castells maintains that “the construction of meaning” occurs “at the source of political power”; it
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is the political elite who “wield the greatest control over news frames” (Castells 2013:163),
especially in the domain of foreign affairs. Yet, Castells says, “what I consider a truly abstract,
unverifiable proposition is the power of the capitalist class, of the military industrial complex, or
of the power elite. Unless we can specify who exactly holds power in a given context and in
relation to a given process, and how his or her power is exercised, any general statement about
the source of power is a matter of belief rather than a tool of research” (Castells 2013:430).
Alternatively, Castells offers the following methodological prescription:
And so, I am not identifying the concrete social actors who are power-holders. I
am presenting a hypothesis: in all cases they are networks of actors exercising
power in their respective areas of influence through the networks that they
construct around their interests. I am also proposing the hypothesis of the
centrality of communication networks to implement the power-making process of
any network. And I am suggesting that switching [i.e. connecting] different
networks is a fundamental source of power. Who does what, how, where, and
why through this multi-pronged networking strategy is a matter for investigation,
not for formal theorization. Formal theory will only make sense on the basis of an
accumulation of relevant knowledge. But for this knowledge to be generated, we
need an analytical construction that fits the kind of society we are in. This is the
purpose of my proposition: to suggest an approach that can be used in research,
rectified, and transformed in ways that allow the gradual construction of a theory
of power that can be disproved by observation. (Castells 2013:430)
Castells goes on to say that in his book he has followed this methodological approach.
But how this approach is different from one that identifies capitalist class interests as an
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important predictor variable is unclear. And similarly for the military-industrial complex and
elite class interests. Castells is right to ask for empirical verification of connections between
networks of elites in specific cases. But ultimately, Castells’s glib dismissal of elite and Marxist
theories as less empirically verifiable than his own seems to be politically motivated and is
unconvincing. “Network of political power” is a much more politically neutral (and vague)
conceptual formation.
The propaganda model calls attention to the symbiotic relationship between the news
media and private and state power in a way that is uncontroversial and empirically supported. It
also identifies the profit imperative of capitalist news media firms as a reason for their
dependence on and deference to these information sources. Historical analysis—like the one
presented in this work regarding the history of United States-Libya relations—can also go a long
way toward establishing elite priorities on particular policy questions, and therefore how the
media will address them. That a powerful elite constituency comprising persons in the Obama
administration, members of Congress, the military, and the oil industry had shared interests in
deposing Gaddafi is not simply a matter of belief. It is an inference based on the purpose of the
U.S. military presence on the African continent, namely to ensure U.S. investment opportunities
and control of resources. It is also based on the fact that Gaddafi was identified as an obstacle to
U.S. economic and military penetration of the African continent.
Whether one chooses to identify the likely actors as “switchers” and “programmers” or as
constituents of an elite or military-industrial complex, one is confronted with the same
methodological problems regarding empirical verification. Often, one cannot know exactly what
decisions are being made behind closed doors, by whom, and why. This can be impossible to
know without leaked or declassified documents. Nevertheless, an explanation of the American
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press’s coverage of the Libya conflict that failed to consider the geostrategic interests of the U.S.
political economy and diplomatic relations between the United States and Libya would lead to a
failure to explain dramatically different policy orientations toward—and media treatment of—
criminal states such as Israel in 2008-9 or Bahrain around the same time as the Libyan conflict in
2011. Compared to what befell Gaddafi’s Libya, these states can carry out massive violence
without much criticism in the mainstream media. Therefore, a communication theory of the
media’s performance would be limited vis-à-vis the propaganda model for a failure to explain
why political economy analyses of our own policies are off the elite agenda and nonexistent in
mainstream commentary. It would not explain this characteristic of mainstream news reporting.
Castells is certainly correct that the analytic framework must match the society in which we live;
hence the importance of the propaganda model’s fifth filter, convergence in the dominant
ideology, including as it does the need for official enemies and the American exceptionalism
framework.
Suggestions for Further Research
One direction for further research, then, would be a comparative case study that
compared media coverage of conflicts in American ally states and enemy states. This is an
approach taken in Herman and Chomsky’s classic work. Particularly salient in the contemporary
period would be a comparison of the media’s treatment of the current civil war in Syria, where
Russia and Iran are bolstering the Assad regime against U.S.-backed rebels, to the current war in
Yemen, where the United States and Saudi Arabia are the most powerful belligerents. Another
revealing comparison would be that of media treatment of any of Israel’s recent murderous
assaults on the Palestinians of Gaza (in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014) compared to its treatment of

118

the civil war in Libya, or some other conflict in which the United States demonized an official
enemy.
Yet, to the present writer, what is of most interest is the possibility of expanding the
model, or supplementing it with an entirely different model, that explains the structural elements
of academia that lead it, too, to perform a kind of propaganda function on behalf of state power
and capitalist social relations. This is a direction that has been suggested by Noam Chomsky. He
has said of the propaganda model:
It doesn’t go far enough in my opinion. I think this [tendency to reflect elite
ideology] is not only true of the media, but also it’s pretty much true of the
general intellectual community, academic scholarship, public intellectuals, and so
on. One thing this model leaves out and should be expanded to cover, is there is a
general intellectual culture of which the media are an institutionalized
crystallization. So, they represent it in a very clear, specific form, but you find
pretty much the same thing in the general intellectual world. (in Smolski 2016)
If this is true, then a rich domain of research remains largely unexplored.
In this study, to establish the historical background to which I compared the New York
Times, I relied on scholars who are as equally critical of state power and capitalism as Chomsky,
who offer similar accounts of American and Western global domination that draw on the same
body of analytic concepts. Journalists are often said to compose the first version of history,
which historians then modify or add to with their own interpretations and evidence. But if the
basis of official history is propaganda, what then becomes of it? The reason I did not rely on,
say, Ethan Chorin’s account of the 2011 civil war in Libya, Exit the Colonel, is because it
reproduced exactly the same myths and distortions found in the Times. Chorin is closely aligned
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with the political and economic elite in the United States, having worked for the State
Department and Shell Oil. One wonders how these kinds of connections bear on the work of elite
scholars.
Finally, a related question about professional academics: Why has the invasion of Iraq in
2003 received so much more attention from media scholars than the case of Libya? Or
Afghanistan? Or Palestine? Could the liberal bias of professional academics explain this
difference? Is it more politically palatable to criticize a Republican administration than it is to
criticize a Democratic administration?
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APPENDIX A
Authoritative Sources on Libya
The three authors I cited and referred to most frequently on the history of United StatesLibya relations and the civil war are Vijay Prashad, Maximilian Forte, and Horace Campbell. I
have provided the following notes on their reputation as scholars and reviews of their work in the
event that the reliability or accuracy of the history and the “standard of comparison” which I
presented in chapter 5 is in question.
Vijay Prashad is a leading historian, journalist, and international relations scholar. He is
the George and Martha Kellner Chair in South Asian History and Professor of International
Studies at Trinity College, Hartford Connecticut. In 2013, he was the Edward Said Chair at the
American University in Beirut. He regularly appears on DemocracyNow! and the Real News
Network. He was a guest on National Public Radio in the buildup to the 2011 NATO
intervention in Libya. He has authored several books, including The Death of the Nation and the
Future of the Arab Revolution, The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South, and
The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World. His works have been positively
reviewed in academic journals and have received numerous awards. The major count against his
book, Arab Spring, Libyan Winter, the book I referenced in this project, is that it does not contain
a bibliography, though it does contain occasional in-text references to news articles.
Nevertheless, Prashad’s account of the Libyan civil war is consistent with that in the other books
I referenced, and it is not factually inconsistent with events reported in the New York Times. The
book received a positive review in the international affairs journal, Perceptions, where the
reviewer concluded that “It is a vital resource to understand the past and present of the Arab
Spring and the reaction of the international community” (Bardakçi 2012).
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Maximilian Forte, author of Slouching Towards Sirte, is less well known than Prashad,
but he is a first-rate scholar. He is Associate Professor of anthropology at Concordia University
in Montreal. To my knowledge, his book on Libya has not been reviewed in mainstream
academic social science journals. Thus, Edward S. Herman, in reviewing it, says the book has
been marginalized (Herman 2014). But reviews of it are available in leftist academic journals
and publications. It was reviewed positively in the Monthly Review (Ajl 2013). The book was
also positively reviewed by Damir Mirkovic, Professor Emeritus of Sociology at Brandon
University, who wrote that “On the whole, the book is a powerful argument against the
humanitarian myth promoted by western powers to mask the imposition of their dominance on
other societies” (Mirkovic 2014). Reviewers note that it is meticulously researched and
documented, as it surely is; the references section of his book contains 29 dense pages.
Horace Campbell is a professor of African American Studies and Political Science at
Syracuse University. He has also been featured on DemocracyNow!. He is the author of several
books on African politics, including Barack Obama and 21st Century Politics: A Revolutionary
Moment in the USA, Pan Africanism, Pan Africanists and African Liberation in the 21st Century,
and Rasta and Resistance: from Marcus Garvey to Walter Rodney, a seminal work on
Rastafarianism. His book, Global NATO and the Catastrophic Failure in Libya has also received
several positive reviews. For example, in the journal New Political Science, Hoffman (2014) says
of it that “Campbell offers a highly informative account of NATO intervention in Libya that
instructively situates the intervention within a set of global economic and political dynamics.”
Campbell’s account parallels that of Prashad and Forte.
It’s worth noting again that each of these books presents an account of the civil war that
is based on information that was publicly available at the time of the civil war; any journalist
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could have come to the same conclusions as those reached by Prashad, Forte, and Campbell
regarding events in Libya between February 15 and March 19, 2011. Most of the “hard
reporting” found in the New York Times—basic facts, chronology, actors, and so on—parallels
the accounts given by each of these authors. The authors made extensive use of mainstream
media reporting from news outlets in the United States, Europe, and Arab countries, and from the
major global news agencies. They also included reference to contemporary documents from the
United Nations, the African Union, and Human Rights Watch, all publicly available. Therefore,
inconvenient facts marginalized in mainstream reporting, but found in these works, cannot be
said to have been unavailable to journalists who were reporting on Libya. And that such facts
have been regarded as essential to an understanding of the conflict by expert authorities indicates
that they have not simply been selected ex hypothesi. It should be clear that such facts or topics
fit into a coherent and plausible framework of analysis, but one that is different from that found
in mainstream reporting.
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APPENDIX B
Coding Manual
For the list of topics in table 1.1, the coding procedures are straightforward. Any time a
topic is mentioned in an article, the article is included in the count of articles mentioning that
topic. The article is not counted twice if the topic appeared more than once in the article. Data is
also recorded on the placement of the topic in the article (how many paragraphs deep) and in the
volume (page number). The placement of the topic in the article may be irrelevant if the entire
article is on that particular topic.
The following topics are from table 1.1. An article is counted as including one of these
topics according to the following criteria:
1. Crackdown on protestors: any time the phrase “crackdown” is used in an article in reference to
Gaddafi’s response to mass demonstrations or rebels.
2. Gaddafi’s personality: any time Gaddafi is described as, for example, “erratic,”
“idiosyncratic,” “megalomaniacal,” etc., or space is dedicated to describing his lifestyle or
personality.
3. Foreign mercenaries: any time reference is made to foreign/African mercenaries present in
Libya.
4. Interviews or quotes of anti-Gaddafi Libyans: any time an interview or quote from an antiGaddafi Libyan is featured or referenced. The anti-Gaddafi political orientation of the person
should be clear.
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5. Gaddafi February 21 air attacks on Tripoli: any time reference is made to these government air
attacks, on this date, in Tripoli.
6. Protestor violence: any time anti-Gaddafi protestors are described as participating in violent
acts, such as possessing gasoline bombs or rocks, setting facilities on fire, attacking police
stations, attacking black Libyans, or similar acts.
7. Rebel killings of “mercenaries”, “conspirators”: any time anti-Gaddafi rebels are described as
killing mercenaries or pro-Gaddafi conspirators.
8. Anti-black racism/violence against blacks: acts of violence against blacks or Libyan racial
animosity towards blacks is described.
9. Interviews of quotes pro-Gaddafi civilians: an interview with a Libyan civilian who holds proGaddafi views on the conflict in Libya.
10. Interviews or quotes of black Africans: an interview with a black African, whether a Libyan,
or from another African country. Not including heads of state or political leaders.
11. March A.U. peace effort: reference to or discussion of the African Union (A.U.) peace effort,
including the February 23 or March 10 A.U. meeting, the A.U. High Level Ad Hoc Committee
on Libya, the diplomatic “roadmap”, or the peace panel of African heads of state.
12. Bouckaert’s report finding no mercenaries in eastern Libya: Human Rights Watch or Peter
Bouckaert’s reporting from eastern Libya, including mention of his finding no evidence of
mercenaries in rebel-controlled prisons.
13. Rebel airstrikes: mention of rebel airstrikes on Libyan government war ships.
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14. Defense Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen on “no confirmation” of gov. airstrikes:
reference to the March 1 press conference given by U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates and
U.S. Navy Admiral Michael Mullen; specifically their negative response to a reporter who asked
whether they could confirm Gaddafi’s airstrikes.
With respect to the data presented in table 1.2, the following criteria were used to
determine when a victim or class of victims was referred to: (a) casualty counts specifying
number of victims of a particular incident (not cumulative counts for the entire conflict) in which
victim loyalty is specified (anti-Gaddafi protestor, rebel fighters, etc.), (b) descriptions of attacks
when victim loyalty is specified, (c) reference to Gaddafi killing “his own people” (to be coded
as anti-Gaddafi protestors/civilians) (d) “crackdown” is used to describe government action, if
protestors are specified as victims of “crackdown”. Any one criterion is sufficient.
For coding data on U.S. foreign policy analysis, the following categories are used.
1. Political economy analysis: a form of foreign policy analysis that links policy decisions
to economic interests, such as gaining control of foreign oil reserves, protecting existing
investments, or creating market-investment opportunities.
2. Intent of state leadership questioned: when official policy declarations are scrutinized as
dishonest or concealing some special interest such as economic gain or geostrategic
goals.
3. Policy as immoral or wrong: when a policy is criticized on moral grounds. Explicit
appeals to morality are required. Here is an example: “our reaction . . . to any atrocity is
always mediated by self-interest. Morality is, first and foremost, a utilitarian concept. If
we learn that lesson maybe we will finally stop proselytizing about freedom and
democracy.”
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4. American exceptionalism: an argument regarding foreign policy, either pro or con, that
does not include one of the three categories above. Instead, it includes arguments or
critiques that make one or more of following assumptions: (a) the United States plays a
benign and positive role in world affairs, (b) the United States does not act in its own
self-interest, (c) the United States is not motivated by material gain, (d) the United States
may make mistakes that have unfortunate consequences, its policies may be mistaken or
too costly, but its actions are never inherently wrong.
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APPENDIX C
Data Collection Instruments

Article Coding Sheet
Date:
Title:
Byline (Author(s)):
Length (lines):
Section:
Type (article, op-ed, etc.):
Main topics:

Victims? Name: ___________________
Outrage, Indignation?

Yes

No

If yes, provide example(s) below.

Or
Philosophical generalizations about violence/conflict?
Search for responsibility?
Victims as source?

Yes

Yes

Yes

No
No

Total lines on victims: ____________

Notes:
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No

If yes, provide example(s) below.

Recording Sheet (Compatible and Incompatible Topics)
Facts compatible
with propaganda

No. times
mentioned

Placement in
article (no. of
paragraphs)

Facts incompatible
with propaganda

Include as many rows as needed.
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Placement in
volume (page)

Recording Sheet (Policy Analysis)
Date of
article

Title of Article

Political economy
analysis

Intent of state
leadership questioned

Policy as immoral or
wrong

Yes / No

Yes / No

Yes / No

Include as many rows as needed.
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APPENDIX D
The Sample
This appendix contains the complete sample of articles used in this study. It was obtained
from LexisNexis Academic using the search term “Gaddafi”, the New York Times as the source,
from February 15 and March 19, 2011. The list of articles below is taken directly from the
bibliography downloaded from LexisNexis, the items arranged in chronological order. Items that
were omitted from the sample are marked with an asterisk. Items were omitted if they only
mentioned Gaddafi or the conflict in Libya in passing and the subject of the article was not the
conflict in Libya.
Alan Cowell. "Protests Take Aim At Leader Of Libya." The New York Times. (February 17, 2011 Thursday )
Neil MacFarquhar. “Unrest Spreads, Some Violently, in Middle East" The New York Times. (February 17, 2011
Thursday)
Alan Cowell. "Libyan Unrest Spreads to More Cities, Reports Say." The New York Times. (February 18, 2011
Friday)
Jack Healy. "Popular Rage Is Met With Violence in Mideast." The New York Times. (February 18, 2011 Friday )
Anthony Shadid. “Clashes in Libya Worsen as Army Crushes Dissent." The New York Times. (February 19, 2011
Saturday)
Anthony Shadid. "In a Town Built Upon Patronage, a Test of Egypt's New Order." The New York Times. (February
20, 2011 Sunday)
"Italy's Trials." The New York Times. (February 20, 2011 Sunday )
Anthony Shadid "Cycle of Suppression Rises In Libya and Other Nations." The New York Times. (February 20,
2011 Sunday )
David Kirkpatrick and Mona El-Naggar. “Son of Qaddafi says Libya faces Civil War Peril” The New York Times.
(February 21, 2011 Monday )
"Unrest Around the Region." The New York Times. (February 21, 2011 Monday)
Colin Moynihan. "Libya's U.N. Diplomats Break With Qaddafi." The New York Times. (February 22, 2011
Tuesday)
David Kirkpatrick and Mona El-Naggar. “Qaddafi’s Forces Strike with Fury as Unrest Grows." The New York
Times. (February 22, 2011 Tuesday)
Ben Protess. "Stocks Worldwide Fall and Oil Spikes on Unrest in Libya." The New York Times. (February 22, 2011
Tuesday )
Ibrahim Dabbashi. "Quotation of the Day." The New York Times. (February 22, 2011 Tuesday)
"Unrest Around the Region." The New York Times. (February 22, 2011 Tuesday).
"Feb. 22: Updates on Middle East Protests." The New York Times Blogs (The Lede). (February 22, 2011 Tuesday )
"Unrest Throughout Northern Africa and the Middle East." The New York Times. (February 23, 2011 Wednesday)
Kareem Fahim and David Kirkpatrick. "Qaddafi Orders Brutal Crackdown as Revolt Grows." The New York Times.
(February 23, 2011 Wednesday)
Rachel Donadio. "Italian Energy Company Suspends Gas Pipeline to Libya." The New York Times. (February 23,
2011 Wednesday )
Scott Shane. "Spending, Nepotism and Rivalries: Cables Detail the Qaddafi Family's Exploits." The New York
Times. (February 23, 2011 Wednesday )

131

Mark Landler. "U.S. Condemns Libyan Tumult but Makes No Threats." The New York Times. (February 23, 2011
Wednesday)
"Libya's Butcher." The New York Times. (February 23, 2011 Wednesday )
"Inside The Times." The New York Times. (February 23, 2011 Wednesday)
Rachel Donadio and Sebnem Arsue. "Governments in Europe and Elsewhere Begin Efforts to Remove Citizens
From Libya." The New York Times. (February 23, 2011 Wednesday )
Dirk Vandewalle. "The Many Qaddafis." The New York Times. (February 24, 2011 Thursday )
Clifford Krauss. "The Threatened Thirst." The New York Times. (February 24, 2011 Thursday )
Kareem Fahim. "Rebels in Libya Hope for Qaddafi's Fall but Remain Fearful of an Onslaught." The New York
Times. (February 24, 2011 Thursday )
Kareem Fahim and David Kirkpatrick. "Qaddafi Massing Forces in Tripoli." The New York Times. (February 24,
2011 Thursday )
J. David Goodman. "United States and Other Nations Step Up Libyan Evacuations." The New York Times.
(February 24, 2011 Thursday)
"Libya Convulses: What Can Be Done?." The New York Times. (February 24, 2011 Thursday )
Nicholas Kristof. "On the Line With Libya." The New York Times. (February 24, 2011 Thursday
Rachel Donadio. "Italy Says Death Toll in Libya Is Likely Over 1,000." The New York Times. (February 24, 2011
Thursday )
*Henry Alford. "The 10 Things To Talk About This Weekend." The New York Times. (February 24, 2011
Thursday)
Helene Cooper and Mark Landler. "Obama Condemns Libya Amid Stalled Evacuation." The New York Times.
(February 24, 2011 Thursday )
"Inside The Times." The New York Times. (February 24, 2011 Thursday)
"Tumult Around the Region." The New York Times. (February 24, 2011 Thursday )
*The New York Times. (February 25, 2011 Friday)
Brian Stelter. "Journalists Tiptoe Inside Forbidding Libya." The New York Times. (February 25, 2011 Friday)
"The Rebellion in Libya: A View From Italy." The New York Times. (February 25, 2011 Friday )
J. David Goodman. "Foreign Evacuees Jam Country's Exits." The New York Times. (February 25, 2011 Friday )
Kareem Fahim. "In the Cradle of Libya's Uprising, the Rebels Learn to Govern Themselves." The New York Times.
(February 25, 2011 Friday)
Christine Hauser. "Wall Street Wanders as Oil Prices Ease." The New York Times. (February 25, 2011 Friday )
Kareem Fahim "Libyan Rebels Repel Qaddafi Forces Near Tripoli." The New York Times. (February 25, 2011
Friday)
"Stopping Qaddafi." The New York Times. (February 25, 2011 Friday)
"Tumult Around the Region." The New York Times. (February 25, 2011 Friday )
Mark Cooper. "Trying to Pick The Winners In the Mideast." The New York Times. (February 25, 2011 Friday)
*Karen Rosenberg. "Authorship or Translation? Notes Toward Redefining Creativity." The New York Times.
(February 25, 2011 Friday)
Sharon Goodman and J. David Goodman. "Hundreds of Thousands Protest Across Mideast." The New York Times.
(February 26, 2011 Saturday)
Helene Cooper. “U.S. Announces Sanctions in Bid to Deter Libya.” The New York Times. (February 26, 2011
Saturday)
"Tumult Around the Region." The New York Times. (February 26, 2011 Saturday)
*Liam Stack. "Egyptian Military Forces End to New Protest." The New York Times. (February 26, 2011 Saturday)
David Kirkpatrick and Kareem Fahim. "Qaddafi Forces Violently Quell Capital Protest." The New York Times.
(February 26, 2011 Saturday)
Sebnum Arsu and Steven Erlanger. "Sarkozy Is Criticized On a Visit To Turkey." The New York Times. (February
26, 2011 Saturday)
Fouad Ajami. "How the Arabs Turned Shame Into Liberty." The New York Times. (February 27, 2011 Sunday)
Helene Cooper. "Following U.S. Sanctions, U.N. Security Council to Meet on Libya." The New York Times.
(February 27, 2011 Sunday )
"Developments In the Region." The New York Times. (February 27, 2011 Sunday)
Kareem Fahim. "In Libyan Port, Stranded Migrants Watch Hope Depart." The New York Times. (February 27, 2011
Sunday)
David Kirkpatrick. “In Libya Capital, Long Bread Lines and Barrivades.” The New York Times. (February 27, 2011
Sunday)

132

Neil MacFarquhar. "The Vacuum After Qaddafi." The New York Times. (February 27, 2011 Sunday )
Edward Wyatt. "Security Council Refers Libya to Criminal Court." The New York Times. (February 27, 2011
Sunday)
Isabel Kershner. "Israeli's Spoof of Qaddafi Finds Fans in Arab World." The New York Times. (February 28, 2011
Monday)
David Kirkpatrick and Kareem Fahim. “Rebels in Libya Gain Firepower and Defectors." The New York Times.
(February 28, 2011 Monday)
Azam Ahmed. "After Several Delays Since the Uprising, Egypt Is to Reopen Its Stock Market on Tuesday." The
New York Times. (February 28, 2011 Monday)
Andrew Kramer. "Qaddafi Appears to Lose Steadfast Nurse." The New York Times. (February 28, 2011 Monday)
"Rebels Repulse Efforts in Libya." The New York Times. (February 28, 2011 Monday)
Scott Shane. "Al Qaeda Sees History Fly By." The New York Times. (February 28, 2011 Monday)
John Broder. "U.S. and Allies Consider Libya No-Fly Zone." The New York Times. (February 28, 2011 Monday)
*Thomas Fuller. "Tunisian Premier, Vestige of the Old Government, Resigns." The New York Times. (February 28,
2011 Monday)
Steven Erlanger. "French Aid Bolsters Libyan Revolt." The New York Times. (March 1, 2011 Tuesday)
Alessandra Stanley. "Famous, With Foot In Mouth." The New York Times. (March 1, 2011 Tuesday)
Kareem Fahim. “Qaddafi’s Forces are Hitting back at Libya Rebels.” The New York Times. (March 1, 2011
Tuesday)
Helene Cooper. "U.S. Freezes a Record $30 Billion in Libyan Assets." The New York Times. (March 1, 2011
Tuesday)
"Qaddafi's Crimes and Fantasies." The New York Times. (March 1, 2011 Tuesday)
Hillary Clinton. "Quotation of the Day." The New York Times. (March 1, 2011 Tuesday)
"Tumult Around the Region." The New York Times. (March 1, 2011 Tuesday)
Alan Cowell. "Refugee Agency Reports 'Humanitarian Emergency' as Multitudes Flee Libya." The New York
Times. (March 1, 2011 Tuesday)
Mark Landler. "Warships Move In as U.S. Readies a Range of Options for Qaddafi's Ouster." The New York Times.
(March 1, 2011 Tuesday)
Steven Erlanger. "Even a Weakened Qaddafi May Be Hard to Dislodge." The New York Times. (March 2, 2011
Wednesday)
Sharon Otterman. "Fleeing Migrant Workers Pile Up at Libya's Borders." The New York Times. (March 2, 2011
Wednesday)
D. D. Guttenplan. "A London University Wrestles With a Qaddafi Gift." The New York Times. (March 2, 2011
Wednesday Correction Appended)
Eric Lichtblau. "Arab Unrest Puts Lobbyists In Uneasy Spot." The New York Times. (March 2, 2011 Wednesday)
Kareem Fahim and David Kirkpatrick. "Libyan Rebels Said to Debate Seeking U.N. Airstrikes Against Qaddafi."
The New York Times. (March 2, 2011 Wednesday)
Elisabeth Bumiller. "Gates Plays Down Idea of U.S. Force in Libya." The New York Times. (March 2, 2011
Wednesday)
David Sanger. "With Qaddafi Cornered, Arms Deal Looms Large." The New York Times. (March 2, 2011
Wednesday)
"In the Region: Saudi Stocks Fall, and Tunisia Dissident Quits." The New York Times. (March 2, 2011 Wednesday)
*Adam Nossiter. "In Ivory Coast, Bloodshed and Misery Prompt Exodus." The New York Times. (March 2, 2011
Wednesday)
*Andy Newman. "For City's Oscar Singers, a Sharp Critic." The New York Times. (March 2, 2011 Wednesday)
David Kirkpatrick. "Qaddafi Vows to Fight to the 'Last Man'." The New York Times. (March 3, 2011 Thursday)
"How Should the U.S. Respond to the Libyan Turmoil?." The New York Times. (March 3, 2011 Thursday)
Nicholas Kristof. "Here's What We Can Do to Tackle Libya." The New York Times. (March 3, 2011 Thursday)
Kareem Fahim and Robert Worth. "Rebels Repel Qaddafi's Forces in a Key Oil City." The New York Times.
(March 3, 2011 Thursday)
*Henry Alford. "The 10 Things To Talk About This Weekend." The New York Times. (March 3, 2011 Thursday)
Nadia Shira Cohen and Sharon Otterman. "As Droves Try to Flee, Concerns Over Aid." The New York Times.
(March 3, 2011 Thursday)
James Risen. "Battle Over Bottling Plant Pitted 2 Qaddafis Against Each Other, Cables Show." The New York
Times. (March 3, 2011 Thursday)

133

David Sanger and Thom Shanker "Gates Warns of the Risks of Imposing a No-Flight Zone Over Libya." The New
York Times. (March 3, 2011 Thursday)
Steven Erlanger. "As Qaddafi Holds On, Tribes Play Key Role." The New York Times. (March 3, 2011 Thursday)
"Developments In the Region." The New York Times. (March 3, 2011 Thursday)
CHIVERS, By C. "Experts Fear Looted Libyan Arms May Find Way to Terrorists." The New York Times. (March
4, 2011 Friday).
The Associated Press. "Britain: University Chief Resigns." The New York Times. (March 4, 2011 Friday)
Marlise Simons. "International Criminal Court Begins Libya Inquiry." The New York Times. (March 4, 2011
Friday)
David Kirkpatrick. “Qaddafi is Using Ruthless Force to Hold Capital.” The New York Times. (March 4, 2011
Friday)
Marlise Simons and Alan Cowell. "Qaddafi Forces Capture 3 Dutch Aviators." The New York Times. (March 4,
2011 Friday)
Kareem Fahim. "In Libya, 'We Won.' Then a Rebel Becomes a Martyr.." The New York Times. (March 4, 2011
Friday)
"Tumult Continues Throughout the Region." The New York Times. (March 4, 2011 Friday)
Simon Romero. "Qaddafi Said to Accept Venezuelan Offer for Help." The New York Times. (March 4, 2011
Friday)
Mark Landler. "Obama Says Qaddafi Must Leave Libya Now." The New York Times. (March 4, 2011 Friday)
Landon Thomas Jr. "Libya's Hidden Wealth May Be Next Battle." The New York Times. (March 4, 2011 Friday)
Clyde Haberman. "Viewing Libya Through Prism Of Lockerbie." The New York Times. (March 4, 2011 Friday)
David Kirkpatrick. "Qaddafi Brutalizes Foes, Armed or Defenseless." The New York Times. (March 5, 2011
Saturday)
Rachel Donadio. "Libya's Unrest Risks Major Economic Toll for Italy." The New York Times. (March 5, 2011
Saturday)
Andrew Kramer. "Unrest in Libya and the Middle East Is Costing the Russian Arms Industry." The New York
Times.
D. D. Guttenplan. "Britain: Inquiry in School's Libya Links." The New York Times. (March 5, 2011 Saturday)
*Gail Collins. "Poison Pen Politics." The New York Times. (March 5, 2011 Saturday)
J. David Goodman. "Friday Prayers Lead to Mideast Protests." The New York Times. (March 5, 2011 Saturday)
Scott Sayare. "Flood of Fleeing Migrants Eases at Tunisian Border Crossing." The New York Times. (March 5,
2011 Saturday)
Dan Gonzales and Sarah Harting. "Can You Hear Libya Now?." The New York Times. (March 5, 2011 Saturday)
"More Tumult In the Region." The New York Times. (March 5, 2011 Saturday)
Thom Shanker. "Gates Ratchets Up His Campaign of Candor." The New York Times. (March 5, 2011 Saturday)
Bill Keller. “How to Lose a Country" The New York Times. (March 6, 2011 Sunday)
"Inside The Times." The New York Times. (March 6, 2011 Sunday)
David Kirkpatrick and Kareem Fahim. “Qaddafi’s Forces Hit Besieged City buy Lose a Port." The New York
Times. (March 6, 2011 Sunday)
*Edith Zimmerman. “Twitter’s New Romeo, Pinching Pants and the Bieb…" The New York Times. (March 6, 2011
Sunday)
Tom Kuntz. "Libya's Late, Great Rights Record." The New York Times. (March 6, 2011 Sunday)
"Upheaval Continues Around the Middle East." The New York Times. (March 6, 2011 Sunday)
Rachel Donadio. "Turmoil in Libya Poses Threat to Italy's Economy." The New York Times. (March 6, 2011
Sunday)
*"Say What? Feb. 27-March 5." The New York Times. (March 6, 2011 Sunday)
Mark Landler. "To Intervene. Or Not.." The New York Times. (March 6, 2011 Sunday)
*"Laugh Lines." The New York Times. (March 6, 2011 Sunday)
*David Berreby. "Names Will Hurt You." The New York Times. (March 6, 2011 Sunday)
David Kirkpatrick. "A Libyan Leader at War With Rebels, and Reality." The New York Times. (March 7, 2011
Monday)
Kareem Fahim. "Attacks by Government Forces in Libya Deal Setback to Rebel Advance." The New York Times.
(March 7, 2011 Monday)
Anthony Shadid. "Free of Qaddafi's Rule, Town Struggles to Build New Order." The New York Times. (March 7,
2011 Monday)
"Developments in the Region." The New York Times. (March 7, 2011 Monday)

134

Thom Shanker. “U.S. Weighs Options, by Air and Sea." The New York Times. (March 7, 2011 Monday Correction
Appended)
Joseph Berger. "U.S. Senators Call for No-Flight Zone Over Libya." The New York Times. (March 7, 2011
Monday)
Scott Sayare and David Kirkpatrick. “Libya War Traps Poor Immigrants at Tripoli’s Edge.” The New York Times.
(March 8, 2011 Tuesday Correction Appended).
Kareem Fahim and David Kirkpatrick. "Libyan Government Presses Assault on Oil Refinery in East and City in
West." The New York Times. (March 8, 2011 Tuesday Correction Appended)
Anthony Shadid. "Qaddafi's Warning About Islamist Infiltrators Fails to Fit Eastern Libyan City." The New York
Times. (March 8, 2011 Tuesday)
Joseph Lieberman. "Quotation of the Day." The New York Times. (March 8, 2011 Tuesday)
Mark Landler. "Obama Bolsters Relief Effort at Libyan Border." The New York Times. (March 8, 2011 Tuesday)
David Sanger and Thom Shanker. "Discord Grows On the Politics Of Intervention." The New York Times. (March
8, 2011 Tuesday)
Anthony Shadid and Kareem Fahim. “Rebels in Libya Strain to Forge a Unified Front.” The New York Times.
(March 9, 2011 Wednesday)
David Kirkpatrick. "Facing Renewed Attacks And a Range of Setbacks." The New York Times. (March 9, 2011
Wednesday)
"Around the Region: a Protest in Oman and Politics in Iran." The New York Times. (March 9, 2011 Wednesday)
Michael Cieply. "Hollywood Feels Ripples From Libya." The New York Times. (March 9, 2011 Wednesday)
"Washington's Options on Libya." The New York Times. (March 9, 2011 Wednesday)
"Migrant Workers Trapped in Libya." The New York Times Blogs (The Learning Network). (March 9, 2011
Wednesday)
"March 9: Updates on Libya's Revolt and Middle East Protests." The New York Times Blogs (The Lede). (March 9,
2011 Wednesday)
Kareem Fahim and David Kirkpatrick. "In Libya, Fierce Fight Near Site Of Refinery." The New York Times.
(March 10, 2011 Thursday)
Erica Chenoweth. "Give Peaceful Resistance a Chance." The New York Times. (March 10, 2011 Thursday)
David Kirkpatrick. "3 BBC Journalists Report Being Tortured." The New York Times. (March 10, 2011 Thursday)
Nicholas Kristof. "The Case for a No-Fly Zone." The New York Times. (March 10, 2011 Thursday)
Anthony Shadid. "At a Hospital Near the Libyan Front, Pride and a War's True Cost Are on Display." The New
York Times. (March 10, 2011 Thursday)
Hisham Matar. "Libya Calling." The New York Times. (March 10, 2011 Thursday)
James Risen and Eric Lichtblah. “Hoard of Cash Enables Qaddafi to Extend Fight." The New York Times. (March
10, 2011 Thursday)
"A Roundup of Developments In North Africa and the Mideast." The New York Times. (March 10, 2011 Thursday)
"March 10: Updates on Libya's Revolt and Middle East Protests." The New York Times Blogs (The Lede). (March
10, 2011 Thursday)
*"Corrections." The New York Times. (March 11, 2011 Friday)
Anthony Shadid. “Momentum Shift as Libyan Rebels Flee an Oil Town.” The New York Times. (March 11, 2011
Friday)
"Developments In the Mideast And Libya." The New York Times. (March 11, 2011 Friday)
David Kirkpatrick. "Qaddafi Reaches Into Schools but Some Youths Elude His Grasp." The New York Times.
(March 11, 2011 Friday)
Christine Hauser. "Disappointing Economic Reports Push Shares Down Across Globe." The New York Times.
(March 11, 2011 Friday)
Robin Pogrebin. "50 Cent Makes Donation In Response to Qaddafi Show." The New York Times. (March 11, 2011
Friday)
Elisabeth Bumiller. "NATO Steps Back From Military Intervention in Libya." The New York Times. (March 11,
2011 Friday)
David Sanger. "White House Announces Steps Against Qaddafi." The New York Times. (March 11, 2011 Friday)
Steven Lee Myers. "Clinton to Meet With Libyan Rebels." The New York Times. (March 11, 2011 Friday)
Mark Landler and Helene Cooper. "Leaning Away From Idealism." The New York Times. (March 11, 2011 Friday)
Mark Mazzetti and David Sanger. "U.S. Intelligence Chief Says Qaddafi Has Edge in Conflict." The New York
Times. (March 11, 2011 Friday)

135

Anthony Shadid and David Kirkpatrick. "Libyan Rebels Defiant but in Disarray, as Qaddafi's Forces Gain
Momentum." The New York Times. (March 12, 2011 Saturday)
Kareem Fahim. "In Libya Revolt, Youth Will Serve, or at Least Try." The New York Times. (March 12, 2011
Saturday)
"Roundup of Fighting and Protests in North Africa and the Middle East." The New York Times. (March 12, 2011
Saturday)
"Should the U.S. Intervene in Libya?." The New York Times. (March 12, 2011 Saturday)
Helene Cooper. "U.S. to Name A Liaison To the Rebels In Libya." The New York Times. (March 12, 2011
Saturday)
Stephen Castle. "European Leaders Don't Rule Out Armed Intervention in Libyan Conflict." The New York Times.
(March 12, 2011 Saturday)
Anthony Shadid. "Veering From Peaceful Models, Libya's Youth Revolt Turns Toward Chaos." The New York
Times. (March 13, 2011 Sunday)
Maureen Dowd. "In Search Of Monsters." The New York Times. (March 13, 2011 Sunday)
*Graham Bowley "Where to Stash All That Cash." The New York Times. (March 13, 2011 Sunday)
Ethan Bronner and David Sanger. "No-Flight Zone In Libya Backed By Arab League." The New York Times.
(March 13, 2011 Sunday).
"Rallies Back Jordan King, But Not Ruler of Bahrain." The New York Times. (March 13, 2011 Sunday)
Anthony Shadid. "At Crossroads, Libya Rebels Vow to Stand or Die." The New York Times. (March 14, 2011
Monday)
Jennifer Preston. "When Unrest Stirs, Bloggers Are Already in Place." The New York Times. (March 14, 2011
Monday)
Anne-Marie Slaughter. "Fiddling While Libya Burns." The New York Times. (March 14, 2011 Monday)
Ross Douthat. "Iraq Then, Libya Now." The New York Times. (March 14, 2011 Monday)
"Developments in the Region." The New York Times. (March 14, 2011 Monday)
"Developments in North Africa and Across the Middle East." The New York Times. (March 15, 2011 Tuesday)
Scott Sayare. "Unrest? Nonsense, Say Libyans at the Border." The New York Times. (March 15, 2011 Tuesday)
David Kirkpatrick. "Tribal Ties, Long Qaddafi's Strength, May Be His Undoing." The New York Times. (March 15,
2011 Tuesday)
The New York Times. (March 15, 2011 Tuesday)
David Brooks. "The Ike Phase." The New York Times. (March 15, 2011 Tuesday)
*Simon Romero. "Chavez Tries to Rally Venezuela Against a New Enemy: Breast Lifts." The New York Times.
(March 15, 2011 Tuesday)
Anthony Shadid and Kareem Fahim. "Air Attacks By Qaddafi, And an Offer Of Amnesty." The New York Times.
(March 15, 2011 Tuesday)
Steven Lee Myers. "Clinton Meets With Libyan Rebel Leader as U.S. Grapples With Role in Crisis." The New York
Times. (March 15, 2011 Tuesday)
Dan Bilesfsky. "Security Council Uncertain About Intervening in Libya." The New York Times. (March 16, 2011
Wednesday)
Jeffrey Gettleman. "Libyan Oil Buys Loyal African Allies for Qaddafi." The New York Times. (March 16, 2011
Wednesday)
Jad Mouawad. "Oil Price Falls as Investors Dump Commodities." The New York Times. (March 16, 2011
Wednesday)
Elhadi Maiga. "Quotation of the Day." The New York Times. (March 16, 2011 Wednesday)
"Conflicts And Protest In Mideast And Africa." The New York Times. (March 16, 2011 Wednesday)
Steven Erlanger. "G-8 Ministers Fail to Agree on Libya No-Flight Zone." The New York Times. (March 16, 2011
Wednesday)
Anthony Shadid. "Qaddafi Forces Routing Rebels." The New York Times. (March 16, 2011 Wednesday)
Ali Ahmida. "Why Qaddafi Has Already Lost." The New York Times. (March 17, 2011 Thursday)
Jeremy Peters. "4 Times Journalists Are Missing in Libya." The New York Times. (March 17, 2011 Thursday)
Nicholas Kristof. "Bahrain Pulls A Qaddafi." The New York Times. (March 17, 2011 Thursday)
Mark Landler and Dan Bilefsky. "Specter of Rebel Rout Helps Shift U.S. Policy on Libya." The New York Times.
(March 17, 2011 Thursday)
"Around the Region: Conflict and Reflection." The New York Times. (March 17, 2011 Thursday)
David Kirkpatrick and Kareem Fahim. "Rebels Claim Small Gains Against Qaddafi Forces." The New York Times.
(March 17, 2011 Thursday)

136

*Adam Nossiter. "In Keeping Power Under Sanctions, Leader Goes by the Book." The New York Times. (March
17, 2011 Thursday)
"What Should Be Done About Libya?." The New York Times. (March 17, 2011 Thursday)
Dan Bilefsky and Mark Landler. "MILITARY ACTION AGAINST QADDAFI IS BACKED BY U.N.." The New
York Times. (March 18, 2011 Friday)
Imam Bugaighis. "QUOTATION OF THE DAY." The New York Times. (March 18, 2011 Friday)
"A Roundup For a Region In Turmoil." The New York Times. (March 18, 2011 Friday)
Mark Mazzetti and Scott Shane. "Old Arab Ties May Harm New Ones." The New York Times. (March 18, 2011
Friday)
Michael Slackman. "Bullets Stall Youthful Push for an Arab Spring." The New York Times. (March 18, 2011
Friday Correction Appended)
Julie Creswell. "Bank Shares Pace a Rally as Group of 7 Nations Try to Stabilize Yen." The New York Times.
(March 19, 2011 Saturday)
*Laura Kasinof and Robert Worth. "Dozens Are Killed in Yemen, But Protesters Stand Ground." The New York
Times. (March 19, 2011 Saturday)
David Kirkpatrick. "Qaddafi Son Says Libya Will Release 4 Journalists." The New York Times. (March 19, 2011
Saturday)
Steven Erlanger. "France and Britain Lead Military Push on Libya." The New York Times. (March 19, 2011
Saturday)
"Tumult Around the Region." The New York Times. (March 19, 2011 Saturday)
"Inside The Times." The New York Times. (March 19, 2011 Saturday)
Eric Schmitt. "American Official Warns That Qaddafi May Lash Out With New Terrorist Attacks." The New York
Times. (March 19, 2011 Saturday)
Helene Cooper and Steven Lee Myers. "Shift by Clinton Helped Persuade President to Take a Harder Line." The
New York Times. (March 19, 2011 Saturday)
Elisabeth Bumiller and David Kirkpatrick. “Obama Threatens Military Action Against Qaddafi.” The New York
Times. (March 19, 2011 Saturday)

137

APPENDIX E
HSIRB Approval Not Needed

138

REFERENCES
Abromeit, John. 2011. Max Horkheimer and the Foundations of the Frankfurt School.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
African Union. 2011. “Communiqué of the 265th Meeting of the Peace and Security
Council.” Retrieved May 14, 2017. (http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/265thcommunique-en.pdf).
Ajl, Max. 2013. “The Fall of Libya.” Monthly Review 64(11): 55-59.
Anderson, James, and Amie D. Kincaid. 2013. “Media Subservience and Satirical
Subversiveness: The Daily Show, The Colbert Report, the Propaganda Model and
the Paradox of Parody.” Critical Studies in Media Communication 30(3):171-188.
Arsu, Sebnem, and Steven Erlanger. 2011. “Sarkosy is Criticized on a Visit to Turkey.” New
York Times, February 26, p. A-10.
Bardakçi, Selma. 2012. “Arab Spring, Libyan Winter.” Perceptions 17(4):241-245.
Baker, Edwin C. 2007. Media Concentration and Democracy: Why Ownership Matters. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Bennett, Lance, Regina Lawrence, and Steven Livingston. 2007. When the Press Fails:
Political Power and the News Media from Iraq to Katrina. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Bilefsky, Dan, and Mark Landler. 2011. “Military Action Against Qaddafi is Backed by U.N.”
New York Times, March 18, pp. A-1, A-7.
Black, Ian, and Owen Bowcott. 2011. “Libya Protests: Massacres Reported as Gaddafi
Imposes New Blackout.” The Guardian, February 18. Retrieved on April 1, 2017.
(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/18/libya-protests-massacresreported).
Boyd-Barrett, Oliver. 2004. “Judith Miller, The New York Times, and the Propaganda
Model.” Journalism Studies 5(4):435-449.
Bronner, Ethan, and David E. Sanger. 2011. “No-Flight Zone in Libya Backed by Arab
League” New York Times, March 13, pp. A-1, A-13.
Bumiller, Elizabeth. 2011. “Gates Plays Down Idea of U.S. Force in Libya.” New York Times,
March 2, p. A-11.
Buss, Terry F., and C. Richard Hofstetter. 1978. “Bias in Television News Coverage of
Political Events: A Methodological Analysis.” Journal of Broadcasting 22(4):517-30.

139

Campbell, Horace. 2013. Global NATO and the Catastrophic Failure in Libya: Lessons for
Africa in the Forging of African Unity. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Castells, Manuel. 2013. Communication Power. 2nd ed. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford
University Press.
Chicago Council on Global Affairs. 2012. Foreign Policy in the New Millennium: Results
of the 2012 Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion and U.S.
Foreign Policy.
Chomsky, Noam. 1991. Deterring Democracy. New York: Verso.
Chomsky, Noam. 2002. Revised ed. Pirates and Emperors Old and New: International
Terrorism in the Real World. Cambridge, MA: South End Press.
Chomsky, Noam. 2003. Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance. New
York: Holt.
Chomsky, Noam, and Edward S. Herman. 2004. “Reply to Kurt and Gladys Engel Lang.”
Political Communication 21(1):103-107.
Chomsky, Noam, and Edward S. Herman. 1979. The Washington Connection and Third World
Fascism: The Political Economy of Human Rights Vol. I. Boston: South End Press.
Cooper, Helene, and Mark Landler. 2011. “Obama Condemns Libya amid Stalled Evacuation.”
New York Times, February 24, p. A-12.
Cooper, Helene, and Mark Lander. 2011. “U.S. Announces Sanctions in Bid to Deter
Libya.” New York Times, February 26, pp. A-1, A-10.
Cowell, Alan. 2011a. “Protests Take Aim at Leader of Libya.” New York Times, February
17, p. A-14.
Cowell, Alan. 2011b. “Refugee Agency Reports ‘Humanitarian Emergency’ as Multitudes Flee
Libya.” New York Times, March 1, p. A-9.
Cromwell, David, and David Edwards. 2006. Guardians of Power: The Myth of the Liberal
Media. New York: Pluto Press.
Dewall, Alex. 2012. “The African Union and Libya Conflict of 2011.” Retrieved April 1, 2017.
(https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2012/12/19/the-african-union-and- the-libyaconflict-of-2011/).
Dimaggo, Anthony. 2009. When Media Goes to War: Hegemonic Discourse, Public
Opinion, and the Limits of Dissent. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Donadio, Rachel. 2011. “Italy Says Death Toll in Libya is Likely Over 1,000.” New York Times,
February 24, Retrieved April 1, 2017.
(http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/24/world/europe/24italy.html).

140

Donadio, Rachel. 2011. “Libya’s Unrest Risks Major Economic Toll for Italy.” New York
Times, March 5, Retrieved April 1, 2017.
(http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/05/world/europe/05italy.html).
Douthat, Ross. 2011. “Iraq Then, Libya Now.” New York Times, March 14, p. A-25.
Dowd, Maureen. 2011. “In Search of Monsters.” New York Times, March 13, p. WK-11.
Dowler, Kenneth. 2004. “Comparing American and Canadian Local Television Crime
Stories: A Content Analysis.” Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal
Justice/Revue Canadienne de Criminologie et de Justice Penale 46(5):573-596.
Entman, Robert. 2007. “Framing Bias: Media in the Distribution of Power.” Journal of
Communication 57(1):163-73.
Erlanger, Steven. 2011. “Even A Weakened Qaddafi May be Hard to Dislodge.” New York
Times, March 2, Retrieved April 1, 2017.
(http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/02/world/africa/02tribes.html).
Fahim, Kareem. 2011a. “In Libyan Port, Stranded Migrants Watch Hope Depart.” New York
Times, February 27, p. A-13.
Fahim, Kareem. 2011b. “Rebels in Libya Hope for Qaddafi’s Fall but Remain Fearful of an
Onslaught.” New York Times, February 24, p. A-10.
Fahim, Kareem, and David Kirkpatrick. 2011a. “In Libya, Fierce Fight Near Site of
Refinery.” New York Times, March 10, p. A-11.
Fahim, Kareem, and David Kirkpatrick. 2011b. “Libyan Government Presses Assault on Oil
Refinery in East and City in West.” New York Times, March 8, p. A-8.
Fahim, Kareem, and David Kirkpatrick. 2011c. “Libyan Rebels Repel Qaddafi Forces Near
Tripoli.” New York Times, February 25, pp. A-1, A-12.
Fahim, Kareem, and David Kirkpatrick. 2011d. “Qaddafi’s Forces are Hitting Back at Libyan
Rebels.” New York Times, March 1, p. A-1.
Fairclough, Norman, and Ruth Wodak. 1997. “Critical Discourse Analysis.” Pp. 355-365 in
Social Research Methods: A Reader edited by C. Seale. New York: Routledge.
Fitzgerald, Ruth, Hugh Campbell, and Leda Sivak. 2001. “Content Analysis of Bias in
International Print Media Coverage of Genetically Modified Food.” Rural Society
11(3): 181-196.
Forte, Maximilian. 2012. Slouching Towards Sirte: NATO’s War on Libya and Africa.
Montreal: Baraka Books.
Gettleman, Jeffery. 2011. “Libyan Oil Buys Loyal African Allies for Qaddafi.” New York Times,
March 16, pp. A-1, A-17.
141

Good, Jennifer E. 2008. “The Framing of climate change in Canadian, American, and
International Newspapers: A Media Propaganda Model Analysis.” Canadian
Journal of Communication 33(2):233-255.
Goodman, J. David. 2011. “Friday Prayers Lead to Mideast Protests.” New York Times, March 5,
Retrieved April 1, 2017.
(http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/05/world/middleeast/05unrest.html).
Goss, Brian M. 2009. “The Left-Media's Stranglehold.” Journalism Studies 10(4):455-73.
Goss, Brian M. 2013. Rebooting the Herman & Chomsky Propaganda Model in the 21st
Century New York: Peter Lang Publishing.
Herman, Edward S. 1998. “All The News Fit To Print (Part I): Structure and Background of the
New York Times.” Z-Magazine. April.
Herman, Edward S. 2003. “The Propaganda Model: A Retrospective.” Propaganda,
Politics, Power Volume 1:1-14. Retrieved on September 12, 2016.
(nature.com/reason/01/herman.pdf).
Herman, Edward S. 2014. “Slouching Towards Sirte: NATO’s War on Libya and Africa”
Z-Magazine. February.
Herman, Edward S., and Noam Chomsky. 2002. Manufacturing Consent: The Political
Economy of the Mass Media. 2nd ed. New York, NY: Pantheon.
Herman, Edward S., and David Peterson. 2011. The Politics of Genocide. New York:
Monthly Review.
Herman, Edward S., and David Peterson. 2014. Enduring Lies: The Rwandan Genocide in
Propaganda System, 20 Years Later. Baltimore, MD: The Real News Books.

the

Hall, Stuart. 1997. “Foucault and Discourse.” Pp. 345-349 in Social Research Methods: A
Reader edited by C. Seale. New York: Routledge.
Herring, Eric, and Piers Robinson. 2003. “Too Polemical or Too Critical? Chomsky on the Study
of the News Media and US Foreign Policy.” Review of International Studies 29(4):55368.
Hoffman, Marcelo. 2014. “Global NATO and the Catastrophic Failure in Libya: Lessons for
Africa in the Forging of African Unity.” New Political Science 36(3):419-422.
Holsti, Ole R. 1968. “Content Analysis” Pp. 596-692 in The Handbook of Social Psychology:
Research Methods Vol. II, 2nd ed., edited by L. Gardner & Elliot Aronson. (Eds.)
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Human Rights Watch. 2011a. “Libya: Governments Should Demand End to Unlawful
Killings.” February 20. Retrieved May 11, 2017.
142

(https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/20/libya-governments-should-demand-endunlawful-killings).
Human Rights Watch. 2011b. “Libya: Security Forces Kill 84 Over Three Days.” February 18.
Retrieved May 11, 2016. (https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/18/libya-security-forceskill-84-over-three-days).
Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. “The Clash of Civilizations.” Foreign Affairs, Summer Issue.
Johnson, Kirk A., Mark Dolan, and John Sonnett. 2011. “Speaking of Looting: An
Analysis of Racial Propaganda in National Television Coverage of Hurricane
Katrina.” The Howard Journal of Communications 22(3):302-18.
Kirkpatrick, David. 2011a. “A Libyan Leader at War With Rebels, and Reality.” New York
Times, March 7, pp. A-1, A-8.
Kirkpatrick, David. 2011b. “Qaddafi Brutalizes Foes, Armed or Defenseless.” New York Times,
March 5, pp. A-1, A-6.
Kirkpatrick, David. 2011c. “Qaddafi Vows to Fight to the ‘Last Man’.” New York Times,
Retrieved April 1, 2017 March 3.
(http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/03/world/africa/03qaddafi.html).
Kirkpatrick, David, and Mona El-Naggar. 2011a. “Son of Qaddafi Says Libya Faces Civil
War Peril.” New York Times, February 21, pp. A-1, A-7.
Kirkpatrick, David, and Mona El-Naggar. 2011b. “Qaddafi’s Forces Strike with Fury as Unrest
Grows.” New York Times, February 22, pp. A-1, A-10.
Kirkpatrick, David, and Scott Sayare. 2011. “Libya War Traps Poor Immigrants at
Tripoli’s Edge.” New York Times, March 8, pp. A-1, A-8.
Klaehn, Jeffery. 2002a. “A Critical Review and Assessment of Herman and Chomsky's
'Propaganda Model'.” European Journal of Communication 17(2):147-182.
Klaehn, Jeffery. 2002b. “Corporate Hegemony: A Critical Assessment of the Globe and Mail's
News Coverage of Near-Genocide in Occupied East Timor 1975-80.” Gazette 64(4):
301-21.
Klaehn, Jeffery, ed. 2005. Filtering the News: Essays on Herman and Chomsky’s Propaganda
Model. New York: Black Rose Books.
Klaehn, Jeffery. 2009. “The Propaganda Model: Theoretical and Methodological
Considerations.” Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 6(2):43-58.
Klaehn, Jeffrey, and Andrew Mullen. 2010a. “The Herman-Chomsky Propaganda Model:
A Critical Approach to Analyzing Mass Media Behavior.” Sociology Compass
4(4):215-29.

143

Klaehn, Jeffery, and Andrew Mullen. 2010b. “The Propaganda Model and Sociology:
Understanding the Media and Society.” Sociology Faculty Publications, Paper 5.
Kristoff, Nicholas D. 2011. “Here’s What We Can Do To Tackle Libya.” New York Times,
March 3, p. A-27.
Kuperman, Alan J. 2011. “False Pretense for War in Libya?” The Boston Globe, April 14.
Retrieved April 1, 2017.
(http://archive.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2011/04/1
4/false_pretense_for_war_in_libya/).
Landler, Mark. 2011a. “To Intervene. Or Not.” New York Times, March 6, p. WK-1.
Landler, Mark. 2011b. “U.S. Condemns Libyan Tumult but Makes no Threats.” New York Times,
February 23, p. A-10.
Landler, Mark and Dan Bilefsky. 2011. “Specter of Rebel Rout Helps Shift U.S. Policy on
Libya.” New York Times, March 17, p. A-17.
Lang, Kurt, and Gladys Engel Lang. 2004a. “Noam Chomsky and the Manufacture of
Consent of American Foreign Policy.” Political Communication 21(1):91-101.
Lang, Kurt, and Gladys Engel Lang. 2004b. “Response to Herman and Chomsky.”
Political Communication 21(1):109-111.
McChesney, Robert W. 2008. The Political Economy of the News: Enduring Issues,
Enduring Dilemmas. New York: Monthly Review.
Matar, Hisham. 2011. “Libya Calling.” New York Times, March 10, p. A-31.
Mazzetti, Mark and Eric Schmitt. 2011. “C.I.A. Agents in Libya Aid Airstrikes and Meet
Rebels.” New York Times, March 30, Retrieved May 18, 2017.
(http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/31/world/africa/31intel.html?_r=4&src=mv&)
Mirkovic, Damir. 2014. “Humanitarian Imperialism in Libya: Another Review of Slouching
Towards Sirte.” Review of Slouching Towards Sirte: NATO’s War on Libya and Africa
by Maximilian Forte. ZeroAnthropology.net Retrieved April 8, 2017.
(https://zeroanthropology.net/2014/03/13/humanitarian-imperialism-in-libya-anotherreview-of-slouching-towards-sirte/).
Moynihan, Colin. 2011. “Libya’s U.N. Diplomats Break With Qaddafi.” New York Times,
February 22. Retrieved January 5, 2017.
(http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/world/africa/22nations.html?_r=0).
Mullen, Andrew. 2010. “Twenty Years On: The Second Order Prediction of the HermanChomsky Propaganda Model.” Media, Culture, and Society 32(4):215-29.
Neuman, Lawrence W. 2003. Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative
Methods. 5th ed. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
New York Times. 2011a. “Libya’s Butcher.” February 23, p. A-22.
144

New York Times. 2011b. “Libya Convulses: What Can be Done?” February 24, p. A-26.
New York Times. 2011c. “Should the U.S. Intervene in Libya?” March 12, p. A-22.
New York Times. 2011d. “Stopping Qaddafi.” February 25, p. A-26.
New York Times. 2011e. “The Rebellion in Libya: A View From Italy.” February 24.
Retrieved April 1, 2017.
(http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/25/opinion/lweb25libya.html).
New York Times. 2011f. “Washington’s Options on Libya.” March 9, p. A-26.
New York Times. 2011g. “What Should Be Done About Libya?” March 17, p. A-34.
Otterman, Sharon. 2011. “Fleeing Migrant Workers Pile Up at Libya’s Border.” New York
Times, March 2, p. A-10.
Pedro, Joan. 2011a. “The Propaganda Model in the early 21st Century, Part I.” International
Journal of Communication 5:1865-1905.
Pedro, Joan. 2011b. “The Propaganda Model in the early 21st century, Part II.” International
Journal of Communication 5:1906-26.
Philpot, Robin. 2013. Rwanda and the New Scramble for Africa: From Tragedy to Useful
Imperial Fiction. Montreal: Baraka Books.
Prashad, Vijay. 2012. Arab Spring, Libyan Winter. Oakland, California: AK Press.
Protess, Ben. 2011. “Stocks Worldwide Fall and Oil Spikes on Unrest in Libya.” New York
Times, February 22nd, pp. B-1, B-7.
Radio Netherlands Worldwide. 2011. “HRW: No Mercenaries in Eastern Libya.” March 2.
Retrieved April 1, 2017. (https://www.rnw.org/archive/hrw-no-mercenaries-easternlibya).
Riffkin, Rebecca. 2015. “Americans’ Trust in Media Remains at Historical Low,”
Gallup, September 28, Retrieved on September 12, 2016.
(http://www.gallup.com/poll/185927/americans-trust-media-remains-historicallow.aspx).
Robertson, J. W. (2006) “Illuminating or Dimming Down? A Survey of UK Television News
Coverage. Fifth Estate Online. International Journal of Radical Mass Media Criticism.
Retrieved on September 12, 2016.
(https://www.researchgate.net/publication/252509441_Illuminating_or_Dimming
_Down_A_Survey_of_UK_Television_News_Coverage).
Schlesinger, Philip. 1989. “From Production to Propaganda.” Culture and Society 11(3):283306.
Schudson, Michael. 2011. The Sociology of News. 2nd ed. New York: Norton.
145

Shadid, Anthony. 2011a. “Clashes in Libya Worsen as Army Crushes Dissent.” New York
Times, February 19, pp. A-1, A-10.
Shadid, Anthony. 2011b. “Momentum Shift as Libyan Rebels Flee an Oil Town.” New York
Times, March 11, pp. A-1, A-13.
Shadid, Anthony. 2011c. “Qaddafi Forces Routing Rebels.” The New York Times, March 16, pp.
A-1, A-18.
Shadid, Anthony and Kareem Fahim. 2011. “Air Attacks by Qaddafi, and an Offer of
Amnesty.” New York Times, March 15, pp. A-4, A-16.
Sierra, Francisco, and Miguel M. Vazquez, eds. 2006. La Construccion del Consenso.
Revistando el modelo de propaganda de Noam Chomsky y Edward S. Herman.
Madrid: Sranda.
Simons, Marlise. 2011. “International Criminal Court Begins Libya Inquiry.” The New York
Times, March 4, Retrieved March 15.
(http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/world/africa/04hague.html)
Smolski, Andrew. 2016. “Noam Chomsky: This is the Propaganda System that Corporate
Media Uses to Dominate Society.” Counterpunch. April 14. Retrieved April 3, 2017.
(http://www.alternet.org/activism/noam-chomsky-propaganda-system-corporate-mediauses-dominate-society).
Sparks, C. 2007. “Extending and Refining the Propaganda Model.” Westminster Papers in
Communication and Culture 4(2):68-84.
U.S. Department of Defense. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) 2011
“DOD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and Adm. Mullen from the Pentagon.” News
Transcript, March 1.
United Nations. 2011. “Security Council Press Statement on Libya.” February 22.
Retrieved May 14, 2017. (https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10180.doc.htm).
United Nations Security Council. 2011. Resolution 1973. March 17. New York: United
Nations Organization.
Whiten, Jon. 2007. “If News from Iraq is bad, It’s Coming From U.S. Officials.” Extra!
Retrieved September 12, 2016. (http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1167).
Wyatt, Edward. 2011. “Security Council Refers Libya to Criminal Court,” The New York Times,
February 27, p. A-14.

146

